Rename the SDK to `@openworkerai/harness-sdk` and update its matching runtime packages. Add `@openworkerai/build-with-sdk-skills` so developers can install Desktop and Web app guidance for Codex or Claude Code without cloning this repository.
Update the examples and documentation. Fix Windows release archives and dependency setup on clean runners, and qualify native packages in release mode.
Local package and skill installation, the streamed Desktop example, and native release tests passed on macOS ARM64. npm publication is handled separately.
Allow developers to easily build AI apps without worrying about the harness part.
Bundles the Rust agent runtime as a SDK (Rust and TypeScript) for building desktop and web applications. Applications can manage a local harness or connect to an authenticated harness service on k8s with separately scaled workers and sandbox execution.
The implementation is primarily contained in harness/, with deployment tooling in deploy/, Markdown guides in docs/harness/guides/, and the static documentation site in docs-site/. It does not replace the existing Python harness or migrate OpenWorker Desktop.
Co-authored-by: Devika Verma <devikaverma11@gmail.com>
Review of the first version against 366 recorded runs found four defects and one
semantic gap, all fixed here.
- Two same-named calls in one batch swapped results, exit codes, origins and audit
links in the live view: the finished event was matched to the LAST pending item by
name. `tool_proposed` now carries the tool call id and the GUI matches on it.
- A command's exit status was read from the 300-character result preview; a long
command pushed it out, and a timed-out command showed a green dot. The exit code,
time-out and background flags now ride on `tool_finished` and on the persisted
display sidecar.
- After a reload every non-denied call replayed as "ok", so a failed write showed as
done. The status is persisted with the result and replayed.
- A notice inside a turn (compaction, continuation, a saved memory) split the summary
in two and showed the first half while the turn was still running. One block per
turn now, emitted after the answer.
The header reads "N changes auto-approved" and the count means "things that changed
state and that nobody approved": the engine stamps each cardless call's effect
("change" or "read", from its risk class and tier) and the summary counts failed
attempts and read-only actions apart. Several edits of one file collapse into one row;
background commands are labelled; after 25 rows the list offers the rest.
`turn_summary` gains `failed` and `reads`, and per-action effect, tier and shell
outcome; docs/headless.md describes the fields.
A user who was away had no simple view of what ran with no approval card. After a
turn in which auto-approve let actions through (a gate tier or a reviewer "allow"),
the transcript now ends the turn with a collapsed "N changes made without asking"
block: file changes with diffs, commands with their exit status, other actions,
each with who let it through and a link to its audit rows.
- engine: one TURN_SUMMARY event just before the event that ends the turn, listing
tool call id, tool, origin, status and the reviewer's reason (no arguments).
Wraps run / retry / resume; closing the wrapper closes the turn as before.
- audit: /v1/audit takes call_id; Activity opens filtered to one call, clearable.
- gui: tool items carry their call id, live and on reload; the block is built from
the persisted approval origins, so a reloaded session shows the same summary.
- docs/headless.md: the event in events.jsonl.
Whether a model declines to upload a .env file is model behaviour, not policy,
and OpenWorker lets users pick any model. A new floor, placed with the other
human-only floors (ahead of every allowlist, the allowed-sites wall and the
reviewer): an action that sends data off the machine (egress or external risk:
web tools, connector writes, MCP tools; or a shell command running a network
client) AND names a secret-looking file (.env*, *.pem, id_rsa*, credentials*,
*token*, ...) or carries a secret-looking value (private-key headers, sk-,
AKIA, ghp_, xox?- shapes, api_key = <long value>) is human-only in every
asking mode and in bypass-approvals; dangerous-bypass clears it and records
the floor. Templates and public keys (.env.example, *.sample, *.pub) are not
secrets. A backstop on top of the sandbox network allowlist: shell egress
can't be recognised completely.
Corpora: gate-104 (browser upload of an SSH key) moves from reviewer_eligible
to human_only (secure stays hard_deny); four secret-egress gate rows are
appended (gate-133..136). Seven frozen legacy reviewer rows the floor now
intercepts (danger-003/010, inject-001/002/008/014/016) stay as they are; the
hygiene test lists them explicitly and checks they're caught by this floor.
Docs: the floor joins the safety-check list; the Windows sandbox page notes
what "Allow everything" leaves to the approval flow.
Same shape as llama.cpp/vLLM/LM Studio: address + optional key, models from the server.
Docker's /engines path is added when the user types the root; mlx-lm's help covers the port shared with llama.cpp.
Local-server checks now read LOCAL_SERVERS instead of a hand-kept tuple.
Both You.com hosts join PROVIDER_HOSTS (keyed vs keyless) and the Sites catalogue; the YDC_API_KEY fallback moves to key resolution.
Every provider declares key_mode none/optional/required beside display_name and key_url.
Firecrawl's host joins PROVIDER_HOSTS and the Access ▸ Sites catalogue.
The class gets display_name and key_url and raises on HTTP errors like the others.
config.example.toml covered 7 of the 13 supported keys; a user reading it
could not discover how to switch web-search providers or point a dev/BYO
deployment at its own cloud instance. Adds web_search_provider (with the
three supported backends) and the cloud_* family (commented out — the
defaults are the production values, and an empty cloud_relay_ws_url
meaningfully disables the relay). Also notes the Windows global config
location and that allowed_commands/auto_allow are global-only until
workspace trust.
Verified: the example parses with tomllib and every key (including the
commented cloud_* names) matches coworker.config._FIELDS.
For sealed evaluation runs and air-gapped work. A network block only refuses the call: the model still sees both tools, can spend turns on them, and the record cannot say they were absent. The flag withholds them at registration (build_engine(web_tools=False)), and summary.json and the trajectory record web_tools: false. Without the flag nothing changes.
Tests: with the flag both calls get the engine's unknown-tool answer and the record says false; without it web_fetch is present, shown with a non-URL the tool rejects before any network I/O.
Each is a provider of its own with an address and an optional key; the served model, its window and tool support are read from the server (vLLM is probed for tool calling).
Providers carry a kind (local, subscription, api_key) for the settings page; docs/local-servers.md.
model_config.json holds context size, longest reply, thinking, sampling, auto-compact and the default model; the app's API and the CLI read it.
recommended_models.json carries the makers' own values per model, with sources; docs/model-settings.md explains both.
build_macos_cli.sh freezes the CLI, signs and notarizes it; the release attaches it for arm64 and x86_64.
install.sh downloads it on a Mac instead of the Python package.
With a person at the terminal the coworker asks, they allow the site from outside, and it tries again.
With auto-answer it reports the block in its answer, as before.