feat(core): sanitize rich text on the way into a composition (#3141)

* feat(core): sanitize rich text on the way into a composition

Studio's patch vocabulary was inline-style, attribute, html-attribute and
text-content. text-content assigns textContent, and the text-field model
escapes markup on the way out and refuses a change in child structure, so a
styled span had no route into a composition file.

Adds a rich-text operation with one, guarded by a single sanitizer called on
both ends of the trip: in the browser so the preview shows what will be
saved, and on the server because that is where the file is written. Tags and
style properties are a small allowlist, and an unexpected tag loses its
formatting rather than its words. Spans an edit adds get their ids in the
same write, so a follow-up write cannot race it.

No UI yet — this is the persistence contract the editor is built on.

* fix(core): document and test the sanitizer boundary

* fix(core): harden rich text sanitizer traversal
This commit is contained in:
Miguel Ángel
2026-08-11 02:03:47 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent fceb376551
commit 636dc042a7
8 changed files with 731 additions and 3 deletions
+231
View File
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/**
* What inline formatting a composition file is allowed to receive.
*
* Editing text in the Studio preview can style a run of characters, which means
* markup now travels from a contenteditable element into a file on disk. This
* module is the only thing deciding what may make that trip. The server write
* boundary applies it unconditionally before returning composition bytes.
*
* One module rather than two implementations. Two would drift, and the drift
* would be a security bug rather than an inconsistency.
*
* It works on an element's subtree in place. Untrusted markup must be parsed in
* an inert document before this function receives it.
*/
/** Tags an inline text edit may contain. Everything else is not text styling. */
const FORMATTING_TAGS = new Set(["SPAN", "B", "STRONG", "I", "EM", "U", "BR"]);
/**
* Style properties a formatting tag may carry.
*
* This was paint-only, on the reasoning that a property which moves or resizes
* text would let an edit inside one element change the composition's layout,
* and layout is the design panel's job. The reasoning was wrong about who was
* being restricted: the design panel writes exactly these typography
* properties onto exactly these spans, as its text layers. Sanitizing them
* away did not stop text from changing layout, it deleted the layout the user
* had already set — colouring one word silently dropped a sibling layer's font
* size. The line that matters is the one below, values that reach outside the
* stylesheet, not which of its own properties the editor is allowed to keep.
*/
const FORMATTING_STYLE_PROPS = new Set([
"color",
"background-color",
"font-weight",
"font-style",
"text-decoration-line",
"font-family",
"font-size",
"letter-spacing",
"line-height",
// Paints the glyph fill and inherits, so an ancestor that sets it wins over
// any `color` below. The editor mirrors a run's colour into it when that is
// happening, and stripping it here would put the colour back to invisible.
"-webkit-text-fill-color",
]);
// Keep this list limited to properties whose grammar cannot fetch a resource.
// Adding a URL-consuming property also requires decoding CSS escapes before
// UNSAFE_VALUE can be a sufficient guard.
/**
* Attributes a formatting tag may carry.
*
* The identity a text layer is tracked by. Everything else is dropped: a
* contenteditable is a paste target, and an event handler or an id that
* shadows a composition's own is not formatting.
*/
const FORMATTING_ATTRS = new Set(["data-hf-text-key", "data-hf-id"]);
/**
* What those attributes are allowed to look like: a bare token, nothing else.
* `:` is deliberate because text keys use selector-like tokens such as
* `child:1`; neither allowed attribute is interpreted as a URL.
*/
const SAFE_ATTR_VALUE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_:-]+$/;
/**
* Tags dropped whole rather than unwrapped.
*
* Everything else is unwrapped, so an unexpected tag costs the user its
* formatting and not their words. These are the ones whose contents are not
* words: unwrapping a script would turn its source into visible text.
*/
const OPAQUE_TAGS = new Set([
"SCRIPT",
"STYLE",
"TEMPLATE",
"NOSCRIPT",
"IFRAME",
"OBJECT",
"EMBED",
"SVG",
"MATH",
]);
/** Anything that reaches out of the stylesheet, in a property that should not. */
const UNSAFE_VALUE = /url\(|expression\(|javascript:|vbscript:|@import|<\//i;
