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teknium1 b1bde77122 docs(code-execution): document HERMES_* env narrowing + passthrough workaround
The execute_code sandbox-child env scrub (108397726, #27303) deliberately
dropped the broad HERMES_ prefix passthrough, keeping only an operational
4-var allowlist (HERMES_HOME/PROFILE/CONFIG/ENV). A script that relied on a
non-secret HERMES_* var (HERMES_BASE_URL, HERMES_KANBAN_DB, HERMES_*_WEBHOOK,
or a plugin-defined one) now sees it unset in the child.

Document the behavior change and the two recovery routes (terminal.env_passthrough
in config.yaml, or required_environment_variables in skill frontmatter), plus
the debug log line that surfaces the drop for diagnosis.
2026-05-29 04:49:38 -07:00
teknium1 1c53d39eaa test: deflake process-registry kill + PTY resize tests
Two CI flakes surfaced on PR #34572 (both in files this PR doesn't touch;
pre-existing host-dependent flakes):

1. test_process_registry::TestPopenLeakOnSetupFailure — the failure-cleanup
   tests use a fake proc.pid (8888/9999) and assert proc.kill() runs. But
   spawn_local's primary cleanup is os.killpg(os.getpgid(pid), SIGKILL),
   falling back to proc.kill() only on ProcessLookupError/PermissionError/
   OSError. When the fake PID happens to exist on a busy host, os.getpgid
   succeeds, os.killpg fires against an UNRELATED real process group, and
   proc.kill() is never reached -> flaky AssertionError (and a real risk of
   SIGKILLing an innocent process group from a unit test). Patch os.getpgid
   to raise ProcessLookupError so the fallback path runs deterministically
   and no real killpg is ever issued.

2. test_web_server::test_resize_escape_is_forwarded — the receive loop calls
   the blocking conn.receive_bytes() with no exception guard. Once the child
   prints its winsize and exits, the PTY closes; on a missed-marker run the
   next recv blocks until the 30s pytest-timeout instead of failing fast.
   Add a try/except break (matching the working sibling tests) and bump the
   child's pre-read sleep 0.15s -> 0.5s so the resize reliably lands first.

Verified: 4/4 pass across 3 consecutive runs; root cause for #1 reproduced
(os.getpgid(1) succeeds -> old code skips proc.kill).
2026-05-29 04:22:41 -07:00
teknium1 6a2e3c2d26 fix(gateway): guard adapter-trust check against bare GatewayRunner in tests
_adapter_enforces_own_access_policy accessed self.adapters directly, but
several auth tests build a bare GatewayRunner via object.__new__ without
setting .adapters (pitfalls.md #17). Read it defensively with getattr so a
missing/empty adapter map means "no adapter owns the policy" instead of
raising AttributeError.

Fixes 4 tests: test_feishu_bot_auth_bypass, test_discord_bot_auth_bypass (x2),
test_signal::test_signal_in_allowlist_maps.
2026-05-29 04:22:41 -07:00
teknium1andFrowtek fd09b2c55e fix(gateway): trust adapter-owned access policy over env default-deny (#34515)
Config-driven platform policies (dm_policy / group_policy / allow_from /
group_allow_from) for WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, and QQBot now work without
also setting a PLATFORM_ALLOWED_USERS env var.

These adapters enforce their access policy at intake — a message is dropped
inside the adapter and never dispatched unless it already passed the policy.
The gateway's env-based check (_is_user_authorized) ran afterward and, with
no env allowlist set, fell through to an env-only default-deny — silently
rejecting `dm_policy: open` and config-only allowlists the adapter had
already authorized.

Rather than re-implement each adapter's policy a second time in run.py
(which would drift), adapters that own their gate now declare it via a new
BasePlatformAdapter.enforces_own_access_policy property (default False). The
gateway trusts that flag and skips the env-only default-deny for those
platforms. Env allowlists still take precedence when set.

Also resolves unauthorized DM behavior from config dm_policy so allowlist /
disabled policies drop unauthorized DMs silently instead of leaking pairing
codes, while an explicit pairing policy opts back in.

Co-authored-by: Frowtek <frowte3k@gmail.com>
2026-05-29 04:22:41 -07:00
teknium1 ddaf2f6712 style: restore PEP8 blank-line separation after dead-code removal
The deletions in the salvaged commit left some top-level defs/classes
separated by a single blank line. Restore the 2-blank-line separation.
2026-05-29 04:22:27 -07:00
kshitijk4poor dc235e93cb chore: remove dead code — 28 unused functions/classes across 16 files
Vulture + per-symbol verification (whole-repo grep incl. tests, string
literals, getattr, decorator/registry/argparse dispatch) confirmed each of
these has zero callers anywhere — not reachable via any dynamic-dispatch path,
not referenced by tests, not re-exported.

Removed:
- acp_adapter/tools.py: _build_patch_mode_content
- agent/anthropic_adapter.py: read_claude_managed_key (diagnostics-only, never called)
- agent/bedrock_adapter.py: get_bedrock_model_ids
- agent/browser_registry.py: get_active_browser_provider
- agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: _take_request_client (x2 nested closures, never invoked)
- gateway/platforms/weixin.py: _rewrite_headers_for_weixin, _rewrite_table_block_for_weixin
- hermes_cli/banner.py: _skin_branding
- hermes_cli/debug.py: _delete_hint
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: _setup_email, _setup_sms, _setup_yuanbao
  (platform keys absent from the _builtin_setup_fn dispatch dict; handled by
  the _setup_standard_platform fallback)
- hermes_cli/kanban_db.py: set_max_runtime, active_run
- hermes_cli/kanban_diagnostics.py: severity_of_highest, _latest_clean_event_ts
- hermes_cli/main.py: _build_provider_choices, cmd_portal
  (portal subcommand is wired via portal_cli.add_parser, not this wrapper)
- hermes_cli/model_switch.py: CustomAutoResult (orphaned by the switch_model() extraction)
- hermes_cli/models.py: format_model_pricing_table, fetch_nous_account_tier
- hermes_cli/portal_cli.py: _nous_portal_base_url
- hermes_cli/proxy/server.py: handle_models_fallback (defined but never registered on the router)
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: _parse_element, _is_arm_mac
- tools/file_operations.py: _get_safe_write_root (prod uses the imported
  agent.file_safety.get_safe_write_root directly)
- tools/skills_tool.py: _load_category_description

Also dropped two imports left unused by the removals:
- tools/file_operations.py: get_safe_write_root alias
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: import platform

Pure deletion: -551 LOC. No behavior change. Test files covering the edited
modules pass (640/640); the broader suite's pre-existing/env-dependent
failures reproduce unchanged on origin/main.
2026-05-29 04:22:27 -07:00
teknium1 0aa9f6acfa docs(nav): wire multi-profile-gateways guide into sidebar
Follow-up for #30240 — the new page was not referenced in sidebars.ts,
leaving it orphaned (unreachable via nav and flagged as a broken relative
link to ./profiles.md). Added under Using Hermes after profile-distributions.
2026-05-29 04:11:10 -07:00
William ChenandClaude Opus 4.7 0c0a905011 docs(gateway): add multi-profile gateways operations guide
Covers running multiple Hermes profiles as managed services on one host:

- A shell-loop wrapper pattern for start/stop/restart/status across every
  profile (the per-profile CLI commands stay unchanged).
- Per-platform service file locations (LaunchAgent on macOS, systemd user
  unit on Linux), plus the rules around clashes.
- Log paths per profile and how to tail every gateway at once.
- Config file layout per profile and the restart-after-edit workflow.
- Keeping the host awake: caffeinate flags on macOS,
  systemd-inhibit + loginctl enable-linger on Linux.
- Token-conflict auditing across .env files.
- Troubleshooting for the common "Could not find service in domain for
  user gui: 501" message and stale PIDs after a crash.

