Found while designing reviewer stress scenarios: _authorize consulted
the reviewer on ANY needs_user decision, but two asks exist precisely
so a PERSON sees them - protected in-project files that execute later
(.git/hooks, CI configs: 'no auto-approve path may clear them') and
writes whose path cannot be located for scoping (an allow would bypass
root scoping unverified). A reviewer 'allow' on either was that floor's
bypass; the 8.3 prompt's git-hook example hoped for unsure but nothing
enforced it.
Decision grows human_only; the two branches set it; _authorize and
_preconsult_reviewer skip the reviewer when it's set (card always).
Shadow recording is untouched - a shadow verdict has no decision path
and 'would the reviewer have allowed this?' is useful data.
Devika Verma
b5a93fb138