Files
hyperframes/packages/cli/src
Miguel Angel Simon Sierra 79e6680a0d fix(media-use): close CSS-escape and image-set bypasses in sanitizeSvg
The url()/@import checks scanned raw text for the literal "url(" and
"@import". A browser decodes CSS escapes first, so fill="\75 rl(...)",
url\28...\29 and @\69mport all loaded an external resource, and
image-set("https://...") loads one with no url() at all. Reproduced in
headless Chrome: 8 of 8 payloads fired a request through the old code.

CSS can only load a resource through a function or @import, so CSS text
now passes only if it has no @import, every function is on a compute-only
allowlist (color, transform, filter and math functions), and every url()
is a same-document fragment, all checked on escape-decoded, lowercased
text. Same fix reaches media-use through the regenerated bundle.

Checked against all 13,384 files of the pinned theSVG corpus: 13,383
sanitize byte-identically; one drops an unreferenced id="XRP-(XRP)".
The parity oracle now fails on any surviving attacker host, so it no
longer shares the sanitizer's parsing blind spot.
2026-09-23 06:36:18 -04:00
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