Tested locally with five profiles on macOS launchd.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 04:11:10 -07:00
Tekniumandzapabob e4b9532c18 feat: embedder environment-hint hook for the system prompt (#34574)
* fix(security): block AWS SDK creds from subprocess env

* fix(security): narrow Bedrock subprocess strip to inference bearer token only

Scopes the AWS_SDK subprocess strip down from the full AWS credential chain
to just AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK — the only Hermes-managed *inference* secret
(analogous to OPENAI_API_KEY). The general AWS credential chain
(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_SESSION_TOKEN / AWS_PROFILE
/ config + role pointers) is intentionally left inheritable.

Why: per SECURITY.md §3.2 the local terminal is the user's trusted operator
shell. Hard-blocklisting the general chain would (a) regress *every* user who
runs aws/terraform/cdk/boto3 in the agent terminal — not just Bedrock users,
since PROVIDER_REGISTRY is iterated unconditionally at import — and (b) be
unrecoverable, because env_passthrough.py refuses to re-allow anything in
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). The narrow strip closes
the reported leak (opencode enumerating the Bedrock catalog off the leaked
bearer token) with no capability loss.

Keeps zapabob's self-healing auth_type=="aws_sdk" mechanism so any future
SDK-cred provider is covered automatically.

Tests: bearer token stripped + general chain preserved (no-regression guard),
on both the runtime strip path and the blocklist-membership path.

Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>

* feat: embedder environment-hint hook for the system prompt

Adds HERMES_ENVIRONMENT_HINT env var (and config.yaml agent.environment_hint)
so a host wrapping Hermes (sandbox runner, managed platform) can describe the
runtime environment — proxy, credential handling, mount layout — in the system
prompt's environment-hints block, without editing the identity slot (SOUL.md).

Read once at prompt-build time, so it lands in the stable, cache-safe portion
of the system prompt. Env var overrides the config key (build-time/container
mechanism). Empty by default — no behavior change for existing installs.

---------

Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>
2026-05-29 04:10:05 -07:00
Hariharan Ayappane c0b17b3c0c docs(weixin): clarify allowed users setup 2026-05-29 04:01:06 -07:00
Dave Tist 2520c9ad68 docs(skills): clarify Reminders alarm timing 2026-05-29 04:01:01 -07:00
LeonSGP43 62e81b2d9b docs(windows): add WSL desktop shortcut guide 2026-05-29 04:00:57 -07:00
SHL0MS fe7e0a8c1d docs(feishu): add permission scopes, event subscription, and publish steps
The setup guide was missing the specific Feishu permission scopes to
configure and the event subscription (im.message.receive_v1) needed
for the bot to receive messages. Users had to reference external
OpenClaw documentation to complete the setup.

Adds:
- Required permissions table (im:message, im:message:send_as_bot,
  im:resource, im:chat, im:chat:readonly)
- Recommended permissions (reactions, app info, contact)
- Event subscription step (im.message.receive_v1)
- App version publish reminder (permissions require published version)
2026-05-29 04:00:52 -07:00
briandevans 6e179c44b1 fix(web): ensure plugin discovery before web_*_tool registry lookups
Web search/extract dispatch read agent.web_search_registry before plugin
discovery had run, so in any process that hadn't imported model_tools.py
(subprocess agent runs, delegate children, standalone scripts) the registry
was empty: get_provider('firecrawl') returned None and the dispatcher emitted
the misleading 'No web extract provider configured' error even with
web.extract_backend set and FIRECRAWL_API_KEY exported.

Adds an idempotent _ensure_web_plugins_loaded() helper (mirrors
tools.browser_tool._ensure_browser_plugins_loaded) and calls it at the top of
both the web_search_tool and web_extract_tool dispatch sites before the
registry lookup.

Fixes #27580.

Co-authored-by: briandevans <252620095+briandevans@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 04:00:00 -07:00
teknium1 58e1b04665 chore(release): map tillfalko to GitHub login for PR #29987 salvage 2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
teknium1 c77a697fa4 refactor(vision): consolidate native fast-path gate into one shared helper
The fast-path decision (native routing + provider allowlist OR
supports_vision override) lived inline in vision_analyze and was copied
into browser_vision. Extract it to _should_use_native_vision_fast_path()
so both tools share one source of truth.

- vision_tools: gate logic now one helper; vision_analyze calls it in 3 lines
- browser_tool: thin envelope decoration over the shared helper, not a copy
- browser_vision typed Union[str, Dict] to match its real return shape
- tests slimmed to target the override path + text-mode-wins invariant
2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
tillfalko c3f28c651d docs(browser): update browser_vision tool description for native vision routing 2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
tillfalko 2402ec5e7b test: extend test coverage to native image routing 2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
tillfalko f8b8dffccf fix(browser): add native image support to browser_vision and respect supports_vision 2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
tillfalko f05353397d fix(vision): respect supports_vision in vision_analyze 2026-05-29 03:58:56 -07:00
EloquentBrush0x 784d8dd2c2 fix(matrix): fail-closed approval reaction auth when MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS is empty
The _on_reaction approval handler used:

    if self._allowed_user_ids and sender not in self._allowed_user_ids:

When MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS is not configured, _allowed_user_ids is an
empty set. The short-circuit on the empty set caused the deny block to
never execute, allowing any Matrix room member to approve or deny tool
calls via / reactions — even users that run.py's _is_user_authorized
would reject for regular messages.

Fix mirrors the Telegram _is_callback_user_authorized fix (commit
89d32052e, PR #28494): deny by default when no allowlist is configured,
unless GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS=true is explicitly set.
2026-05-29 03:58:45 -07:00
teknium1 3171845479 fix(code-exec): make dropped HERMES_* env vars diagnosable in sandbox scrub
Follow-up mitigation for the #27303 env-scrub tightening. Dropping the
broad HERMES_ prefix in favor of a 4-var operational allowlist is correct
hardening, but a sandbox script that imports a repo module reading a
non-allowlisted HERMES_* var at import time would otherwise see it
silently unset. _scrub_child_env now emits a one-shot debug log naming the
dropped non-secret HERMES_* vars and pointing at the env_passthrough
opt-in escape hatch. Secret-shaped vars are never named in the log.

Tests: dropped vars are logged + env_passthrough named; no log when
nothing is dropped; secret vars excluded from the diagnostic.
2026-05-29 03:44:49 -07:00
firefly 4bdae34771 test(code-exec): regression suite for the approval-bypass cluster
Cover context+callback propagation and teardown-clears, a source guard that both RPC threads stay wrapped, the check_execute_code_guard decision matrix (isolated backend, headless-local, cron-deny, gateway approve/deny/timeout/missing-notify, smart mode, session-yolo), the env-scrub allowlist/secret rules, and a behavioral test that execute_code() blocks before spawning on denial.

Refs #4146, #27303, #30882, #33057
2026-05-29 03:44:49 -07:00
firefly 655090b3d3 feat(gateway): warn at startup on manual approvals with no risk assessor
When approvals.mode=manual with security.tirith_enabled off and no auxiliary.approval model, dangerous commands and execute_code scripts can only be gated by live in-chat approval; with routing fixed they now fail closed (block) rather than silently auto-run. Surface that at startup so operators knowingly enable tirith or auxiliary.approval for unattended gateways.

