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Commits
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74149e249a |
fix(cli): keep a live preview's ownership record and stop past a bad one (#3308)
* fix(cli): keep a live preview's ownership record and stop past a bad one A missed liveness probe is not proof the preview is gone — a server blocked on a Puppeteer capture answers nothing for a second or two — but any miss retired the session record, and the record carries the only PID-reuse guard `--stop` has. Reproduced by SIGSTOPping a managed preview and running `--status`: the record was deleted and never came back, leaving every later stop to fall through to an unauthenticated port scan with no ownership proof at all. Only a wrapper process that is provably gone now retires a record. That record gains a process-birth token so a recycled PID reads as a different process, and it is written through a temp file and renamed — every reader deletes it when it fails to parse, so a torn read would otherwise destroy a live server's proof of ownership. Two failure-propagation bugs in the stop path: `--kill-all` collected the first unprovable record's exception and abandoned every server after it, so they were left running AND unreported; and a replacement refused to launch when the server it was replacing had already exited on its own, which is the goal state rather than a failure. `--list` now shows managed sessions ahead of whatever else answers the scan. * fix(cli): keep a record whose identity lookup gave no answer, not a different one Review blocker. The keep-alive path this PR adds could still retire a LIVE record — through a different door than the one it closed. `processIdentity` catches every failure into `null`, and on two of three platforms that failure is a subprocess timeout on a live process: the win32 `Win32_Process` CIM query and the POSIX `ps -o lstart=` both run on a 2 s budget, under exactly the load that made the HTTP probe miss in the first place. A `null` compared unequal to the saved token, so the record was deleted and `wrapperIdentity` — the only PID-reuse guard `--stop` has — was gone for good. Only Linux, reading /proc directly, was reliable. No answer is now distinguished from a different answer: the PID is checked with `kill(pid, 0)` first, which asks the kernel without signalling and treats EPERM as alive. A PID nothing can signal is gone and retires the record with no subprocess at all; a signalable PID whose token cannot be read keeps it. Only a token that comes back and differs retires it. That ordering also answers the `--list` note: the identity subprocess no longer runs for the stale records that made it slow, so the N x 2 s worst case is gone along with the timeouts that fed the bug. Verified by mutation: restoring the old "no answer means gone" behaviour reds the new case. Also clean up the temp file when a rename fails, rather than orphaning it in the session directory. * test(cli): assert only what the birth-token lookup actually guarantees `captures a stable birth token for the current process` made two assertions that a lookup allowed to fail cannot support. `processIdentity` returns null whenever the lookup cannot be completed — not only when the process is absent — and on Windows and macOS it shells out to PowerShell or `ps` on a 2 s budget that a cold CI runner routinely outruns. Both failed on windows-latest, in sequence: first `.toMatch()` received null, and once that was guarded, `expect(second).toBe(first)` compared a null from the cold first spawn against a token from the warm second one. Two lookups can disagree for exactly one reason — one of them failed — so stability is only assertable across two successful ones. The token itself cannot change between calls; it is a birth timestamp and the process did not restart. `processIdentity(-1)` stays unconditional: the guard rejects it before any subprocess runs. The strict shape assertion moves to a Linux-only case, where /proc is read directly with no subprocess and null is genuinely not allowed — keeping the guarantee on the one platform that can honour it rather than dropping it everywhere. Callers already depend on this contract: `wrapperProcessIsAlive` treats null as "no answer" rather than "gone" precisely because it is reachable. |
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c1c70f44bd |
fix(cli): signal only processes the OS says own the port (#3307)
* fix(cli): signal only processes the OS says own the port `/__hyperframes_config` is unauthenticated and the PID it reports is what `--stop` and `--kill-all` send signals to, so any local process answering on a scanned port could name an arbitrary PID and have the CLI kill it. Reproduced with a twenty-line HTTP server on a scanned port self-reporting an unrelated PID: before this, `--kill-all` killed that process; after it, the process survives and only the real listener is stopped. The listening PID now comes from the OS — `lsof`, and `netstat` on Windows, where the lookup was previously unavailable and the self-reported value was taken on trust. The response's own PID is used only where the OS lookup fails, which is also the only case where it is unfalsifiable. Orphan cleanup moves to the last step before a launch. It reaches outside the process and kills other people's PIDs, so it must not run for an invocation that turns out to be a validation error and never starts anything. * fix(cli): fail closed when the OS cannot confirm who owns a port Review follow-up. The two halves of this change picked opposite directions for the same condition. `isProcessDescendant` fails closed by design; `activeServerOnPort` fell back to the self-reported PID whenever the OS lookup came back empty — and that is not only "unsupported platform". `lsof` may be absent (the default on many slim images), may time out, or may not see a socket owned by another user. On such a machine every scanned port silently reverted to pre-change behaviour, with nothing said. Provenance is now part of the type rather than a convention: `ActiveServer` carries `pidSource`, so a caller cannot mistake a self-report for the kernel's answer. `--kill-all` requires `"os"` and skips the rest, naming the ports it left alone and why. That is the deliberate trade — a blind sweep of a port range has no evidence beyond an unauthenticated response, so an unconfirmed PID must not be signalled. Managed previews are unaffected: they stop through their session record, which proves ownership by process birth identity. The fallback branch — the one with the security consequence — now has the coverage it lacked, via an injected lookup matching the seam `testPortOnAllHosts` and `isProcessDescendant` already use, including a live process that survives because nothing confirmed it owns the socket. Also state that `killProcessTree` honours `signal` on POSIX only: Windows always passes `/F`, deliberately, since taskkill without it posts WM_CLOSE that a console process may ignore. The caller-side comment claiming Windows cleanup is a no-op described the code before this change and now says the opposite. |
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7e4ce96ba8 |
fix: SIGKILL escalation in killProcessTree + unit tests
Remaining review follow-ups:
- killProcessTree now escalates to SIGKILL after 500ms if SIGTERM
doesn't kill the process (same pattern as killTrackedProcesses).
Covers orphan cleanup and dev/local mode tree kill.
- Added unit tests for both new modules:
- processTracker.test.ts (6 tests): track/remove on exit/error,
kill running processes, SIGKILL escalation for SIGTERM-resistant
processes, idempotency.
- orphanCleanup.test.ts (5 tests): tree kill with children,
SIGKILL escalation, non-existent PID handling, orphan detection
returns 0 when clean.
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