mirror of
https://github.com/andrewyng/openworker.git
synced 2026-11-20 20:37:44 +00:00
- Bare `env` asks, as `printenv` already does. - `git config` is no longer read-only: settings can hold credentials. - On PowerShell, a recursive Get-ChildItem piped into a cmdlet that reads the listed files asks; piped into Select-Object, Sort-Object or Measure-Object it still runs. - The card offers "Allow read-only commands for this session" using the engine's shell kind, so on Windows it matches what the grant covers.
168 lines
6.6 KiB
Python
168 lines
6.6 KiB
Python
"""The session-scoped read-only command grant (owner ask 2026-08-11).
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The classifier is deliberately fail-closed: local reads and pure pipelines only. A false
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negative costs one manual approval; a false positive costs an unreviewed side effect.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from coworker.permissions import Mode, PermissionEngine
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from coworker.readonly import is_readonly_command
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ACCEPT = [
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"ls -la",
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"cat README.md",
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"grep -rn 'pattern' src",
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"rg --json TODO",
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"nl -ba tests/test_x.py | sed -n '320,345p'",
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"nl -ba a.py | sed -E \"s/'[^']*'/'[REDACTED]'/g\"",
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"git log --oneline -5",
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"git diff main...HEAD",
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"git status",
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"git -C /tmp/repo log -1",
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"git branch --show-current",
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"git stash list",
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"git rev-parse HEAD",
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"git remote -v",
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"jq '.results | length' /tmp/report.json",
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"find . -name '*.py'",
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"find . -newer build.log",
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"LC_ALL=C grep -c uses .github/workflows/ci.yml",
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"command -v semgrep",
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"wc -l file.txt | sort",
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"printf 'a: '",
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"awk '{print $1}' data.txt",
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"awk -F'|' '{print $1}' data.txt",
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"head -20 x | tail -5 | uniq -c",
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# -- the write/exec flags stay denied without taking the plain reads away ---------
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"sort data.txt",
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"xxd dump.bin",
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"xxd -p dump.bin",
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"file magic",
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"date -u +%Y",
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"du -sh .",
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"sed --expression='s/a/b/' data.txt",
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"sed -ne 's/a/b/' data.txt",
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"sed 's/wide/X/' wide.txt",
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"git grep -c needle",
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"git grep --cached needle",
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]
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REJECT = [
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"",
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"rm -rf /",
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"cat a > b", # redirection
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"cat a >> b",
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"grep x f 2>/dev/null", # even stderr redirects
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"ls; rm -rf /", # chaining
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"ls && touch x",
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"cat `whoami`", # substitution
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"cat $(secret)",
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"grep '$(x)' file", # can't tell quoted-safe apart — fail closed
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r"cat $env:APPDATA\coworker\secrets.json", # PowerShell variable expansion
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r"cat $HOME/.config/coworker/secrets.json", # POSIX variable expansion
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r"cat ${HOME}/.config/coworker/secrets.json", # POSIX braced expansion
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"curl https://api.github.com/repos/x", # network = exfil channel, excluded
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"wget http://x",
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"ssh host ls",
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"python3 -c 'print(1)'", # interpreters
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"bash -c ls",
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"sed -i 's/a/b/' f", # in-place write
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"sed -n 'w /tmp/x' f", # sed write command
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"sed -f script.sed f", # script file could carry w
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"awk '{print > \"f\"}' x", # awk redirection
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"awk 'BEGIN{system(\"rm x\")}'",
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"find . -delete",
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"find . -exec rm {} ;",
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"git push origin main",
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"git branch new-branch", # creates
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"git tag v1", # creates
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"git stash", # writes
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"git config user.name evil", # writes
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"git -c core.pager='touch x' log", # exec hook via -c
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"git log --output=/tmp/f", # write via flag
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"git grep -O./pwn.sh needle", # exec via pager
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"git grep --open-files-in-pager=sh needle",
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"git grep --open-files-in-pager needle", # pager defaults to less, still exec-shaped
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"/tmp/evil/cat file", # path-invoked binary
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"env FOO=1 rm x",
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"tee /tmp/x",
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"xargs rm",
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"ls | tee /tmp/x", # every pipeline stage must classify
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"ls |", # dangling pipe
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"sudo cat /etc/shadow",
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# -- flags that turn a listed reader into a writer or an executor ---------------
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"sort -o /tmp/f data.txt", # writes the sorted output
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"sort -o/tmp/f data.txt", # attached value
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"sort --output=/tmp/f data.txt",
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"sort --output /tmp/f data.txt",
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"sort -ro /tmp/f data.txt", # cluster
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"sort --compress-program=./p data.txt", # executes the compressor
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"xxd -r dump.hex out.bin", # reverse mode writes the outfile
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"xxd payload.txt direct.bin", # the outfile needs no flag at all
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"rg --pre ./pwn.sh pattern file.txt", # executes the preprocessor
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"rg --pre=./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",
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"rg --hostname-bin=./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",
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"rg --pager ./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",
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"file -C -m magic", # compiles magic.mgc
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"file --compile -m magic",
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"date -s 2020-01-01", # sets the system clock
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"date --set=2020-01-01",
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"du --files0-from=/etc/list", # reads filenames the scoper cannot see
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"sed -e'w /tmp/f' data.txt", # attached -e script carries the write
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"sed --expression='w /tmp/f' data.txt",
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"sed -n '1wout.txt' data.txt", # attached filename after an address
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"sed 's/a/b/w out.txt' data.txt", # substitution flag
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"sed 's/a/b/wout.txt' data.txt",
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"sed '1w w1.txt' data.txt",
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"awk 'BEGIN{print \"x\" | \"sh\"}'", # pipe to a command executes
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"awk 'BEGIN{\"id\" | getline x}'",
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"awk -f prog.awk data.txt", # program file can carry system()/pipes
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"awk --file=prog.awk data.txt",
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("cmd", ACCEPT)
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def test_classifier_accepts(cmd):
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assert is_readonly_command(cmd) is True, cmd
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("cmd", REJECT)
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def test_classifier_rejects(cmd):
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assert is_readonly_command(cmd) is False, cmd
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def test_engine_grant_gates_on_classifier(tmp_path):
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eng = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=tmp_path, mode=Mode.INTERACTIVE, shell_kind="bash")
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class Meta:
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category = "shell"
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risk_level = "high"
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capabilities = ["exec"]
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# Before the grant: a read-only command still asks.
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d = eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "ls -la"}, Meta())
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assert d.needs_user
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eng.allow_readonly_for_session()
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assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "ls -la"}, Meta()).allowed
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assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "git log -1"}, Meta()).allowed
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# The grant never covers writes/network — those keep asking.
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assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "rm -rf x"}, Meta()).needs_user
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assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "curl https://x"}, Meta()).needs_user
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def test_grant_persists_via_session_grants(tmp_path):
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from coworker.server.manager import _grants_of
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class FakeEngine:
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class permissions:
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session_allow_tools = set()
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session_allow_commands = set()
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session_readonly = True
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grants = _grants_of(FakeEngine)
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assert grants == {"tools": [], "commands": [], "readonly": True}
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