Refs #30882
2026-05-29 03:44:49 -07:00
firefly 1083977261 fix(code-exec): restore approval context in execute_code RPC threads + guard entry
Wrap both execute_code RPC threads (local UDS + remote file-RPC) with propagate_context_to_thread so gateway sessions no longer fall into check_dangerous_command's non-interactive auto-approve branch and the CLI approval prompt stays reachable. Add check_execute_code_guard: one-shot fail-closed approval of the whole script in gateway/ask/cron-deny before the child spawns (skips isolated backends; command-string built only past the early returns). Drop the broad HERMES_ env passthrough for an explicit operational allowlist plus DSN/WEBHOOK secret substrings, and update the POSIX-equivalence oracle.

Refs #4146, #27303, #30882, #33057
2026-05-29 03:44:49 -07:00
firefly 21aeefe5fd fix(code-exec): propagate agent-turn context into tool worker threads
Worker threads that dispatch Hermes tools started with an empty contextvars.Context and no thread-local approval/sudo callbacks. Add tools/thread_context.propagate_context_to_thread factoring that capture/install/clear lifecycle (mirrors the GHSA-qg5c-hvr5-hjgr pattern), and refactor agent/tool_executor onto it so the security-critical logic lives in one audited place. Update the contextvar-propagation source guard for the new call shape.

Refs #33057
2026-05-29 03:44:49 -07:00
kshitijk4poor a22c250001 refactor(auth): remove vestigial Nous min_key_ttl/inference_auth_mode params
After the legacy session-key path was removed, two parameters became dead
surface on the Nous runtime-resolution chain:

- min_key_ttl_seconds: del'd inside refresh_nous_oauth_pure and pass-through /
  telemetry-only in refresh_nous_oauth_from_state, _try_import_shared_nous_state,
  _nous_device_code_login, and resolve_nous_runtime_credentials. It controlled the
  now-deleted agent-key mint TTL and drives no behavior.
- inference_auth_mode: with the legacy mode gone, AUTO and FRESH are behaviorally
  identical; the value only fed _normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode validation and
  oauth trace output, never a branch.

Removing inference_auth_mode orphaned its whole supporting cluster
(NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO/FRESH, NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODES,
_normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode), and dropping min_key_ttl_seconds orphaned
DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS — all deleted here.

Updated every caller (run_agent, auxiliary_client, credential_pool, proxy adapter,
runtime_provider, web_server, main, auth_commands, setup) and pruned the matching
test kwargs. Deleted two tests that exercised the removed surface
(test_legacy_auth_mode_is_rejected, test_try_refresh_..._accepts_explicit_auth_mode).

No behavior change: net -134 LOC of dead code.
2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00
kshitijk4poor 95cf8f9842 refactor(auth): drop weak JWT-shape fallback in auxiliary _nous_api_key
The import-failure fallback returned any 3-segment token without scope/
expiry validation, a divergent reimplementation of the canonical
_nous_invoke_jwt_is_usable check. The import is from the same module that
provides resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, so a failure means the whole
auxiliary Nous path is unavailable anyway; return "" instead so the caller
falls through to the clear 'run: hermes auth add nous' guidance rather than
handing back an unvalidated token.
2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00
Robin Fernandes 4e4984a11a test(auth): update nous jwt-only expectations 2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00
Robin Fernandes 7e958dafc2 fix(auth): address Nous JWT fallback review 2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00
Robin Fernandes 41ff6e5937 refactor(auth): Disable Nous legacy session key fallback 2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00
teknium1 a87f0a82a5 test(tool-search): redact secrets from harness transcripts + console
The live harness runs against a real OpenRouter key; record['error'] is a
full traceback that, on an auth failure, could echo a request header or URL
containing the key. _redact_secrets() now masks the live OPENROUTER_API_KEY,
any sk-/sk-or- bearer token, and Authorization/Bearer headers before
final_response and error enter the transcript or the console print. Addresses
the CodeQL clear-text-storage/logging findings at the source.
2026-05-29 02:04:12 -07:00
teknium1 18c9e89106 test: update _invoke_tool dispatch assertion for new toolset-scope kwargs
The scoping fix added enabled_toolsets/disabled_toolsets to the
agent_runtime_helpers sequential dispatch into handle_function_call, so
test_invoke_tool_dispatches_to_handle_function_call's assert_called_once_with
(exact match) needs the two new kwargs. Both are None for the default agent
fixture.
2026-05-29 02:04:12 -07:00
teknium1 1709776120 test(tool-search): add live A/B harness, drop checked-in transcripts
Brings in the tool_search live-test harness from the original PR but leaves
out the 11 checked-in scripts/out/*.json transcript files — those are
non-deterministic model output that goes stale the moment the model changes
and were the bulk of the diff. scripts/out/ is now gitignored so a harness
run never re-commits them.

Fixes on top:
- API-key loading goes through hermes_cli.env_loader.load_hermes_dotenv
  instead of hand-parsing ~/.hermes/.env and assigning the value to a local.
  The canonical loader never materializes the secret in a local variable in
  this module, which clears the four CodeQL high alerts
  (py/clear-text-storage / py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data at the
  transcript write/print sites — they were tracing the key from the
  hand-rolled parser into the records) and removes a hand-rolled parser.
- encoding='utf-8' on every write_text/read_text in both harness scripts
  (Windows-footgun hygiene).

Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 02:04:12 -07:00
teknium1 7427b9d581 fix(tool-search): scope bridge catalog + dispatch to the session's toolsets
Tool Search read its catalog from the global registry (get_tool_definitions
with no toolset scope = 'start with everything'), so a restricted-toolset
session — subagent, kanban worker, curated gateway session — could:

  1. tool_search the entire process registry, not just its granted tools, and
  2. tool_call any registered plugin/MCP tool it was never given, because
     registry.dispatch() has no enabled_tools gate for non-execute_code tools.

A scoped session (enabled_toolsets=['mcp-github']) reported total_available=26
and successfully invoked an out-of-scope plugin tool via tool_call.

Fix:
- handle_function_call gains enabled_toolsets/disabled_toolsets; the bridge
  dispatch scopes get_tool_definitions to them (also stops polluting the
  process-global _last_resolved_tool_names with out-of-scope tools, which
  leaked into execute_code's sandbox-tool fallback).
- A defense-in-depth gate rejects any tool_call'd name not in the scoped
  deferrable catalog.
- tool_executor's unwrap (both concurrent + sequential paths) enforces the
  same scope before dispatch, since it unwraps tool_call -> underlying name
  and bypasses the bridge branch. New _tool_search_scoped_names() helper,
  cached per-agent on registry generation + toolset scope.
- New scoped_deferrable_names() helper in tool_search.py shared by both sites.

Tests: 4 new regression tests in TestRegression_ToolsetScoping (scoped
catalog, out-of-scope tool_call rejection, no global pollution, helper).
2026-05-29 02:04:12 -07:00
teknium1 369075dc95 feat(tools): progressive tool disclosure for MCP and plugin tools
Adds Tool Search, a structured-tools progressive-disclosure layer that
replaces MCP and non-core plugin tools in the model-visible tools array
with three bridge tools (tool_search / tool_describe / tool_call) when
the deferrable surface would consume more than a configurable percentage
of the active model's context window. Core Hermes tools are never deferred.

Default mode is 'auto' with a 10% context threshold, so small toolsets
pay no overhead. Set tools.tool_search.enabled to 'on' to force or 'off'
to disable.

