Files
openworker/coworker/config.py
T
Devika Verma a442e0e0b8 PR1: split egress out of READ, stop override downgrades, scope patch writes
Three gate defects, each verified by direct execution before and after.

1. web_fetch was RiskClass.READ, so is_consequential() was False and evaluate()
   returned allow on its third rung -- before any rule, mode or PDP, in EVERY
   mode including plan/discuss. A URL's query string carries data outbound, so
   this was an ungated egress path. New RiskClass.EGRESS covers model-chosen
   network reads; web_search stays READ (fixed configured provider, not a
   model-chosen host). Adds an allowed_domains allowlist (exact host or
   subdomain; 'evil-python.org' never matches 'python.org'), a session-scoped
   "always allow this domain" grant, and ApprovalOutcome.ALWAYS_DOMAIN.

2. A risk override could DOWNGRADE a built-in: marking write_file as read made
   is_write False (skipping path scoping) and consequential False (skipping the
   read-only gate) at once -- one settings line disabling two protections, in
   every future session. Overrides may now only tighten a built-in write/exec/
   egress tool; relaxing a metadata/MCP tool (the intended use) still works.

3. Path scoping read a literal "path" argument, so apply_patch and
   apply_unified_diff -- whose paths live inside the patch/diff blob -- were
   never scoped at all. write_paths() extracts them from the blob and scopes
   every one; a write whose path cannot be located now fails closed to approval
   rather than slipping through auto/custom unscoped.

allowed_domains is user-global only, alongside auto_allow: a cloned repo must
not be able to widen the agent's network reach.

Golden matrix: web_fetch interactive allow->ask, plan allow->deny, plus new
egress/patch rows (31 rows green). test_permissions_risk's override test
asserted the old downgrade behavior and is updated to the tightening rule.
Full suite: 22 failures, all pre-existing on the unmodified tree (boto3 absent,
Windows symlink privilege, Slack socket timeouts) -- none introduced here.

Design of record: ocw-context/docs/reviewed-auto-mode.md Part 3.
2026-08-11 11:37:46 -07:00

140 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Configuration — layered TOML: built-in defaults < global < per-workspace.
Global: <state-dir>/config.toml (see `secrets.state_dir`; platform-native)
Workspace: <workspace>/.coworker/config.toml (overrides global)
Workspace command allowances apply only after the user trusts that exact canonical
workspace path. Other permission grants remain global-only.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
try:
import tomllib # stdlib since 3.11
except ModuleNotFoundError: # 3.10, the floor requires-python declares
import tomli as tomllib # type: ignore[no-redef]
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Optional
from .secrets import state_dir
# Commands auto-run WITHOUT an approval prompt. There is no generally safe executable:
# nominally read-only programs can read secrets outside the workspace, expand environment
# variables, load project-controlled config/plugins, or execute helpers (for example
# `find -exec` and pytest collection). Keep the built-in list empty. A user may explicitly
# opt into command prefixes in their user-owned global config, accepting that authority.
DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS: list[str] = []
@dataclass
class Config:
model: str = "gpt-5.6-sol"
mode: str = "interactive"
max_iterations: int = 150
allowed_commands: list[str] = field(
default_factory=lambda: list(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS)
)
# In "custom" permission mode, these tools are auto-approved (e.g. file edits)
# while everything else still asks.
auto_allow: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
# Egress destinations `web_fetch` may reach WITHOUT an approval prompt (exact host or
# subdomain). Empty by default — the first fetch to any host asks. A power-user opt-in,
# like `allowed_commands`; user-global only, so a repo can't widen the agent's network reach.
allowed_domains: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
host: str = "127.0.0.1"
port: int = 8765
# Web search provider: "duckduckgo" (keyless default) | "tavily" | "brave" (need a key).
web_search_provider: str = "duckduckgo"
# OpenWorker Cloud (sign-in + managed connectors). Config, never constants:
# dev/staging/BYO-VPC deployments point these at their own instances.
cloud_base_url: str = "https://api.openworker.com"
# Auth0 tenant + API audience are registered identifiers, not branding: the
# tenant name can never be renamed, and the audience must match the API
# identifier registered in Auth0 — both keep the legacy value on purpose.
cloud_auth_domain: str = "opencoworker.us.auth0.com"
cloud_client_id: str = "g1l4Q1lhYWmyS03qPSf4KEJGrgq02Qam"
cloud_audience: str = "https://api.opencoworker.app"
# Managed relay WebSocket endpoint (Slack/GitHub inbound). Defaults to the
# PRODUCTION relay so a fresh install relays out of the box — an empty
# default shipped once as "connected but relay OFF" on every machine
# without a hand-edited config.toml. Empty override ⇒ relay disabled
# (manual Socket Mode still works); dev/BYO deployments point elsewhere.
cloud_relay_ws_url: str = (
"wss://l4z1paxb83.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ocw-connect"
)
_FIELDS = {
"model",
"mode",
"max_iterations",
"allowed_commands",
"auto_allow",
"allowed_domains",
"host",
"port",
"web_search_provider",
"cloud_base_url",
"cloud_auth_domain",
"cloud_client_id",
"cloud_audience",
"cloud_relay_ws_url",
}
# These fields change what consequential actions can run without a prompt, so the normal
# workspace override pass never applies them. `allowed_commands` is added separately only
# for a canonically trusted workspace; `auto_allow` and `allowed_domains` remain user-global
# only (a repo must not be able to widen the agent's command or network reach).
_GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS = {"allowed_commands", "auto_allow", "allowed_domains"}
_WORKSPACE_FIELDS = _FIELDS - _GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS
def global_config_path() -> Path:
return state_dir() / "config.toml"
def _read(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
with open(path, "rb") as f:
return tomllib.load(f)
except (OSError, tomllib.TOMLDecodeError):
return {}
def workspace_allowed_commands(workspace: str | Path) -> list[str]:
"""Command prefixes requested by repository config; advisory until workspace trust."""
path = Path(workspace).expanduser() / ".coworker" / "config.toml"
value = _read(path).get("allowed_commands", [])
if not isinstance(value, list):
return []
return list(dict.fromkeys(v.strip() for v in value if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip()))
def load_config(
workspace: Optional[str | Path] = None,
*,
global_path: Optional[Path] = None,
workspace_trusted: bool = False,
) -> Config:
cfg = Config()
g = Path(global_path) if global_path is not None else global_config_path()
if g.is_file():
for key, value in _read(g).items():
if key in _FIELDS:
setattr(cfg, key, value)
if workspace:
w = Path(workspace).expanduser() / ".coworker" / "config.toml"
if w.is_file():
for key, value in _read(w).items():
if key in _WORKSPACE_FIELDS:
setattr(cfg, key, value)
if workspace_trusted:
cfg.allowed_commands = list(
dict.fromkeys(
[*cfg.allowed_commands, *workspace_allowed_commands(workspace)]
)
)
return cfg