Whether a model declines to upload a .env file is model behaviour, not policy,
and OpenWorker lets users pick any model. A new floor, placed with the other
human-only floors (ahead of every allowlist, the allowed-sites wall and the
reviewer): an action that sends data off the machine (egress or external risk:
web tools, connector writes, MCP tools; or a shell command running a network
client) AND names a secret-looking file (.env*, *.pem, id_rsa*, credentials*,
*token*, ...) or carries a secret-looking value (private-key headers, sk-,
AKIA, ghp_, xox?- shapes, api_key = <long value>) is human-only in every
asking mode and in bypass-approvals; dangerous-bypass clears it and records
the floor. Templates and public keys (.env.example, *.sample, *.pub) are not
secrets. A backstop on top of the sandbox network allowlist: shell egress
can't be recognised completely.
Corpora: gate-104 (browser upload of an SSH key) moves from reviewer_eligible
to human_only (secure stays hard_deny); four secret-egress gate rows are
appended (gate-133..136). Seven frozen legacy reviewer rows the floor now
intercepts (danger-003/010, inject-001/002/008/014/016) stay as they are; the
hygiene test lists them explicitly and checks they're caught by this floor.
Docs: the floor joins the safety-check list; the Windows sandbox page notes
what "Allow everything" leaves to the approval flow.
Sites from Settings are listed plain; sites allowed for this session are marked "Session only".
The person can allow one more for the session or take one back; the running sandbox follows at once.
A new tool, request_network_access, raises a card only a person answers: this session, always, or deny.
A command's result names the sites the sandbox blocked while it ran, and the agent is told the live list each turn.
The header chip lists the sites allowed for this session apart from the machine's.
"This session" and "Always allow" now reach the session's commands at once.
OpenShell: the policy is rendered again and set on the sandbox; macOS and Windows: the session's own proxy takes the host.
"Always allow" now copies the list back as the store keeps it, so the chip matches Settings.
The three sandbox pages say web search and fetch follow the list; connectors and MCP do not.
Network allow list holds only the machine's ticked sites, none by default; strict/standard removed.
The app no longer installs OpenShell; setup is two checks and one step with progress.
DMG build requires grpcio so the sidecar can use OpenShell.
Network: registries and search (strict folded in) with the machine's own hosts, or allow everything.
Credentials list only what was added; shipped entries become presets with the variable each tool reads.
A hung docker info no longer fails the OpenShell checklist.
Setup and remove routes prove the wall in a throwaway sandbox before the choice takes effect.
Credential entries are a file or a folder, labelled credential or configuration; collapsible cards.
The same-user fallback is gone: without setup the provider refuses and Settings say why (ruling 18).
A shell could not enter a granted folder under the profile; the parents now get a traverse-only entry.
The entry check matches by SID, so it works for a real account too.
One list per platform (coworker/sandbox/toolchains.py), machine-level, editable by name; read entries on Windows,
the Seatbelt profile on the Mac. The Windows full mode passes its environment through a file (1024-character logon limit).