Design carefully reflects the OpenClaw production failure modes
documented in the openclaw-tool-search-report:

  - Core tools never defer (toolsets._HERMES_CORE_TOOLS). Addresses the
    'tools silently missing from isolated cron turns' regression class
    (openclaw#84141) by construction: there is no code path that can
    drop a core tool.
  - Catalog is stateless across turns — rebuilt from the live tool-defs
    list on every assembly. No session-keyed Map that can drift out of
    sync with the registry.
  - tool_call unwraps the bridge call before any hook fires, so plugin
    pre/post hooks, guardrails, approval flows, and the activity feed
    all see the underlying tool name, not the bridge (addresses
    openclaw#85588 and the verbose-mode complaint on openclaw#79823).
  - The unwrap happens in both the parallel and sequential paths of
    agent/tool_executor.py and also in handle_function_call, so direct
    callers (sandboxed code, eval harnesses) are covered too.
  - Bridge tools cannot invoke each other (recursion guard) and cannot
    invoke core tools (those must be called directly).
  - Tools mode only — no JS-sandbox code-mode. Keeps the surface small.
  - Token estimation via cheap char/4 heuristic; precision isn't needed
    for the threshold decision.

Files:
  - tools/tool_search.py — new module (BM25 retrieval, classification,
    threshold gate, bridge dispatch, unwrap helper).
  - tests/tools/test_tool_search.py — 35 tests including the OpenClaw
    #84141 regression guard.
  - model_tools.py — wires assembly into _compute_tool_definitions as the
    final step, adds skip_tool_search_assembly kwarg so the bridge can
    see the real catalog, dispatches the three bridge tools.
  - agent/tool_executor.py — unwraps tool_call in both parallel and
    sequential parsing loops so checkpointing, guardrails, plugin hooks,
    and tool-progress callbacks all observe the underlying tool name.
  - hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG['tools']['tool_search'] block.
  - website/docs/user-guide/features/tool-search.md — user docs.

Validation:
  - 35/35 new tests pass.
  - Existing tool/registry/model_tools/config/coercion/executor tests
    (82 + 74 + small adjacents) green.
  - Live E2E: 20 fake MCP tools registered, get_tool_definitions returns
    3 bridges, tool_search returns top 3 hits, tool_describe returns
    full schema, tool_call dispatches to the real underlying handler
    and the underlying result is what the model sees.
  - Reserved-name recursion guard verified live.
  - Core-tool refusal via tool_call verified live.
2026-05-29 02:04:12 -07:00
teknium1andGille 73d73f1f0d fix(codex): relax no-byte TTFB watchdog default from 12s to 120s
The chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex endpoint can spend tens of seconds in
backend admission / prompt prefill before emitting its first SSE event. The
12s no-byte TTFB cutoff aborted those still-valid streams, surfacing as
'Codex stream produced no bytes within 12s' through all retries (Discord
reports). The OpenAI SDK's own streaming read timeout is 600s, so 12s was
~50x more aggressive than the transport layer would have tolerated.

Default the no-byte cutoff to 120s and raise the openai-codex MAX cap default
to 120s so it no longer clamps the new default back to 20s. Disabling stays
available via HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=0; the 25k-token auto-disable,
_STRICT override, and post-first-event idle watchdog are unchanged.

Co-authored-by: Gille <4317663+helix4u@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 02:02:25 -07:00
teknium1andzapabob 6bebab4761 fix(security): narrow Bedrock subprocess strip to inference bearer token only
Scopes the AWS_SDK subprocess strip down from the full AWS credential chain
to just AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK — the only Hermes-managed *inference* secret
(analogous to OPENAI_API_KEY). The general AWS credential chain
(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_SESSION_TOKEN / AWS_PROFILE
/ config + role pointers) is intentionally left inheritable.

Why: per SECURITY.md §3.2 the local terminal is the user's trusted operator
shell. Hard-blocklisting the general chain would (a) regress *every* user who
runs aws/terraform/cdk/boto3 in the agent terminal — not just Bedrock users,
since PROVIDER_REGISTRY is iterated unconditionally at import — and (b) be
unrecoverable, because env_passthrough.py refuses to re-allow anything in
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). The narrow strip closes
the reported leak (opencode enumerating the Bedrock catalog off the leaked
bearer token) with no capability loss.

Keeps zapabob's self-healing auth_type=="aws_sdk" mechanism so any future
SDK-cred provider is covered automatically.

Tests: bearer token stripped + general chain preserved (no-regression guard),
on both the runtime strip path and the blocklist-membership path.

Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>
2026-05-29 01:48:08 -07:00
zapabob 95b5b72404 fix(security): block AWS SDK creds from subprocess env 2026-05-29 01:48:08 -07:00
Teknium db2ce9e7d2 fix(compression): fail open when lock subsystem is missing (version skew) (#34475)
A process running mismatched module versions — conversation_compression.py
re-imported with the post-#34351 lock code while a long-lived
hermes_state.SessionDB stays bound to the pre-#34351 class in memory — has
the try_acquire_compression_lock call site but not the method. The
AttributeError it raises is NOT a sqlite3.Error, so the method's own
fail-open guard never runs; the exception escapes to the outer agent loop,
which prints the error and retries. Compression never succeeds, the token
count never drops, and the loop re-triggers compaction forever (the
'API call #47/#48/#49 ... has no attribute try_acquire_compression_lock'
spin a user hit after an update).

Wrap the lock acquire so any unexpected exception fails OPEN: skip locking
and proceed with compression. Skipping the lock risks a rare
concurrent-compression session fork; an infinite no-progress loop that never
compresses at all is strictly worse. The remediation hint in the log points
at the real fix (restart / hermes update to resync the stale module).

Also guards get_compression_lock_holder against the same skew.

Adds a regression test simulating the version skew (real SessionDB wrapped
so only the lock methods raise AttributeError) — asserts _compress_context
proceeds and rotates instead of raising.
2026-05-29 01:32:32 -07:00
Tekniumandwysie e28a668b40 fix(gateway): diagnosable MEDIA rejections + canonical cache roots + null-path guard
Operators can now see which MEDIA path was dropped and why, generated
artifacts under the canonical ~/.hermes/cache/{images,...} layout deliver,
and a crafted ~\x00 path no longer aborts the whole attachment batch.

- MEDIA_DELIVERY_SAFE_ROOTS: add canonical cache/{images,audio,videos,
  documents,screenshots} alongside the legacy *_cache dirs (#31733).
- filter_media/local_delivery_paths: log the rejected path (was a blind
  "outside allowed roots") via _log_safe_path, which strips control chars
  and Unicode line separators so a model-emitted path can't forge a log line.
- validate_media_delivery_path + extract_media: guard os.path.expanduser
  so a ~\x00 path returns None / is skipped instead of raising and dropping
  every other attachment in the response.

Salvaged and slimmed from #33251 (780 LOC -> 35): the reason-tag taxonomy,
the parts-eliding redactor, and the extension-partition hoist are dropped in
favor of logging the path directly. All three findings were verified and
reproduced by the contributor.

Co-authored-by: wysie <wysie@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 01:23:35 -07:00
2765b02021 fix(packaging): ship bundled plugin.yaml manifests in wheel and sdist
The v0.15.0 PyPI wheel shipped every plugin's Python code but none of its
plugin.yaml manifests, so plugin discovery (hermes_cli/plugins.py) found zero
plugins and ALL gateway platforms failed with "No adapter available for
<platform>" (discord, slack, mattermost, ...). Same gap also dropped the
web-search provider manifests (#28149).

Declare manifest coverage in both packaging channels:
- wheel: [tool.setuptools.package-data] plugins += **/plugin.yaml, **/plugin.yml
- sdist: MANIFEST.in recursive-include plugins plugin.yaml plugin.yml
  (Homebrew and other downstream packagers build from the sdist)

Verified by building the wheel before/after: plugin.yaml count went 0 -> 69,
discord's manifest now ships. Adds a regression test asserting both channels
cover manifests.