const ELEMENT_NODE = 1;
const TEXT_NODE = 3;
type SanitizerFrame =
| { phase: "visit"; node: Node }
| { phase: "sanitize"; element: Element; tag: string };
export function isRichTextFormattingTag(tagName: string): boolean {
return FORMATTING_TAGS.has(tagName.toUpperCase());
}
function isElementNode(node: Node): node is Element {
return node.nodeType === ELEMENT_NODE;
}
/**
* Strip everything but allowed formatting from an element's contents, in place.
*
* The element itself is never touched, only what is inside it. Callers own the
* element, and it is the composition's, not the editor's, to rewrite.
*
* When the children came from untrusted markup, callers must parse that markup
* into an inert document (for example linkedom or a detached DOMParser document)
* first. Never assign untrusted HTML to a live DOM element and then call this
* function: active content can run before sanitization begins.
*/
export function sanitizeRichTextChildren(parent: Element): void {
const pending: SanitizerFrame[] = Array.from(
parent.childNodes,
(node): SanitizerFrame => ({ phase: "visit", node }),
).reverse();
// Post-order without recursion: adversarially deep pasted markup must not
// exhaust either the server or browser call stack.
for (let frame = pending.pop(); frame; frame = pending.pop()) {
if (frame.phase === "sanitize") {
if (!FORMATTING_TAGS.has(frame.tag)) unwrap(frame.element);
else stripAttributes(frame.element);
continue;
}
const child = frame.node;
if (child.nodeType === TEXT_NODE) continue;
if (!isElementNode(child)) {
// Comments and processing instructions are neither words nor formatting.
child.parentNode?.removeChild(child);
continue;
}
const element = child;
const tag = element.tagName.toUpperCase();
if (OPAQUE_TAGS.has(tag)) {
element.parentNode?.removeChild(element);
continue;
}
pending.push({ phase: "sanitize", element, tag });
for (const descendant of Array.from(element.childNodes).reverse()) {
pending.push({ phase: "visit", node: descendant });
}
}
}
/** Replace an element with its own children, keeping their order and place. */
function unwrap(element: Element): void {
const parent = element.parentNode;
if (!parent) return;
while (element.firstChild) parent.insertBefore(element.firstChild, element);
parent.removeChild(element);
}
/** Leave a kept tag with a filtered style attribute and its identity, no more. */
function stripAttributes(element: Element): void {
const style = element.getAttribute("style");
for (const name of Array.from(element.getAttributeNames())) {
const value = element.getAttribute(name) ?? "";
if (FORMATTING_ATTRS.has(name.toLowerCase()) && SAFE_ATTR_VALUE.test(value)) continue;
element.removeAttribute(name);
}
if (style === null) return;
const safe = filterStyle(style);
if (safe) element.setAttribute("style", safe);
else element.removeAttribute("style");
}
/** Keep only the allowlisted declarations, and only if their values are inert. */
function filterStyle(style: string): string {
return splitDeclarations(style)
.map((declaration) => {
const colon = declaration.indexOf(":");
if (colon === -1) return null;
const property = declaration.slice(0, colon).trim().toLowerCase();
const value = declaration.slice(colon + 1).trim();
if (!FORMATTING_STYLE_PROPS.has(property)) return null;
if (!value || UNSAFE_VALUE.test(value)) return null;
return `${property}: ${value}`;
})
.filter((declaration): declaration is string => declaration !== null)
.join("; ");
}
function isQuoteDelimiter(char: string): char is "'" | '"' {
return char === "'" || char === '"';
}
function nextParenthesisDepth(depth: number, char: string): number {
if (char === "(") return depth + 1;
if (char === ")") return Math.max(0, depth - 1);
return depth;
}
function isDeclarationSeparator(char: string, depth: number, quote: "'" | '"' | null): boolean {
return char === ";" && depth === 0 && quote === null;
}
/**
* Split on the semicolons that separate declarations, not the ones inside a
* value. `color: rgb(1, 2, 3)` is one declaration however many separators its
* value contains.
*/
function splitDeclarations(style: string): string[] {
const declarations: string[] = [];
let current = "";
let depth = 0;
let quote: "'" | '"' | null = null;
for (const char of style) {
if (char === quote) quote = null;
else if (quote === null && isQuoteDelimiter(char)) quote = char;
else if (isDeclarationSeparator(char, depth, quote)) {
declarations.push(current);
current = "";
continue;
} else if (quote === null) {
depth = nextParenthesisDepth(depth, char);
}
current += char;
}
if (current.trim()) declarations.push(current);
return declarations;
}