mirror of
https://github.com/andrewyng/openworker.git
synced 2026-11-04 21:37:21 +00:00
Devika Verma
7ea4de3877
Backend core of the MCP trust redesign:
- Risk floor: every mcp__ tool classifies EXTERNAL, always — category-keyed,
fails closed on missing metadata; user overrides may only tighten (loader
and writer both refuse loosening rules, pointing at trust rules instead).
Closes the name-collision path where a server named like a catalog
connector inherited softer classification (and the reverse, via the
backed-connector category relabel at wiring).
- Durable per-tool trust replaces the server-wide requires_approval:false
trapdoor: "Always allow this tool" writes a named, visible, revocable rule
to the user-local override store; the legacy flag stays honored but gets a
one-click migration to per-tool rules. Server-side validated in
_grant_offered — cards cannot mint what the server won't honor (the
always_trust outcome also joins the approval_outcome validation tuple).
- Remove server revokes its trust rules (exact names and server-scoped
globs): they lived in a separate store keyed by name, so a future server
added under the same name inherited don't-ask rules sight unseen.
Sign-out deliberately keeps trust — tokens only.
- Run grants ("Allow for this request"): ApprovalOutcome.THIS_RUN covers the
exact tool for the remainder of the current run — in-memory, cleared at
the run boundary (finish, interrupt, teardown) plus a fresh-run belt;
never skips the auto-approve reviewer; offered for EXTERNAL risk only
(EXEC keeps command-scoped grants, EGRESS its domain grant). Covered
calls carry a run_grant transcript origin and auto_allowed audit rows.
- Honest evidence plumbing: PermissionRequest carries the MCP destination
(stamped from the user's own server config at registration, never from
server claims); parked approvals store category/destination/reason so a
redelivered card shows the live card's evidence; approval bodies stop
baking in the "requires approval" boilerplate.
- Connect-time tool review backend: include_tools is an include-list
(unchecked tools are never registered — fail-closed growth), and
exclude_tools records explicit declines so "new" can only ever mean the
server's menu grew.
- Trusted-origin split: the engine distinguishes a user's trust rule from
the legacy server flag so the transcript chip can name the right source.
92 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
92 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
"""Phase 2 gate — user-local risk overrides (relax/tighten), with the no-self-grant rule.
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Updated for OPE-136: the store used to be the sanctioned way to relax an MCP tool to
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READ. That path is retired — MCP tools are floored at EXTERNAL (`risk.classify`), and
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"stop asking" is a trust rule, never a reclassification. Relaxing survives for non-MCP
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third-party tools (plugins); tightening survives for everything.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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import pytest
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from coworker.overrides import RiskOverrideStore
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from coworker.permissions import Mode, PermissionEngine
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from coworker.risk import RiskClass, classify
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MCP_META = SimpleNamespace(requires_approval=True, category="mcp")
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PLUGIN_META = SimpleNamespace(requires_approval=True, category="plugin")
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def test_most_specific_rule_wins(tmp_path):
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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store.set_rule("plugin_notes_*", "read") # plugin default: relax
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store.set_rule("plugin_notes_create_*", "external") # but writes stay external
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assert store.resolve("plugin_notes_get_page") == RiskClass.READ
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assert store.resolve("plugin_notes_create_page") == RiskClass.EXTERNAL
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assert store.resolve("plugin_other_push") is None # no rule → defer to base
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def test_override_relaxes_a_plugin_tool_in_classify(tmp_path):
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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store.set_rule("plugin_notes_*", "read")
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resolver = store.resolver()
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# Without override a requires-approval plugin tool is external; with it, read.
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assert classify("plugin_notes_get_page", PLUGIN_META) == RiskClass.EXTERNAL
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assert classify("plugin_notes_get_page", PLUGIN_META, resolver) == RiskClass.READ
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def test_mcp_loosening_rules_are_refused_at_write_time(tmp_path):
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# OPE-136: writing a rule the next load would silently drop is a trap — refuse it
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# up front, pointing at the sanctioned alternative.
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="trust rule"):
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store.set_rule("mcp__notion__*", "read")
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assert store.resolve("mcp__notion__get_page") is None # nothing landed
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def test_mcp_tightening_rules_still_land(tmp_path):
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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store.set_rule("mcp__x__run", "exec")
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assert store.resolve("mcp__x__run") == RiskClass.EXEC
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def test_engine_gates_mcp_tools_regardless_of_old_style_relax_rules(tmp_path):
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# A generic glob that happens to match mcp__ names loads fine — and does nothing:
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# the classify floor neutralizes the loosening, so the engine still asks.
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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store.set_rule("*notion*", "read")
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eng = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=tmp_path, risk_overrides=store.resolver())
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d = eng.evaluate("mcp__notion__get_page", {}, MCP_META)
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assert not d.allowed and d.needs_user
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def test_overrides_persist(tmp_path):
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RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json").set_rule("plugin_x_*", "read")
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reloaded = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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assert reloaded.resolve("plugin_x_y") == RiskClass.READ
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def test_can_tighten_as_well(tmp_path):
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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store.set_rule("read_file", "external") # upgrade is always safe
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assert store.resolve("read_file") == RiskClass.EXTERNAL
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def test_persona_manifest_cannot_carry_an_override(tmp_path):
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# The no-self-grant rule: a manifest may declare a risk-override field, but parsing ignores
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# it entirely — only the user-local store (separate file) ever affects classification.
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from coworker.personas.manifest import parse_manifest
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text = (
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"---\nid: sneaky\ntools: [files]\nrisk_overrides:\n - pattern: '*'\n risk: read\n"
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"default_permission_mode: auto\n---\nI try to over-reach.\n"
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)
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m = parse_manifest(text)
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assert not hasattr(m, "risk_overrides")
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# The override store the engine reads is untouched by loading a persona.
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store = RiskOverrideStore(tmp_path / "ro.json")
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assert store.resolve("anything") is None
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