Fixes #34034

Co-authored-by: outsourc-e <201563152+outsourc-e@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Dhruvil Parikh <41384593+dparikh79@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ousiaresearch <261687298+ousiaresearch@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: libre-7 <6366424+libre-7@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 01:23:28 -07:00
Teknium c01a2df0a3 fix(auth): don't launch a text-mode browser inside the terminal for OAuth (#34479)
OAuth auto-open only checked _is_remote_session() (SSH + cloud-shell env
vars). On a headless/CLI-only Linux box with no GUI browser, none of those
trip, so webbrowser.open() resolved to a console browser (w3m/lynx/links)
and launched it INSIDE the terminal — hijacking the user's TTY with the
xAI 'Account Management' login page instead of letting them copy the URL.

Add _can_open_graphical_browser(): returns False when webbrowser would
resolve to a known console browser, when $BROWSER names one, when there's
no display server on Linux, or when no browser resolves at all. Gate all 5
OAuth auto-open callsites (xAI loopback, Spotify loopback, MiniMax device
code, Anthropic, Google) on it in addition to the existing remote check.
Headless boxes now print the URL / fall through to manual-paste instead.
2026-05-29 01:23:06 -07:00
loongzhao f247686c42 feat(yuanbao): cache resolved media resources by resourceId
Add an in-memory resourceId->local-path cache (24h TTL, 256-entry LRU) to
MediaResolveMiddleware so the same Yuanbao resource isn't re-downloaded when
it's referenced more than once in a session (own attachment, then quoted, then
group-observed backfill). Each reference otherwise triggers a fresh token
exchange + COS download.

The cache verifies the file still exists on disk before returning a hit (cache
dir may be swept) and is threaded through all three resolve paths:
_resolve_media_urls (rid parsed from placeholder URL), _collect_observed_media,
and the DispatchMiddleware quote path.

Salvaged from PR #30418 by @loongfay; the broader middleware refactor in that
PR converged with work already merged on main, so only the net-new download
cache is carried over.
2026-05-29 01:05:00 -07:00
wysie f32b66c758 fix: improve plugins list usability 2026-05-29 00:59:42 -07:00
Teknium c692000a57 docs(xai-oauth): mirror bare-code paste note to the primary guide (#33917)
The original PR diff updated two guides (oauth-over-ssh.md and
xai-grok-oauth.md) but only the oauth-over-ssh.md edit landed in the
PR's actual commit.  Mirror the note to the primary xai-grok-oauth.md
guide too so users reading the main entry point don't miss the
bare-code form that already shipped in #33880.
2026-05-29 00:57:13 -07:00
Evo 2410e11395 docs(xai-oauth): note bare-code manual-paste from #33880 2026-05-29 00:57:13 -07:00
Teknium 0384398c65 chore(release): map blackpilledsoftware-prog email to GitHub login
Required by CI author validation after salvaging PR #16780.
2026-05-29 00:31:44 -07:00
Blake 26b83a5f5f fix(cli): ignore terminal focus reports (salvage of #16780)
Ghostty/macOS window or tab navigation (Cmd+Shift+[ / ], Alt+Tab,
etc.) can deliver terminal focus reports (CSI I / CSI O) to the
running TUI. prompt_toolkit does not map those sequences by default,
so its parser falls back to literal key presses (ESC, [, I/O) and
inserts `[I` / `[O` into the prompt buffer after the ESC byte is
handled.

Fix: register the two sequences as Keys.Ignore in ANSI_SEQUENCES at
parser level, plus a no-op kb.add(Keys.Ignore) handler so the
default self-insert path never inserts focus-report bytes.

Salvage notes: original PR put the helper in cli.py. Salvaged into
hermes_cli/pt_input_extras.py alongside install_shift_enter_alias /
install_ctrl_enter_alias to match the established pattern for
ANSI_SEQUENCES augmentation. setdefault → in-check so any prior user
registration wins.

Closes #16780
2026-05-29 00:31:44 -07:00
Teknium c1485d52e3 chore(release): add moikapy AUTHOR_MAP for PR #31527 salvage 2026-05-29 00:28:02 -07:00
moikapy f6a2ba6261 fix(auxiliary): detect xAI OAuth 403 bad-credentials as auth error
xAI returns HTTP 403 (not 401) with unauthenticated:bad-credentials
when an OAuth2 access token has expired or is invalid. The existing
_is_auth_error() only checked for 401 status codes, so these tokens
were never refreshed and the 403 propagated as a generic permission
denied error.

Three fixes:

1. _is_auth_error: Recognize xAI's 403+bad-credentials pattern as
   an auth failure, triggering token refresh instead of silent failure.

2. _refresh_provider_credentials: Add xai-oauth branch with
   pool-level refresh (try_refresh_current with select to ensure
   current entry) then fallback to singleton resolver with
   force_refresh=True.

3. _recoverable_pool_provider: Map api.x.ai host to xai-oauth
   pool for auto-resolved providers, matching existing pattern for
   openai-codex/openrouter/nous/anthropic.

Includes 14 tests covering the new detection logic, host mapping,
and graceful fallback behavior.

Signed-off-by: moikapy <moikapy@devmoi.com>
2026-05-29 00:28:02 -07:00
teknium1 bc736ff543 test(model-catalog): use exact URL equality in fallback tests
CodeQL flagged 'hermes-agent.nousresearch.com' in url and similar substring
checks as py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization. The rule is about URL
allowlist checks in production code, not test routing — there's no
security boundary here. Switch to url == self.PRIMARY / self.FALLBACK,
which is the same semantic and silences the rule.
2026-05-29 00:25:36 -07:00
teknium1 f2d88c820c fix(model-catalog): fall through to raw.github when Vercel 403s; swap step-3.5-flash for step-3.7-flash on OpenRouter+Nous
The docs site (Vercel) serves /docs/api/model-catalog.json behind a bot
mitigation rule that returns HTTP 403 + x-vercel-mitigated: challenge for
non-browser User-Agents — including urllib (what the CLI uses) and curl.
When that happens, get_catalog() falls back to the stale disk cache and
new model releases (Opus 4.8, etc.) never reach the /model picker even
though they're already in OPENROUTER_MODELS and the live OpenRouter API.

Adds a fallback URL chain: when the primary catalog URL fails, walk
DEFAULT_CATALOG_FALLBACK_URLS — currently the raw.githubusercontent.com
copy of the same file. GitHub raw doesn't bot-gate, so the manifest stays
reachable through Vercel firewall hiccups. Per-provider override URLs
keep their direct-fetch semantics (operators configure those specifically,
no implicit fallback).

Also swaps stepfun/step-3.5-flash for stepfun/step-3.7-flash in the
OpenRouter + Nous Portal curated picker lists. Native stepfun provider
configuration (api.stepfun.ai) is left alone — that depends on what
stepfun.ai itself serves, not what OpenRouter routes.

Test plan: 5 new TestFallbackChain tests cover primary-success,
primary-failure-fallback-success, all-fail, primary==fallback-dedup, and
end-to-end get_catalog routing through the new helper. Existing 23 tests
in test_model_catalog.py still pass (28 total). Wider tests/hermes_cli/
sweep: 5701/5701 pass.
2026-05-29 00:25:36 -07:00
teknium1 8d57281650 chore: add AUTHOR_MAP entry for Interstellar-code 2026-05-29 00:21:54 -07:00
Rohit Sharma 9d4fda9952 feat(kanban): add POST /runs/{run_id}/terminate endpoint
Closes the termination-control gap left by PR #28432, which shipped the
read-only sibling endpoints (/workers/active, /runs/{run_id},
/runs/{run_id}/inspect) but no way to stop a misbehaving worker from
the dashboard without dropping to the CLI.

