Commit Graph
13 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
James RussoandClaude Opus 5.5 1c3fcf4d23 feat(telemetry): identify signed-in CLI users by their HyperFrames user id, and say signed-in usage is not anonymous (#6703)
* docs(telemetry): say signed-in usage is linked to your account, not anonymous

After hyperframes auth login the CLI sends a PostHog $identify with the
account email (username as fallback) and merges the install's earlier
anonymous usage; media-use does the same when it finds a signed-in
account. Several places still called all telemetry anonymous. Say it is
anonymous until you sign in, in the CLI reference (media-use, --skill,
feedback, events, telemetry), the hyperframes-cli skill references, and
the CLI help and notice strings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): identify signed-in CLI users by their HyperFrames user id

The CLI and media-use identified a signed-in install by account email, so
CLI usage landed on a different PostHog person than the same account in
the HyperFrames web app, which keys on toUUID(username). Identify by that
same sha256-derived id instead, and $set email plus heygen_username on the
person. heygen_username is the cross-project join column for the Snowflake
event table (HeyGen's own project stores it as `name`). An account with no
username still falls back to the lowercased email.

Notices and docs now say usage is keyed on an id derived from the username
with email and username stored on it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(telemetry): trim comments to the package's comment share

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): put heygen_username on every event while signed in

The Snowflake event sync may not carry PostHog person properties, so a
$set alone does not let an event row join across projects. The CLI now
adds the signed-in HeyGen username (raw, from ~/.heygen/credentials) to
every event and drops it once the credentials hold no user; media-use
does the same on each event it sends.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: count auth/paths.ts as an edit-accuracy bench input

Telemetry now imports it to read the signed-in username.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): stat and read the credentials through one file handle

CodeQL flagged the stat-then-read as a file system race.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): key signed-in events on the account id; fix stale anonymity copy

Genesis review on #6703:
- telemetry --help listed 'Any personally identifiable information' as
  never collected, and media-use's meta.md still said anonymous.
- Installs already identified by email under an older CLI never merge
  into the new person, so send signed-in events with distinct_id = the
  account id (back to the install id after logout), in the CLI and in
  media-use, and stop claiming earlier usage always merges.
- A user block with no credential no longer counts as signed in.
- A UUID-shaped username passes through unhashed, as on the web.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-29 02:57:48 +00:00
Miguel Ángel cf1b04bb71 feat(cli): accept host-managed HeyGen access tokens (#5177)
* fix(auth): accept host-managed HeyGen access tokens

* fix(auth): share environment header validation

* docs(auth): condense credential resolver guidance

* fix(auth): report the account a browser login just signed in

Identify the account from the tokens the login issued, not a fresh credential
lookup that an environment token or API key outranks.

* docs(auth): list the host access token in the CLI credential order

* fix(cli): name a rejected host access token on publish

Publish told a host-token user to log in again, which cannot help while the token outranks the login.

* docs(auth): show the media credential order main resolves

* fix(cli): warn at logout that a host access token still signs commands

One map of environment credential variables, owned by the resolver, now feeds the logout warning and both publish messages.

* docs(auth): scope the media credential order to the audio scripts

* refactor(cli): read every env credential name from the resolver's map
2026-10-08 10:33:57 +00:00
Miguel Ángel de9bf487d4 fix(cli): publish with a refused login refreshes or asks you to log in again (#4964)
* fix(cli): publish with an expired login stops and asks you to log in again

The server now answers 401 to a rejected credential instead of publishing
anonymously, so the CLI says so and drops the warning for the old fallback.

* fix(cli): publish refreshes an expired login first, and names a rejected API key

An expired access token with a refresh token is refreshed (the cloud commands
already do) instead of being sent and refused. Only the requests that carry the
credential map a 401; an environment API key is named, since logging in would
not replace it.

* fix(cli): an expired login without a refresh token asks you to log in again

A stored login past expiry with no refresh token now resolves as
LOGIN_EXPIRED instead of "not signed in", so publish stops with the
re-login message before sending anything. A signed-in publish that the
server answers with an unclaimed project fails the same way and links nothing.

