fix(core): block symlink-based path escape in studio-api isSafePath (#1397)

* fix(core): block symlink-based path escape in studio-api isSafePath

path.resolve() collapses ./.. but does not dereference symlinks, so a
symlink living inside the project dir but pointing outside it (e.g.
project/link -> /etc) passed the prefix check, letting a downstream
read/write/stat follow it to a file outside the project root. The `..`
traversal case was already blocked; symlink traversal was the gap.

Canonicalize both base and target with realpathSync before comparing.
The target may not exist yet (new-file writes), so canonicalize the
deepest existing ancestor and re-attach the trailing not-yet-existing
segments, which cannot be symlinks at check time. Fail closed if base is
unresolvable.

Adds safePath.test.ts covering: in-base allow, not-yet-existing write
target, `..` escape, existing-file-through-symlink escape, write-target
under a symlinked parent, file-symlink escape, in-base symlink allow,
symlinked-base canonicalization, and base-missing fail-closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(core,cli): route render + play composition paths through isSafePath

Review on #1397 found a third call site with the same vulnerable
startsWith pattern. Apply Rule 2: fix every site sharing the contract
(gate an attacker-influenced path before a symlink-following fs op).

- studio-api routes/render.ts: body.composition (from c.req.json()) was
  checked with `resolved.startsWith(resolve(project.dir) + sep)`, which
  doesn't dereference symlinks — an in-project symlink to an external
  target escaped the project root. Now uses isSafePath().
- cli commands/play.ts: the `/composition/*` server route used
  `filePath.startsWith(project.dir)` with no trailing-separator guard, so
  both a sibling dir sharing the prefix (`<dir>-evil`) and symlink escapes
  passed. Now uses isSafePath() via @hyperframes/core/studio-api (the same
  lazy-import pattern commands/validate.ts already uses).

Tests: render.test.ts gains a "composition path safety" block (in-base
allow, `..` reject, in-project-symlink-to-outside reject, in-project
symlink staying inside allow). The shared render test adapter now points
at a real dir since isSafePath fails closed on an unresolvable base
(production project dirs always exist on disk).

Not in this change: compiler/htmlBundler.ts has the same class at two
sites (safePath helper + inline CSS @import check), but the compiler sits
below studio-api in the dependency graph and can't import isSafePath
without a backwards edge; that fix needs the helper promoted to a neutral
module and is tracked as a follow-up. renderArgs.ts / videoFrameExtractor.ts
carry the trailing-sep guard and a local-CLI/engine-internal threat model.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(core): promote isSafePath to a shared module + harden htmlBundler

Per review on #1397: extend the symlink-escape fix to the compiler, and
remove the duplicated path-safety logic.

- Move isSafePath to packages/core/src/safePath.ts (a neutral package-root
  module). studio-api/helpers/safePath.ts re-exports it for back-compat
  (keeping walkDir), and it's now exported from the core entrypoint so
  non-studio-api layers can use it. compiler/ sits below studio-api in the
  dep graph, so it could not import the helper from its old home without a
  backwards edge — the promotion removes that constraint.
- compiler/htmlBundler.ts: route both containment checks (the safePath
  helper and the inline CSS @import check) through isSafePath. The bundler
  reads+inlines these files, so an in-project symlink pointing outside the
  root would otherwise bake external content into the output. All callers
  already skip on a null/false result, so nothing is read on rejection.

Tests: safePath.test.ts moves with the impl; htmlBundler.test.ts gains a
case proving an in-project sub-composition script is inlined while a
script reached through an escaping symlink is not (positive control + leak
assertion).

Deferred (tracked for a dedicated follow-up, see PR thread): the
relative()-based isPathInside family (core/compiler/assetPaths,
producer/services/fileServer, producer/utils/paths and their callers in
the render pipeline) is symlink-blind in the same way, and engine
videoFrameExtractor's asset resolver needs a caller-side gate (its http
downloads land outside the project root, so a single-root check is wrong).
Both are regression-sensitive render-pipeline surfaces that warrant their
own focused, well-tested pass. renderArgs.ts is intentionally left: it is
filesystem-free by design (injected stat) and its threat model is the
user's own --composition CLI arg.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(core): hedge symlink tests for Windows + copy before reverse (review nits)

Addresses Via's non-blocking review notes on #1397:

