Files
hyperframes/packages/cli/src/auth/store.test.ts
T
James RussoandClaude Opus 4.8 b9b5780396 feat(cli): persist + show friendly user identity; preserve unknown credential fields (#1741)
* feat(cli): persist + show friendly user identity; preserve unknown credential fields

The `~/.heygen/credentials` file is SHARED with the Go `heygen` CLI. This
is the hyperframes-side mirror of heygen-cli#197, which adds an optional
`user` block to that file. Two CLIs writing one file must round-trip each
other's data without loss.

Load-bearing change: the credentials reader/writer now PRESERVES unknown
fields on round-trip. Previously readStore/writeStore stripped any key
this CLI didn't model, so writing the file back would silently drop the
`user` block heygen-cli wrote (and any future key). Unrecognized top-level
keys, and unknown keys inside `oauth` / `user`, are captured on a hidden
symbol slot and re-emitted verbatim. Known fields stay strictly validated.

Also mirrors heygen-cli#197's friendly-display feature:
- New optional `user` block schema (email/first_name/last_name/username),
  all omitempty; legacy files without it parse fine.
- After login (OAuth + api-key paths) probe /v3/users/me, persist the
  block, and show a friendly name (email > "first last" > username).
  Probe failure is non-fatal (login still succeeds); a stale block is
  cleared on probe failure so a wrong account can't surface.
- `auth status` surfaces the persisted block (persisted_user in JSON,
  a cached Account row in human output) for file-sourced credentials;
  env-sourced credentials skip it (the on-disk block may belong to a
  different key).
- Fixed the OAuth write path to carry the user block + unknown keys
  across a fresh login / refresh (it previously rebuilt a minimal record).

Tests: preserve-unknown-fields round-trip (top-level, oauth, user), the
exact cross-CLI `user`-block scenario, schema round-trip + omitempty,
backwards-compat with legacy files, login persistence + graceful probe
failure + stale-clear, and the `auth status` surface. Full CLI suite
(1009 tests) green; oxlint + oxfmt + tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): preserve unknown credential data in cleanup/rollback paths

Addresses Magi's REQUEST_CHANGES on #1741. The credentials reader/writer
already round-trips unknown/foreign keys (the cross-CLI forward-compat
contract), but three destructive paths still deleted the whole file when
no known api_key/oauth survived — even when the hidden Symbol-keyed
unknown-field bag held a future credential another CLI owns. That clobbers
exactly the data this PR preserves.

- Add `hasPreservedUnknownData(record)` to store.ts (checks the top-level
  unknown bag + the oauth/user sub-object bags) and export it via the
  barrel.
- `clearOAuth`, `clearUserInfo`, and the failed `auth login --api-key`
  rollback now write the credential-less remnant (carrying the unknown
  bag) instead of deleting the file when unknown/foreign data survives.
  They still delete when nothing worth preserving remains.
- Regression tests: rollback path + both cleanup paths (clearOAuth,
  clearUserInfo) preserve a foreign top-level key; `hasPreservedUnknownData`
  unit tests at all three levels.

Also addresses the review's minor items:
- Add a refresh-path round-trip test (`refreshTokens`) proving an unknown
  key inside the oauth sub-object survives a no-rotation refresh — the
  most-frequent write path, previously only implicitly covered.
- Clarify the `userDisplayName` / `combineName` docstrings: precedence is
  `email > "first last" > first-only > last-only > username`.
- Replace the stale `expires_at` example date in store.ts with
  `<ISO-8601 UTC>`.

