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Whether a model declines to upload a .env file is model behaviour, not policy, and OpenWorker lets users pick any model. A new floor, placed with the other human-only floors (ahead of every allowlist, the allowed-sites wall and the reviewer): an action that sends data off the machine (egress or external risk: web tools, connector writes, MCP tools; or a shell command running a network client) AND names a secret-looking file (.env*, *.pem, id_rsa*, credentials*, *token*, ...) or carries a secret-looking value (private-key headers, sk-, AKIA, ghp_, xox?- shapes, api_key = <long value>) is human-only in every asking mode and in bypass-approvals; dangerous-bypass clears it and records the floor. Templates and public keys (.env.example, *.sample, *.pub) are not secrets. A backstop on top of the sandbox network allowlist: shell egress can't be recognised completely. Corpora: gate-104 (browser upload of an SSH key) moves from reviewer_eligible to human_only (secure stays hard_deny); four secret-egress gate rows are appended (gate-133..136). Seven frozen legacy reviewer rows the floor now intercepts (danger-003/010, inject-001/002/008/014/016) stay as they are; the hygiene test lists them explicitly and checks they're caught by this floor. Docs: the floor joins the safety-check list; the Windows sandbox page notes what "Allow everything" leaves to the approval flow.