"""Address guard for URLs the model chooses. `web_fetch` and `browser_read_url` take a URL straight from the model, and the model's input is untrusted by design — it reads web pages, email and Slack messages, all of which are documented as "data, not instructions". A page that talks the agent into fetching `http://169.254.169.254/` or `http://127.0.0.1:11434/` turns a read-only research tool into a probe of the machine's own network position, and `web_fetch` is `requires_approval=False`, so no prompt ever appears. This blocks the ranges that are only reachable *because* OpenWorker runs on the user's machine: loopback, RFC1918 and other private space, link-local (which covers the cloud metadata endpoint at 169.254.169.254), and the reserved/multicast blocks. Every hop is checked, not just the first: `follow_redirects=True` otherwise lets a public URL 302 straight to loopback, which is the standard way this filter is bypassed. Not covered: DNS rebinding. The name is resolved here and resolved again by the client when it connects, so a record with a ~0 TTL can change between the two. Closing that needs connection-level IP pinning; the hop check is the cheap 90% and is stated as such. """ from __future__ import annotations import ipaddress import socket from typing import Optional from urllib.parse import urlsplit MAX_REDIRECTS = 5 def _blocked_reason(ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> Optional[str]: if ip.is_loopback: return "loopback" if ip.is_link_local: return "link-local (includes the cloud metadata endpoint)" if ip.is_private: return "a private network" if ip.is_multicast: return "multicast" if ip.is_reserved or ip.is_unspecified: return "a reserved range" return None def check_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: """None if the URL may be fetched, else a human-readable refusal reason. Resolves the host and rejects when *any* answer lands in a blocked range, so a name with both a public and a private A record cannot be used to slip through. """ parts = urlsplit(url) if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return "url must start with http:// or https://" host = parts.hostname if not host: return "url has no host" # A literal address needs no lookup. try: literal = ipaddress.ip_address(host) except ValueError: literal = None if literal is not None: reason = _blocked_reason(literal) return f"refusing to fetch {host}: {reason}" if reason else None try: infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, parts.port or (443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80), proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP) except OSError as exc: return f"could not resolve {host}: {exc}" for info in infos: raw = info[4][0] try: ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw) except ValueError: continue # ::ffff:127.0.0.1 and friends must be judged as the v4 address they carry. mapped = getattr(ip, "ipv4_mapped", None) if mapped is not None: ip = mapped reason = _blocked_reason(ip) if reason: return f"refusing to fetch {host} ({ip}): {reason}" return None def get_checked(client, url: str, *, max_redirects: int = MAX_REDIRECTS): """GET `url`, validating the address before every hop. `client` must be built with `follow_redirects=False`; redirects are walked here so each Location is checked. Returns the final response. Raises `PermissionError` when a hop is refused, `RuntimeError` when the redirect budget is exhausted. """ seen = url for _ in range(max_redirects + 1): reason = check_url(seen) if reason: raise PermissionError(reason) resp = client.get(seen) if resp.status_code not in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308): return resp location = resp.headers.get("location") if not location: return resp seen = str(resp.url.join(location)) raise RuntimeError(f"too many redirects (>{max_redirects})")