Full CLI suite green (1020 tests); tsc, oxlint, oxfmt --check all clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 10:16:23 -07:00

459 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { isAuthError } from "./errors.js";
import {
clearOAuth,
deleteStore,
hasPreservedUnknownData,
readStore,
writeStore,
type Credentials,
} from "./store.js";
async function makeTmpDir(): Promise<string> {
return fs.mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "hf-auth-store-"));
}
// POSIX file modes don't apply on Windows — `fs.chmod` only toggles the
// read-only bit there, so `stat.mode & 0o777` reports 0o666/0o444
// regardless of what we requested. Skip the mode assertions on win32;
// the 0600/0700 hardening is a Unix concern.
const IS_POSIX = process.platform !== "win32";
describe("auth/store", () => {
let dir: string;
let path: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
dir = await makeTmpDir();
path = join(dir, "credentials");
});
afterEach(async () => {
await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it("returns absent when the file does not exist", async () => {
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result).toEqual({ credentials: {}, source: "absent" });
});
it("round-trips api_key only", async () => {
const creds: Credentials = { api_key: "hg_test_abc" };
await writeStore(creds, path);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.source).toBe("file_json");
expect(result.credentials).toEqual(creds);
});
it("round-trips oauth tokens", async () => {
const creds: Credentials = {
oauth: {
access_token: "at_123",
refresh_token: "rt_456",
expires_at: "2026-06-25T12:00:00.000Z",
scope: "openid profile",
token_type: "Bearer",
},
};
await writeStore(creds, path);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials).toEqual(creds);
});
it("round-trips both api_key and oauth", async () => {
const creds: Credentials = {
api_key: "hg_test_abc",
oauth: { access_token: "at_123" },
};
await writeStore(creds, path);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_test_abc");
expect(result.credentials.oauth?.access_token).toBe("at_123");
});
it("reads legacy one-line plaintext format", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "hg_legacy_key\n", { mode: 0o600 });
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.source).toBe("file_legacy");
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_legacy_key");
});
it("treats empty file as absent", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "", { mode: 0o600 });
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.source).toBe("absent");
});
it("throws ErrInvalidStore on garbage JSON", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "{not valid json", { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("throws ErrInvalidStore on multi-line non-JSON content", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "not\na\nkey", { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it.skipIf(!IS_POSIX)("writes file 0600 and dir 0700", async () => {
const nested = join(dir, "sub", "deeper");
const p = join(nested, "credentials");
await writeStore({ api_key: "hg_x" }, p);
expect((await fs.stat(p)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
expect((await fs.stat(nested)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
});
it("preserves content across overwrites", async () => {
await writeStore({ api_key: "first" }, path);
await writeStore({ api_key: "second" }, path);
if (IS_POSIX) {
expect((await fs.stat(path)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
}
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("second");
});
it("rejects empty-string api_key", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ api_key: "" }), { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("rejects api_key with CR/LF (header-injection guard)", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x\r\nX-Evil: foo" }), { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("strips oauth fields containing CR/LF rather than crashing later", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
oauth: {
access_token: "good_at",
refresh_token: "bad_rt\r\nX-Smuggle: 1",
},
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.oauth?.access_token).toBe("good_at");
expect(result.credentials.oauth?.refresh_token).toBeUndefined();
});
it("rejects access_token containing CR/LF (header-injection guard)", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ oauth: { access_token: "at\r\nX-Evil: 1" } }), {
mode: 0o600,
});
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("accepts a legacy plaintext key of any HeyGen key format", async () => {
// Real HeyGen keys come in multiple formats (`sk_V2_…`, `hg_…`,
// partner keys, etc.). The CLI doesn't shape-check — the backend
// does. Any single-line printable non-empty value is accepted as
// a legacy key here; the next /v3/users/me call decides validity.
await fs.writeFile(path, "sk_V2_hgu_kVzzCxfI3cT_Yi96MxT2Ki6UamtWxyP7oOIPqsxaFHqN", {
mode: 0o600,
});
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.source).toBe("file_legacy");
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe(