* fix(cli): keep the resolver comment share at its base

* fix(cli): an API-key publish still succeeds, and only an owned publish is linked

* fix(cli): --update and --space refuse an API key instead of being ignored

* fix(cli): publish uploads with the credential it checked, so --update and --space are never dropped

* fix(cli): a login that expires during the bake is refreshed, not reported as expired

* fix(cli): an expired login that cannot refresh stops publish before anything is sent

* fix(cli): a token refresh never writes over a login that replaced it

* fix(cli): a refresh that cannot read the saved login reports that, not a changed login
2026-10-04 04:56:23 +00:00
Miguel Ángel 08934bfd55 revert(cli): keep HeyGen API traffic on stable prod (#3202)
* Revert "fix(cli): route HeyGen API calls through canary (#3201)"

This reverts commit 5545521556.

* fix(cli): remove remaining EF canary routes
2026-08-10 21:41:21 -04:00
Miguel Ángel 5545521556 fix(cli): route HeyGen API calls through canary (#3201) 2026-08-10 21:26:46 -04:00
Miguel Ángel b9233525b2 feat(cli): add device authorization login (#2836)
* feat(cli): add device authorization login

* refactor(auth): simplify device authorization flow

* fix(cli): harden device authorization flow

* refactor(cli): simplify device auth validation tests
2026-08-04 20:36:42 -07:00
James 3aa2404747 refactor(cli): centralize process lifecycle 2026-07-20 09:04:03 -07:00
Miguel Ángel 746b6d5b75 feat(cli): tag HeyGen API calls with X-HeyGen-Client-Source (#2368)
Send `X-HeyGen-Client-Source: hyperframes` from buildAuthHeaders on every
HeyGen API call (both OAuth and API-key), so backend billing meta can
isolate hyperframes CLI usage. The single buildAuthHeaders chokepoint covers
the core CLI + cloud client. Mirrors the media-use tagging; the OAuth-only
X-HeyGen-Source cli free-gate header is unchanged.
2026-07-13 19:02:22 -04:00
Miguel ÁngelandClaude Opus 4.8 3b93f516b4 feat(media-use): use CLI free HeyGen usage (#2027)
* feat(media-use): use CLI free HeyGen usage

* fix(media-use): address #2027 R1 nits — gate cli-source header to OAuth, export origin constant

- X-HeyGen-Source is now sent only on OAuth (Bearer) requests, not API-key ones —
  the backend ignores it for API-key traffic (normal billing), so it was dead
  metadata there. buildAuthHeaders + heygenAuthHeaders + tests updated.
- Export HEYGEN_CLI_ORIGIN_HEADER ("X-HeyGen-Client-Origin") for future cli:<origin>
  consumers.
- Document the deliberate paid/X4 confirm-before-call decision on heygen.tts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H5k87mPZ4d6yiFwcWSb8Vv

* refactor(cli): drop unused origin-header export, dedup auth-client tests

Fallow flagged 5 findings on this PR:
- major: HEYGEN_CLI_ORIGIN_HEADER was exported but never emitted or
  imported — speculative dead code ("future consumers"). Remove it; a
  real consumer can add the constant when one exists.
- 4x minor duplication in client.test.ts: fold the repeated
  `.rejects.toSatisfy(auth-code)` assertion into expectAuthCode(), and the
  repeated try/catch scrubbed-message assertion into expectRejectionMessage().

No behavior change; auth/client tests still 17/17.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H5k87mPZ4d6yiFwcWSb8Vv

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 18:28:26 -04:00
Miguel Ángel a5c2636e8c fix(cli): never print "[object Object]" from validate/inspect errors (#1810)
* fix(cli): use normalizeErrorMessage so validate/inspect never print "[object Object]"

The validate and inspect (layout) commands formatted thrown values with
`err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)`. When a browser/CDP/
Puppeteer protocol error or a structured page error reaches the formatter
as a plain object without a string `message`, `String(obj)` yields the
useless literal "[object Object]", hiding the real cause.

Route those paths through the existing shared `normalizeErrorMessage`
helper, which returns an Error's message, a string as-is, an object's
`.message` when present, or a compact JSON serialization otherwise (with
a key-list and String fallback for circular/opaque objects). Also fold
the duplicated local `errorMessage` helpers in batchRender and preview
into the same shared helper.

Covered by added assertions in errorMessage.test.ts for the no-message
object and Puppeteer-style protocol-error object cases.

* fix(cli): route remaining browser/process error sites through normalizeErrorMessage

The validate/inspect fix routed only those two commands through the shared
normalizeErrorMessage helper. The same err instanceof Error ? err.message :
String(err) pattern survived in the other commands that drive a headless
browser or an external process (ffmpeg, Docker, CDP) or surface a network
API error, so a thrown structured object without a string message would
still render as the useless literal [object Object].