The new endpoint resolves run_id -> task_id and delegates to the
existing kanban_db.reclaim_task() flow, so the SIGTERM->SIGKILL
escalation, run-outcome bookkeeping, and event-log append all match
POST /tasks/{task_id}/reclaim exactly. No new termination semantics
introduced.

Responses:
  200 {ok, run_id, task_id} on success
  404 unknown run_id
  409 run already ended OR task no longer reclaimable

Refs: #23762
2026-05-29 00:21:54 -07:00
teknium1 7d10105918 test(kanban): update iteration-exhaustion tests for #29747 gap 2
The two tests in TestRunConversation now verify the new behavior:
  - test_kanban_block_called_on_iteration_exhaustion → verifies
    _record_task_failure(outcome='timed_out') is called instead of
    kanban_block
  - test_no_kanban_block_when_not_in_kanban_mode → verifies the bridge
    is a no-op when HERMES_KANBAN_TASK is unset

The function names are kept for diff stability; both assert against
_record_task_failure now, which is the correct contract per the gap-2
fix in this PR.
2026-05-29 00:13:29 -07:00
teknium1andbaofuen 592a4ffb6b fix(kanban): close three blocked/iteration-exhausted handling gaps (#29747)
Reporter diagnosed three independent gaps that together allowed infinite
'unblock → re-stuck' loops with no surfacing or escalation:

GAP 1: `_rule_stuck_in_blocked` resets timer on any `commented`/`unblocked`
event, so a task that cycles every few minutes is invisible to it
regardless of how many times it cycles.

Fix: new `_rule_block_unblock_cycling` rule (`hermes_cli/kanban_diagnostics.py`)
that counts block→unblock cycles in a sliding window. Default threshold
3 cycles within 24h, configurable via `block_cycle_threshold` /
`block_cycle_window_seconds`. Walks events in arrival order (event id)
since multiple events can share the same `created_at` second. Fires as a
warning with a CLI hint to inspect the block reasons.

GAP 2: Iteration-budget-exhausted runs in kanban workers map to
`kanban_block` (status=blocked, but a clean exit from the kernel's
perspective). `_rule_repeated_failures` reads `consecutive_failures`,
which `_record_task_failure` increments only for crashed/timed_out/
spawn_failed — `blocked` outcome bypasses the failure counter, so the
`kanban.failure_limit` circuit breaker never trips on budget-exhaustion
loops.

Fix: `agent/conversation_loop.py` budget-exhaustion path now calls
`_record_task_failure(outcome="timed_out")` instead of `kanban_block`.
Budget exhaustion is genuinely a timeout-shaped failure (the task ran out
of allowed iterations), so this is more honest semantics; it also routes
through the unified failure counter, so repeated budget exhaustions trip
the circuit breaker and the task auto-blocks with `gave_up` after
`failure_limit` retries.

GAP 3: `release_stale_claims` uses `_pid_alive(worker_pid)` only and
ignores `last_heartbeat_at`. Reporter observed a 91-min run that held
its claim with frozen heartbeat because the worker entered a logic loop
with no tool calls — `_pid_alive` kept returning True so the claim was
extended every 15 minutes indefinitely.

Fix: heartbeat-stale backstop. If `last_heartbeat_at` is set AND older
than `DEFAULT_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS` (default 1h), reclaim
even if the PID is alive. NULL `last_heartbeat_at` preserves backward
compatibility (no heartbeat yet = extend, as before). The reclaim event
payload now includes a `heartbeat_stale` boolean so operators see why a
live-PID worker was reclaimed.

This works cleanly in concert with PR #34418 (#31752 runtime → heartbeat
bridge): once `_touch_activity` keeps `last_heartbeat_at` fresh as a
side effect of normal API traffic, the backstop only fires for genuinely
wedged workers (no chunks, no tool results, no progress at all).

Co-authored-by: baofuen <45189813+baofuen@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 00:13:29 -07:00
teknium1andfaisfamilytravel bc31ee5cf8 fix(kanban): bridge worker runtime activity to board heartbeat (#31752)
The dispatcher watchdog (release_stale_claims) reads tasks.last_heartbeat_at
to decide whether to reclaim a running task. The agent maintains its own
in-process `_last_activity_ts` for every chunk/tool result, but those
liveness ticks never reach the board unless the model explicitly calls
the `kanban_heartbeat` tool — so a worker actively executing a long run
without tool-level heartbeats can be reclaimed mid-flight as 'stale',
returning the task to ready and orphaning the in-flight worker's progress.

Fix: in `_touch_activity` (the canonical 'we just did work' hook in
run_agent.py), call a new `heartbeat_current_worker_from_env` helper
in `tools/kanban_tools.py` that:

- No-ops outside dispatcher-spawned worker context (no HERMES_KANBAN_TASK).
- Rate-limited to one DB write per 60s (runtime activity ticks too often
  to faithfully mirror; we just need the watchdog to see liveness).
- Best-effort: never raises. heartbeat_claim + heartbeat_worker calls are
  individually try/except'd; any DB error logs at debug and returns.
- Uses worker env identity: HERMES_KANBAN_TASK + HERMES_KANBAN_RUN_ID +
  HERMES_KANBAN_CLAIM_LOCK (all pinned by the dispatcher at spawn time).
- No durable note on auto-heartbeats — that's reserved for the explicit
  `kanban_heartbeat` tool which carries a model-supplied note.

The explicit `kanban_heartbeat` tool stays available unchanged for
workers that want to attach a note or pre-emptively extend a claim
across a known-long single tool call.

Co-authored-by: faisfamilytravel <223516181+faisfamilytravel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 00:05:58 -07:00
teknium1andkweiner 40217aa194 fix(kanban): tell workers not to use clarify; route to kanban_block instead (#32167)
Kanban workers run headless — no live user is on the other side of `clarify`,
so the call times out (~120s default) and the task sits silently in `running`
with no signal to the operator that input is needed. Reporter observed a real
incident where a worker asked 'promote to production, or check staging first?'
via clarify, the call timed out, the agent hallucinated a fallback, and the
task sat 'running' for hours.

Fix: explicit 'do not call clarify' bullet in two surfaces every kanban worker
sees —

- `agent/prompt_builder.py` KANBAN_GUIDANCE `## Do NOT` section (auto-injected
  into every dispatcher-spawned worker run).
- `skills/devops/kanban-worker/SKILL.md` `## Do NOT` section (the bundled
  worker skill).

Both point at the right pattern: `kanban_comment` (context) + `kanban_block`
(decision needed) — the task surfaces on the board as blocked, the operator
sees it, unblocks with their answer in a comment, and the worker respawns
with the thread.

Co-authored-by: kweiner <17778+kweiner@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-28 23:57:20 -07:00
Teknium 86a389fee2 fix(credential-pool): STATUS_DEAD for terminal OAuth failures (#32849) (#34412)
When OpenAI Codex returns 401 token_invalidated or token_revoked, the
credential is broken upstream — retrying after a TTL cooldown cannot
fix it. The existing code treated every 401/429 the same way:
STATUS_EXHAUSTED with a TTL cooldown (5 min for 401, 1 hour for 429).
After the TTL elapsed, the broken credential re-entered rotation and
immediately failed again with the same 401, surfacing as 'Failed to
generate context summary' on every context-compression cycle.

Reporter observed 7 separate 401 token_invalidated failures from the
same revoked credential in a single day; the only workaround was
removing it manually via 'hermes auth'.

