GET /v1/system: processor, graphics, memory, storage, the largest model that runs well.
GET /v1/providers/ollama/models: size, tools, thinking, context and fit per model, read from Ollama instead of guessed; only tool-capable models join the picker.
With it off, OpenShell reads as not usable, the page offers Set up, and the dialog's Docker row says where the setting is.
A yes is remembered for ten minutes; a no is asked again each time.
Gated sessions run workspace+scratch dual-root; artifact listing scans scratch only.
Artifact chips resolve across workspace, scratch, and granted roots; request_directory registers for all sessions.
WorkspaceTrustStore.set_trusted protected its state file with a bare
os.chmod(tmp, 0o600). On Windows that is a silent no-op, because os.chmod
only toggles the read-only bit there, so workspace_trust.json kept the broad
ACEs it inherited from its parent directory:
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
<user>:(I)(F)
coworker/secrets.py already documents this hazard and solves it in
_restrict_to_user() via icacls /inheritance:r /grant:r, exposed as the
write_private_text() helper. server/run.py uses that helper for the sidecar
auth token, but the trust store did not. Since this file is the allowlist
deciding which workspaces get auto-approved command execution, route it
through the same helper. Afterwards the file carries a single ACE:
<user>:(F)
The two tests meant to catch this asserted st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600, which is
unsatisfiable on Windows. os.stat cannot see ACLs there, so every writable
file reports 0o666, including the correctly protected sidecar token. Replace
both with a shared assert_user_only() that checks mode bits on POSIX and the
DACL on Windows.
Imported from andrewyng/aisuite@1b4bbf303e
(contents of its platform/ directory, hoisted to the repo root).
Development history prior to this commit lives in that repository.
Co-authored-by: Devika <devikaverma11@gmail.com>