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James RussoandClaude Opus 4.8
fada399539
The `/projects/:id/renders/file/*` route joined attacker-controlled wildcard input straight onto rendersDir with a bare join() + readFileSync and no containment check — the only project-scoped filesystem route that skipped the resolveWithinProject chokepoint every sibling route uses. Literal/encoded `../` traversal is collapsed upstream by Hono's WHATWG URL normalization (verified empirically), so the plain LFI is not reachable over HTTP. But a symlink living inside rendersDir and pointing outside it was still followed and served verbatim (verified: leaked an external secret, 200 OK). Routing through resolveWithinProject canonicalizes with realpath before serving, closing the symlink escape and making the route's safety independent of the URL layer's normalization behavior. Adds regression coverage: serves an in-dir file, rejects an escaping symlink (403), and still serves a symlink that stays inside rendersDir. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>