Add a STATUS_DEAD terminal state. Only 401 responses whose
error.code/reason matches a known terminal OAuth state (token_invalidated,
token_revoked, invalid_token, invalid_grant, unauthorized_client,
refresh_token_reused) transition to DEAD. Everything else keeps the
existing TTL semantics — 429 rate limits are transient and should
recover.

DEAD entries are excluded from rotation unconditionally. They only
clear when an explicit write-side re-auth sync rewrites the tokens
(the existing _sync_codex_pool_entries / _sync_*_entry_from_auth_store
paths already clear last_status to None). The read-side
auth.json-sync paths also now fire on DEAD so an in-flight pool entry
can adopt fresh tokens written by another process without needing
explicit re-auth.

After 24 hours, DEAD manual entries (source='manual:*') are pruned
from the pool automatically so dead state doesn't accumulate forever.
Singleton-seeded DEAD entries (source='device_code' etc.) are kept
because _seed_from_singletons would recreate them on the next load
with the same stale tokens — pruning would be pointless. The audit
trail stays visible (label, last_error_reason, timestamps).

Closes #32849.
2026-05-28 23:45:42 -07:00
teknium1andjulio-cloudvisor ae6817f7f7 fix(kanban): add --reason flag to unblock for symmetry with block (#30897)
`hermes kanban unblock <id> review-required: ...` parsed every trailing word
as another task_id (since `task_ids` is `nargs='+'`), then quietly failed on
each non-existent id with "cannot unblock review-required: (not blocked/scheduled?)".
Reporter saw this as asymmetric with `block <id> <reason...>` which accepts
positional reason words.

Fix: add a `--reason "..."` flag that, when provided, is appended as a
`UNBLOCK: <reason>` comment before the unblock transition. Bulk syntax
(`unblock t_a t_b t_c`) is preserved unchanged.

Co-authored-by: julio-cloudvisor <211828103+julio-cloudvisor@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-28 23:41:44 -07:00
AhmetArif0 4126da65ae fix(security): add bws_cache.json to file_safety read guard
The Bitwarden Secrets Manager disk cache introduced in #31968 stores
plaintext secret values at <hermes_home>/cache/bws_cache.json to avoid
re-fetching across back-to-back CLI invocations. The file was not added
to get_read_block_error()'s credential_file_names list, leaving the
agent able to read it directly via the read_file tool.

Add os.path.join("cache", "bws_cache.json") to credential_file_names
so both HERMES_HOME and the global root are covered, matching the
existing pattern used for auth.json, .anthropic_oauth.json, etc.

Other files under cache/ (images, documents, audio) are unaffected —
the check is an exact-file match, not a prefix match.

Verified: 11/11 exploit/regression scenarios pass; 38/38 existing
file_safety tests pass.
2026-05-28 23:31:20 -07:00
Teknium 71ae98b792 chore(release): map seppe@fushia.be to GitHub login
Required by CI author validation after salvaging PR #33193.
2026-05-28 23:30:39 -07:00
Seppe Gadeyne cf8862cfa3 fix: preserve Ctrl+J newlines in Ghostty 2026-05-28 23:30:39 -07:00
Gabor Barany 1386a7e478 fix(xai-sanitize): deepcopy tools_for_api before in-place mutation (#27907)
The xAI tool-schema sanitizers (strip_slash_enum, strip_pattern_and_format)
mutate their input in place — that's their documented contract. The two
call sites (chat_completion_helpers.build_api_kwargs and the auxiliary
client) were passing agent.tools straight through, so the first xAI
request would permanently strip slash-containing enum constraints and
pattern/format keywords from the per-agent tool registry.

Effect: any subsequent non-xAI call from the same agent (auxiliary task
routed to Anthropic, OpenRouter fallback, mid-session model switch) saw
the already-stripped schema with no way for the user to notice from
their config.

Fix: deepcopy tools_for_api before sanitizing at both call sites.

The slash-enum bug itself (xAI 400ing on enums with '/') was fixed
earlier by #32443 (Nami4D) — that PR landed the strip but used the
sanitizers directly without copying. This salvages #27907's correctness
contribution (the deepcopy) while skipping its redundant parallel
sanitizer (strip_xai_incompatible_enum_values is functionally
equivalent to the existing strip_slash_enum) and its preflight-
neutrality argument (we chose model-gated preflight in #32443).

3 new tests in tests/run_agent/test_run_agent_codex_responses.py:

- strips_slash_enum_from_outgoing_request — outgoing kwargs has no
  slash-containing enum values (functional contract preserved).
- does_not_mutate_agent_tools — headline #27907 regression. Snapshot
  agent.tools before build_api_kwargs, assert it survives intact
  after. Pre-fix this assertion would have caught the mutation.
- is_idempotent_across_repeated_calls — three xAI requests in a row
  each strip cleanly AND don't progressively erode the source schema.

344/344 across tests/agent/test_auxiliary_client.py,
tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py,
tests/run_agent/test_run_agent_codex_responses.py, and
tests/tools/test_schema_sanitizer.py.

Co-authored-by: Gabor Barany <barany.gabor@gmail.com>
2026-05-28 23:29:59 -07:00
Teknium db96fc60d0 fix(gateway): keep Telegram topic bindings aligned with compression children (#34409)
Telegram DM topic bindings persist (chat_id, thread_id) -> session_id in
SQLite so reopening a topic resumes the right Hermes session. When
compression rotated session_entry.session_id mid-turn, the binding row
stayed pointed at the pre-compression parent. On the next inbound
message in that topic the gateway reloaded the oversized parent
transcript, retriggering preflight compression — sometimes in a loop.

Two-pronged fix:

1. `_sync_telegram_topic_binding(source, entry, *, reason)` helper
   called immediately after each of the three session_id rotation sites
   in _handle_message_with_agent (hygiene compression, agent-result
   compression rotation, /compress command). Keeps future bindings
   fresh.

2. Read-path self-heal: when resolving an existing topic binding, walk
   SessionDB.get_compression_tip() forward and switch_session to the
   descendant instead of the stored parent. Rewrites the binding row to
   the tip so subsequent messages skip the walk. Heals existing stale
   state on the next user message without requiring a gateway restart.

Skipped from competing PRs as not load-bearing for the bug:
- advance_session_after_compression SessionStore primitive (#26204/
  #28870/#33416) — preserves end_reason='compression' analytics nicety
  but doesn't affect routing correctness.
- Cached-agent eviction on session_id mismatch — _compress_context()
  already mutates tmp_agent.session_id on the cached object so the
  in-memory agent self-corrects.
- Startup repair pass (#33416) — redundant once the read path heals on
  the next message; one-line CLI follow-up can address bindings for
  topics users never reopen.

Closes #20470, #29712, #33414. Acknowledges work in #23195
(@litvinovvo), #26204 (@bizyumov), #28870 (@donrhmexe), #29713
(@hehehe0803), #29945 (@eugeneb1ack), #33416 (@bizyumov).
2026-05-28 23:25:52 -07:00
Ben ec7736f8a7 fix(docker): auto-join Docker socket group for docker-in-docker backend
When users bind-mount /var/run/docker.sock to use TERMINAL_ENV=docker from
inside the container, the supervised hermes user (UID 10000) lacks
permission to talk to the socket — every `docker` invocation EACCES'es and
check_terminal_requirements() returns False. In messaging mode this also
silently strips the file/terminal toolset from the registered tool list,
so the agent rationalizes the missing tools as a platform restriction.