"sk_V2_hgu_kVzzCxfI3cT_Yi96MxT2Ki6UamtWxyP7oOIPqsxaFHqN",
);
});
it("still rejects plaintext that contains a space (not a credential shape)", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "hello world this is not a key", { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("still rejects too-short plaintext", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, "tiny", { mode: 0o600 });
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("rejects oauth without access_token", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ oauth: { refresh_token: "rt" } }), {
mode: 0o600,
});
await expect(readStore(path)).rejects.toSatisfy((err) => isAuthError(err));
});
it("exposes only the typed surface for known keys (unknown keys hidden from callers)", async () => {
// The typed `credentials` view shows only the modelled keys —
// unknown/foreign keys are captured in a hidden (symbol-keyed)
// passthrough slot, not the enumerable surface, so callers can't
// accidentally read them. Round-trip preservation is covered below.
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x", future_field: { stuff: 1 } }), {
mode: 0o600,
});
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(Object.keys(result.credentials)).toEqual(["api_key"]);
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_x");
});
// --- Cross-CLI forward compatibility: unknown-field preservation. ---
// The credentials file is SHARED with the Go `heygen` CLI. If this CLI
// strips keys it doesn't model when it writes the file back, it
// silently destroys the other CLI's data (and vice versa). The writer
// MUST round-trip unknown fields untouched.
it("preserves an unknown TOP-LEVEL key across a read → write round-trip", async () => {
// Simulate a file another CLI version wrote with a future key.
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x", future_field: { nested: [1, 2], flag: true } }),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
// Read it, then write back a typed update (here: just the api_key it
// surfaced). The unknown key must survive.
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
await writeStore(credentials, path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.api_key).toBe("hg_x");
expect(onDisk.future_field).toEqual({ nested: [1, 2], flag: true });
});
it("preserves the heygen-cli `user` block when this CLI rewrites only the credential", async () => {
// The exact cross-CLI data-loss scenario: heygen-cli wrote a `user`
// block; hyperframes-cli updates the api_key and must not drop it.
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
api_key: "hg_old",
user: { email: "jane@example.com", first_name: "Jane", last_name: "Doe", username: "jdoe" },
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
credentials.api_key = "hg_new";
await writeStore(credentials, path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.api_key).toBe("hg_new");
expect(onDisk.user).toEqual({
email: "jane@example.com",
first_name: "Jane",
last_name: "Doe",
username: "jdoe",
});
});
it("preserves an unknown key INSIDE the oauth sub-object", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
oauth: { access_token: "at_1", id_token: "future_id_token_value" },
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
await writeStore(credentials, path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.oauth.access_token).toBe("at_1");
expect(onDisk.oauth.id_token).toBe("future_id_token_value");
});
it("preserves an unknown key INSIDE the user sub-object", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
api_key: "hg_x",
user: { email: "u@example.com", avatar_url: "https://cdn/x.png" },
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
await writeStore(credentials, path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.user.email).toBe("u@example.com");
expect(onDisk.user.avatar_url).toBe("https://cdn/x.png");
});
it("round-trips the user block (schema + omitempty: empty fields are not written)", async () => {
const creds: Credentials = {
api_key: "hg_x",
user: { email: "u@example.com", username: "u" },
};
await writeStore(creds, path);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.user).toEqual({ email: "u@example.com", username: "u" });
// omitempty: only the populated fields appear on disk — no empty
// first_name / last_name strings littering the file.
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.user).toEqual({ email: "u@example.com", username: "u" });
expect(Object.keys(onDisk.user)).toEqual(["email", "username"]);
});
it('omits an all-empty user block entirely (no `"user": {}` litter)', async () => {
await writeStore({ api_key: "hg_x", user: {} }, path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.user).toBeUndefined();
expect(onDisk.api_key).toBe("hg_x");
});
it("backwards-compat: a legacy file WITHOUT a user block parses with user undefined", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_legacy" }), { mode: 0o600 });
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.source).toBe("file_json");
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_legacy");