- Wrap every symlinkSync in the new tests with a tryCreateSymlink helper that
  returns false (and the test early-returns) when creation throws, mirroring the
  preview.test.ts convention. Non-symlink-privileged Windows runners no longer
  risk crashing the suite on EPERM.
- safePath.ts: `[...trailing].reverse()` instead of mutating `trailing` in place —
  harmless today (single return) but future-proof against a looping edit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
James Russo
2026-06-12 20:08:35 -07:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 3bcab3dc29
commit 953bab319b
9 changed files with 343 additions and 20 deletions
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
import { resolve, sep, join } from "node:path";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { readdirSync } from "node:fs";
/** Reject paths that escape the project directory. */
export function isSafePath(base: string, resolved: string): boolean {
const norm = resolve(base) + sep;
return resolved.startsWith(norm) || resolved === resolve(base);
}
// `isSafePath` lives at the package root so non-studio-api layers (compiler,
// CLI, engine) can share it without a backwards dependency on studio-api.
// Re-exported here for back-compat with existing `../helpers/safePath.js` imports.
export { isSafePath } from "../../safePath.js";
const IGNORE_DIRS = new Set([".thumbnails", ".hyperframes", "node_modules", ".git"]);
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, symlinkSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { VALID_CANVAS_RESOLUTIONS } from "../../core.types";
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ function createAdapter(
): { adapter: StudioApiAdapter; rendersDir: string } {
const adapter: StudioApiAdapter = {
listProjects: () => [],
resolveProject: async (id: string) => ({ id, dir: "/tmp/proj" }),
// Use a real, existing dir: isSafePath() canonicalizes the project dir with
// realpath and fails closed if it doesn't exist (real projects always do).
resolveProject: async (id: string) => ({ id, dir: tmpdir() }),
bundle: async () => null,
lint: async () => ({ findings: [] }),
runtimeUrl: "/api/runtime.js",
@@ -261,3 +263,94 @@ describe("POST /projects/:id/render — fps wire format", () => {
}
});
});
describe("POST /projects/:id/render — composition path safety", () => {
const tmpDirs: string[] = [];
function buildAppWithProjectDir(spy: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>): {
app: Hono;
projectDir: string;
} {
const projectDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-render-proj-"));
const rendersDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-render-out-"));
tmpDirs.push(projectDir, rendersDir);
const adapter: StudioApiAdapter = {
listProjects: () => [],
resolveProject: async (id: string) => ({ id, dir: projectDir }),
bundle: async () => null,
lint: async () => ({ findings: [] }),
runtimeUrl: "/api/runtime.js",
rendersDir: () => rendersDir,
startRender: (opts) => {
spy(opts);
return { id: opts.jobId, status: "rendering", progress: 0, outputPath: opts.outputPath };
},
};
const app = new Hono();
registerRenderRoutes(app, adapter);
return { app, projectDir };
}
afterEach(() => {
for (const d of tmpDirs) rmSync(d, { recursive: true, force: true });
tmpDirs.length = 0;
});
async function postComposition(app: Hono, composition: string): Promise<Response> {
return app.request("http://localhost/projects/demo/render", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ fps: 30, quality: "standard", format: "mp4", composition }),
});
}
// Mirror the repo convention (preview.test.ts): skip symlink cases on
// non-symlink-privileged Windows runners rather than crash the suite.
function tryCreateSymlink(target: string, path: string, type: "dir" | "file"): boolean {
try {
symlinkSync(target, path, type);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
it("accepts a composition path inside the project directory", async () => {
const spy = vi.fn();
const { app } = buildAppWithProjectDir(spy);
const res = await postComposition(app, "scenes/intro.html");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it("rejects a `..` traversal in the composition path", async () => {
const spy = vi.fn();
const { app } = buildAppWithProjectDir(spy);
const res = await postComposition(app, "../../etc/passwd");
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects a composition reached through an in-project symlink pointing outside the project", async () => {
const spy = vi.fn();
const { app, projectDir } = buildAppWithProjectDir(spy);
const external = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-render-external-"));
tmpDirs.push(external);
writeFileSync(join(external, "secret.html"), "<html></html>");
if (!tryCreateSymlink(external, join(projectDir, "link"), "dir")) return;
const res = await postComposition(app, "link/secret.html");
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("allows a composition reached through an in-project symlink that stays inside the project", async () => {
const spy = vi.fn();
const { app, projectDir } = buildAppWithProjectDir(spy);
mkdirSync(join(projectDir, "real"));
writeFileSync(join(projectDir, "real", "scene.html"), "<html></html>");
if (!tryCreateSymlink(join(projectDir, "real"), join(projectDir, "alias"), "dir")) return;
const res = await postComposition(app, "alias/scene.html");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
});
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
import type { Hono } from "hono";
import { streamSSE } from "hono/streaming";
import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
import { join, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
import type { StudioApiAdapter, RenderJobState } from "../types.js";
import { VALID_CANVAS_RESOLUTIONS, parseFps, type CanvasResolution } from "../../core.types.js";
import { isSafePath } from "../helpers/safePath.js";
const VALID_RESOLUTIONS = new Set<string>(VALID_CANVAS_RESOLUTIONS);
@@ -80,7 +81,10 @@ export function registerRenderRoutes(api: Hono, adapter: StudioApiAdapter): void
let composition: string | undefined;
if (typeof body.composition === "string" && body.composition.length > 0) {
const resolved = resolve(project.dir, body.composition);
if (!resolved.startsWith(resolve(project.dir) + sep)) {
// `body.composition` is attacker-controlled (from c.req.json()). isSafePath
// dereferences symlinks so an in-project symlink pointing outside the root
// can't smuggle the render target out of the project dir.
if (!isSafePath(project.dir, resolved)) {
return c.json({ error: "composition path must be within the project directory" }, 400);
}
composition = body.composition;