Route those sites through the shared helper:
  snapshot.ts (the closest sibling to validate/inspect, same bug class),
  render.ts (Chrome launch + Docker build), capture/index.ts and
  commands/capture.ts (page-driven extraction), auth/browser.ts,
  browser/manager.ts (Puppeteer browser resolution), and the cloud/lambda
  paths (cloud/render.ts, cloudrun.ts, lambda/render-batch.ts,
  lambda/policies.ts, cloud/detectAspectRatio.ts) that surface API/network
  error objects.

Only the message-deriving expression changes; control flow and error
propagation are untouched. capture/index.ts keeps appending the stack for
real Errors and only routes the non-Error branch. Adds a helper test for a
structured CDP-style error object (code + nested data, no message).
2026-06-30 10:47:54 -07:00
James RussoandClaude Opus 4.8 b9b5780396 feat(cli): persist + show friendly user identity; preserve unknown credential fields (#1741)
* feat(cli): persist + show friendly user identity; preserve unknown credential fields

The `~/.heygen/credentials` file is SHARED with the Go `heygen` CLI. This
is the hyperframes-side mirror of heygen-cli#197, which adds an optional
`user` block to that file. Two CLIs writing one file must round-trip each
other's data without loss.

Load-bearing change: the credentials reader/writer now PRESERVES unknown
fields on round-trip. Previously readStore/writeStore stripped any key
this CLI didn't model, so writing the file back would silently drop the
`user` block heygen-cli wrote (and any future key). Unrecognized top-level
keys, and unknown keys inside `oauth` / `user`, are captured on a hidden
symbol slot and re-emitted verbatim. Known fields stay strictly validated.

Also mirrors heygen-cli#197's friendly-display feature:
- New optional `user` block schema (email/first_name/last_name/username),
  all omitempty; legacy files without it parse fine.
- After login (OAuth + api-key paths) probe /v3/users/me, persist the
  block, and show a friendly name (email > "first last" > username).
  Probe failure is non-fatal (login still succeeds); a stale block is
  cleared on probe failure so a wrong account can't surface.
- `auth status` surfaces the persisted block (persisted_user in JSON,
  a cached Account row in human output) for file-sourced credentials;
  env-sourced credentials skip it (the on-disk block may belong to a
  different key).
- Fixed the OAuth write path to carry the user block + unknown keys
  across a fresh login / refresh (it previously rebuilt a minimal record).

Tests: preserve-unknown-fields round-trip (top-level, oauth, user), the
exact cross-CLI `user`-block scenario, schema round-trip + omitempty,
backwards-compat with legacy files, login persistence + graceful probe
failure + stale-clear, and the `auth status` surface. Full CLI suite
(1009 tests) green; oxlint + oxfmt + tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): preserve unknown credential data in cleanup/rollback paths

Addresses Magi's REQUEST_CHANGES on #1741. The credentials reader/writer
already round-trips unknown/foreign keys (the cross-CLI forward-compat
contract), but three destructive paths still deleted the whole file when
no known api_key/oauth survived — even when the hidden Symbol-keyed
unknown-field bag held a future credential another CLI owns. That clobbers
exactly the data this PR preserves.

- Add `hasPreservedUnknownData(record)` to store.ts (checks the top-level
  unknown bag + the oauth/user sub-object bags) and export it via the
  barrel.
- `clearOAuth`, `clearUserInfo`, and the failed `auth login --api-key`
  rollback now write the credential-less remnant (carrying the unknown
  bag) instead of deleting the file when unknown/foreign data survives.
  They still delete when nothing worth preserving remains.
- Regression tests: rollback path + both cleanup paths (clearOAuth,
  clearUserInfo) preserve a foreign top-level key; `hasPreservedUnknownData`
  unit tests at all three levels.

Also addresses the review's minor items:
- Add a refresh-path round-trip test (`refreshTokens`) proving an unknown
  key inside the oauth sub-object survives a no-rotation refresh — the
  most-frequent write path, previously only implicitly covered.
- Clarify the `userDisplayName` / `combineName` docstrings: precedence is
  `email > "first last" > first-only > last-only > username`.
- Replace the stale `expires_at` example date in store.ts with
  `<ISO-8601 UTC>`.

Full CLI suite green (1020 tests); tsc, oxlint, oxfmt --check all clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 10:16:23 -07:00
James 81aff68397 fix(cli): address code-review findings on OAuth PR 2026-05-28 05:59:24 +00:00
James 8a9291c434 fix(cli): address code-review findings on auth PR 2026-05-28 05:39:24 +00:00