expect(result.credentials.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it("ignores a malformed user sub-field rather than rejecting the whole file", async () => {
// The user block is additive metadata — a junk sub-field must never
// block resolving a perfectly good api_key. Non-string fields are
// dropped; the credential survives.
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x", user: { email: "u@example.com", first_name: 12345 } }),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_x");
expect(result.credentials.user).toEqual({ email: "u@example.com" });
});
it("deleteStore is idempotent", async () => {
await writeStore({ api_key: "hg_x" }, path);
await deleteStore(path);
await deleteStore(path);
await expect(fs.access(path)).rejects.toThrow();
});
it("clearOAuth removes only the oauth field", async () => {
await writeStore({ api_key: "hg_keep", oauth: { access_token: "drop_me" } }, path);
await clearOAuth(path);
const result = await readStore(path);
expect(result.credentials.oauth).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.credentials.api_key).toBe("hg_keep");
});
it("clearOAuth removes the whole file when no api_key remains", async () => {
await writeStore({ oauth: { access_token: "only" } }, path);
await clearOAuth(path);
await expect(fs.access(path)).rejects.toThrow();
});
it("clearOAuth keeps the user block (and unknown keys) when an api_key survives", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
api_key: "hg_keep",
oauth: { access_token: "drop_me" },
user: { email: "u@example.com" },
future_field: 1,
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
await clearOAuth(path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.oauth).toBeUndefined();
expect(onDisk.api_key).toBe("hg_keep");
expect(onDisk.user).toEqual({ email: "u@example.com" });
expect(onDisk.future_field).toBe(1);
});
it("clearOAuth is a no-op when file is absent", async () => {
await clearOAuth(path);
await expect(fs.access(path)).rejects.toThrow();
});
// --- Destructive paths must not clobber preserved unknown data. ---
// When clearing the only known credential would otherwise delete the
// file, a surviving unknown/foreign top-level key (a future credential
// another CLI owns) must keep the file alive — deleting would clobber
// exactly the cross-CLI data this machinery exists to preserve.
it("clearOAuth keeps the file (writing the unknown bag) when no api_key but a foreign top-level key survives", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
oauth: { access_token: "drop_me" },
future_credential: { token: "owned_by_other_cli" },
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
await clearOAuth(path);
// File must still exist and carry the foreign key.
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.oauth).toBeUndefined();
expect(onDisk.future_credential).toEqual({ token: "owned_by_other_cli" });
});
it("clearOAuth keeps the file when no api_key but a foreign key survives inside the user block", async () => {
// The user block has no known friendly fields, only a foreign sub-key
// — the block itself survives the oauth clear, so its unknown data
// must too.
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({
oauth: { access_token: "drop_me" },
user: { external_org_id: "org_123" },
}),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
await clearOAuth(path);
const onDisk = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(path, "utf8"));
expect(onDisk.oauth).toBeUndefined();
expect(onDisk.user).toEqual({ external_org_id: "org_123" });
});
it("clearOAuth still deletes the file when only a known (empty-after-clear) surface remains", async () => {
// No api_key, no foreign data — just the oauth block being cleared.
// Nothing worth preserving, so the file goes.
await writeStore({ oauth: { access_token: "only" } }, path);
await clearOAuth(path);
await expect(fs.access(path)).rejects.toThrow();
});
describe("hasPreservedUnknownData", () => {
it("false for an empty record", () => {
expect(hasPreservedUnknownData({})).toBe(false);
});
it("false for a record with only known fields", () => {
expect(
hasPreservedUnknownData({
api_key: "hg_x",
oauth: { access_token: "at" },
user: { email: "u@example.com" },
}),
).toBe(false);
});
it("true when a top-level unknown key was captured at read time", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x", future_field: 1 }), {
mode: 0o600,
});
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
expect(hasPreservedUnknownData(credentials)).toBe(true);
});
it("true when an unknown key was captured inside the oauth sub-object", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({ oauth: { access_token: "at", id_token: "future" } }),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
expect(hasPreservedUnknownData(credentials)).toBe(true);
});
it("true when an unknown key was captured inside the user sub-object", async () => {
await fs.writeFile(
path,
JSON.stringify({ api_key: "hg_x", user: { email: "u@example.com", avatar_url: "x" } }),
{ mode: 0o600 },
);
const { credentials } = await readStore(path);
expect(hasPreservedUnknownData(credentials)).toBe(true);
});
});
});