fix(cli,core,studio): close 15 review findings + 2 R5 blockers

R5 blockers
- Negative install-state latch was cached for the process lifetime, but
  only `true` is monotonic across processes. A long-lived preview server
  held a stale `false` and could re-enrol after another process tripped
  the breaker. Only the positive is cached now; `false` re-reads.
- The real breaker writer used writeConfig(), which collapses
  {ok:true, mirrored:false} to success, so a run that mirrored nothing
  reported done with the latch only on the erasable store. It consumes
  writeConfigWithResult and retries until both stores carry it.

Bucketing integrity
- Storage-restricted Studio profiles all bucketed on the literal
  "anonymous": computed against the shipped hash, 100% of them were
  enrolled in calibration-50 rather than 50%, and they merged into one
  PostHog person. Per-session random id instead — persists nothing.
- bucketSeed had read/write authority backwards: install-state is
  write-once authoritative, but readConfig took config.json's blindly, so
  the stores could hold different seeds until a re-mint flipped every
  cohort. Merged on read, like the latch.
- An unwritable ~/.hyperframes with no config.json re-minted per call,
  re-rolling the seed on every command, and the "cohorts will not be
  stable" warning was unreachable on that path.
- A corrupt PRE-MOVE state file was never deleted, so a machine reset
  with `rm -rf ~/.hyperframes` reported predecessorFound/stateFileCorrupt
  forever — poisoning the exact metric this work exists to produce.

Opt-out honoring
- CLI canary decisions memoized per process, so `hyperframes telemetry
  disable` during a running preview server was ignored for hours while
  the server kept serving pre-opt-out decisions. The memo is keyed on the
  telemetry posture.
- shouldTrack() memoized, contradicting policy.ts's documented "not
  memoized" contract that policy.test.ts asserts.
- The Studio override path resolved the bucket unit eagerly as an
  argument, minting and PERSISTING a tracking id for an opted-out profile
  — a value evaluateCanary discards unread.
- Storage reads could throw out of telemetry into a post-commit catch
  block, reporting an already-committed edit as failed.
- readConfig printed an unsilenceable stderr warning on every invocation
  for installs that opted out of telemetry entirely.

Host split
- isLoopbackHost rejected 0.0.0.0, so the documented
  HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST LAN mode silently lost CLI→Studio identity
  stitching and split one user across two PostHog persons. Identity is
  now allowed when the operator explicitly opted into LAN binding.
- Corrected the comment claiming the guard refuses spoofed Hosts: a
  non-browser client sets Host freely. It is a browser DNS-rebinding
  mitigation, not access control, and now says so.

Semantics and test hygiene
- percentage:100 did not mean everyone — exclude and no_unit_id sat above
  the fast path, so the registry's "delete the entry at 100" step was an
  unstaged flip for CI and seedless installs.
- CLI cohort adoption returned before evaluateCanary, dropping Studio's
  own webdriver exclusion.
- overdueCanaries() was asserted against wall-clock time, so the whole
  core suite would go red on 2026-09-15 for every unrelated PR; and `>`
  against midnight made a canary overdue ON its sunset date.
- Statistical assertions ran on unseeded randomUUID() populations tight
  enough to fail ~1 run in 200. Seeded.

Also: broke a config -> policy -> transport -> config import cycle by
moving POSTHOG_API_KEY to a leaf module.

Tests: 2347 CLI (bundle absent), 3153 Studio, 1450 core. Fault injection
covers the latch, seed authority, LAN identity, webdriver exclusion and
the anonymous-bucket fix. Two pre-existing tests asserted behaviour these
findings identify as wrong (shouldTrack memoization, 100%-excludes-CI)
and were rewritten with the reasoning stated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Vance Ingalls
2026-07-31 01:27:37 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 5e2a9432f1
commit 3f69a2c635
24 changed files with 648 additions and 109 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
// CLI → Studio telemetry identity seeding (Layer 1). Verifies the server only
// hands the browser a distinct id when CLI telemetry is enabled, and passes
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ const {
buildStudioHeadScripts,
isLoopbackHost,
buildStudioHeadScriptsForHost,
identityAllowed,
} = await import("./telemetryIdentity.js");
describe("resolveCliTelemetryDistinctId", () => {
@@ -251,3 +252,49 @@ describe("buildStudioHeadScriptsForHost — Host split", () => {
expect(buildStudioHeadScriptsForHost(ENV, "localhost")).toContain("__HF_STUDIO_ENV__");
});
});
describe("identityAllowed — loopback-bound vs explicitly LAN-bound", () => {
const original = process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"];
afterEach(() => {
if (original === undefined) delete process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"];
else process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"] = original;
});
describe("loopback-bound (the default)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
delete process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"];
});
it.each(["localhost:5173", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]:3000"])("allows %s", (host) => {
expect(identityAllowed(host)).toBe(true);
});
// A rebinding page cannot forge Host, so it arrives carrying its own name.
it.each(["evil.example.com", "127.0.0.1.evil.com", "192.168.1.10:3000", undefined])(
"refuses %s",
(host) => {
expect(identityAllowed(host)).toBe(false);
},
);
});
describe("explicitly LAN-bound", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"] = "0.0.0.0";
});
// The mode this regressed: browsing your own LAN-exposed Studio lost the
// CLI stitch entirely, so the same human became two PostHog persons.
it.each(["0.0.0.0:3000", "192.168.1.10:3000", "my-dev-box.local:3000"])(
"allows %s once the operator opted into LAN exposure",
(host) => {
expect(identityAllowed(host)).toBe(true);
},
);
it("still allows loopback in that mode", () => {
expect(identityAllowed("localhost:3000")).toBe(true);
});
});
});