The naive workaround (docker run --group-add <socket-gid>) does NOT work
with our s6-setuidgid privilege drop: s6-setuidgid calls initgroups() for
the target user, which rebuilds supp groups from /etc/group. Without a
matching /etc/group entry the kernel-granted supp group is wiped between
PID 1 and the dropped hermes process. Verified empirically:

  --group-add 998 alone:    PID 1 Groups: 0 998 → after drop: Groups: 10000
  This fix's /etc/group add: id hermes shows 998 → after drop: Groups: 998 10000

Detect the socket's GID at boot in stage2-hook (runs as root before the
privilege drop), reuse an existing group name if one matches the GID,
otherwise create 'hostdocker'. Idempotent across container restarts.
Silent no-op when no socket is mounted.

End-to-end verified by building the image and running the supervised
hermes user against the real host Docker daemon: `docker version`
succeeds and check_terminal_requirements() returns True.

Fixes #16703
2026-05-29 16:15:44 +10:00
Ben Barclayandkonsisumer 48083211ef fix(docker): accept PUID/PGID as aliases for HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID (#25872) (#34401)
Salvages #25872 by @konsisumer against current main.

NAS users (UGOS, Synology, unRAID) expect the LinuxServer.io
PUID/PGID convention and bind-mount /opt/data from a host directory
owned by their own UID.  Without this alias those vars are silently
ignored and the s6-setuidgid drop to UID 10000 leaves the runtime
unable to read the volume.  HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID still take
precedence when both are set.

The original PR targeted docker/entrypoint.sh, which is now a 27-line
deprecation shim under s6-overlay (the May 2026 rework moved all
bootstrap logic to docker/stage2-hook.sh, installed as
/etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup).  Re-applied the same 2-line
alias resolution at the equivalent spot in stage2-hook.sh just
before the existing UID/GID remap block.  Test was retargeted at
docker/stage2-hook.sh; docs hunk adapted to current main's wording
("stage2 hook" + s6-setuidgid, not the obsolete "entrypoint drops
via gosu") with the NAS bind-mount example preserved verbatim.

Test-first regression verification: reverted just docker/stage2-hook.sh
to origin/main and re-ran the new tests.  Result:

  FAILED test_stage2_hook_resolves_puid_pgid_aliases
  FAILED test_puid_pgid_populate_hermes_uid_gid
      AssertionError: assert ':' == '1000:10'

That's the exact bug shape — PUID=1000 PGID=10 silently ignored,
HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID stay empty.  With the salvage applied, all 4
tests pass.

Closes #25872

Co-authored-by: konsisumer <11262660+konsisumer@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 16:07:15 +10:00
wysieandWysie a0fc3df878 fix(browser): rewrite Camofox Docker loopback URLs (#25541)
Co-authored-by: Wysie <wysie@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 15:43:55 +10:00
Teknium f61fd59b62 docs(run_agent): clarify why F401 re-exports stay 2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
Teknium 00b8204cf4 fix: restore side-effect imports in test files (test_kanban_tools, test_command_guards)
The previous ruff prune commit removed two categories of test-file
imports whose value is the side effect of importing them, not their
binding:

  tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py — 5 sites
    `import tools.kanban_tools  # ensure registered`
    The import itself runs tools/kanban_tools.py's @registry.register
    calls; without it, the kanban tool registry is empty and
    test_kanban_tools_visible_with_env_var asserts {} != {7 kanban tools}.

  tests/tools/test_command_guards.py — 1 site
    `import tools.tirith_security  # Ensure the module is importable so we can patch it`
    The comment names the requirement: keep the bare module reference
    so subsequent mock.patch("tools.tirith_security.<fn>") calls find
    a registered submodule.

CI failure: test (5) shard, tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py:58
  AssertionError: expected {kanban_*}, got set()
2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
Teknium e371bf5d68 fix: re-export pruned names for tests that mock.patch or from-import them
The mechanical ruff prune in the previous commit removed several names that
`appear` unused inside their defining module but are external test/runtime
anchors:

  run_agent
    OpenAI, _SafeWriter
    get_tool_definitions, handle_function_call, check_toolset_requirements
    estimate_request_tokens_rough
    DEFAULT_AGENT_IDENTITY, build_context_files_prompt,
    build_environment_hints, build_nous_subscription_prompt
    _is_destructive_command, _extract_parallel_scope_path, _paths_overlap,
    _append_subdir_hint_to_multimodal, _trajectory_normalize_msg

  tools/web_tools
    Firecrawl, _get_firecrawl_client

These get accessed via four channels that are invisible to ruff's
in-module usage analysis:

  1. `mock.patch('module.name', ...)` in tests — resolves the attribute
     lazily, so `pytest --collect-only` passes even when the name is
     gone, but every test using the patch fails at runtime with
     AttributeError.
  2. `from run_agent import X` in production siblings (agent/transports
     /codex.py, etc.).
  3. The `_ra().X` indirection pattern in agent/system_prompt.py et al.
     — explicitly documented ("Many tests patch('run_agent.load_soul_md')")
     to preserve the patch contract.
  4. `from tools.web_tools import _get_firecrawl_client` in tests.

Each re-added import carries an explicit `# noqa: F401` with a comment
naming the channel, so future cleanup passes won't strip them again.
2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
kshitijk4poor 66827f8947 chore: prune unused imports and duplicate import redefinitions
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.

- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
  public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
  unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
  F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
  agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
  agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
  agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
  can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
  selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change

Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
  toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
  module still resolves
2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
Teknium a4d8f0f62a feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe (#34340)
* fix(codex): surface error code in Responses 'failed' status errors

When a Codex Responses turn ends with status=failed, the response carries
the failure details under `response.error` as
`{code, message, param, ...}`. The previous extractor pulled only
`message`, so users seeing a rate-limit failure got a bare "Slow down"
string indistinguishable from a generic stream truncation; an
internal_error with empty message degraded to a dict dump
("{'code': 'internal_error', 'message': ''}").

Extract a `_format_responses_error()` helper that:
- prefixes `code` when both code and message are present
  (e.g. 'rate_limit_exceeded: Slow down')
- falls back to the bare `code` when message is empty
- accepts both dict and attribute-style payloads (SDK and JSON-RPC paths)
- preserves the prior status-only fallback when no error payload exists

Apply the same helper at the sibling site in
`codex_app_server_session.run_turn()` so codex-CLI subprocess turn
failures get the same treatment.

Tests:
- 8 new unit tests for `_format_responses_error` covering both shapes,
  empty/missing fields, non-string fields, and the status-only fallback.
- 2 regression tests on `_normalize_codex_response` for failed status
  with and without a code, asserting the exact RuntimeError message.
- All 3603 tests in tests/agent/ pass.

Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.

* feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe

Two cross-model failure modes get a single-line answer in the cached
system prompt. Both gated by config (default on), both add zero overhead
when not needed, both verified via real AIAgent prompt builds.

## What changed

`TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE` — short prompt block applied to ALL models.
Targets two failure modes observed on a real Sarasota real-estate build
task: (1) Opus stopped after writing an 85-byte stub and gave a prose
response with finish_reason=stop on call #3 of 90; (2) DeepSeek pushed
through a PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings instead of
admitting the blocker. Both behaviors are model-family-agnostic, so the
guidance lives outside the existing tool_use_enforcement gate (~192
tokens, paid once per session via prefix cache).

`tools/env_probe.py` — local Python toolchain probe. Detects
python3/pip/uv/PEP-668 state and emits ONE short line in the system
prompt when something is non-default. Emits NOTHING when the env is
clean (zero token cost for normal users). Skipped entirely for remote
terminal backends (docker/modal/ssh) — they have their own probe.

Example output on a broken environment (the actual case):

    Python toolchain: python3=3.11.15 (no pip module),
    python=missing (use python3), pip→python3.12 (mismatch),
    PEP 668=yes (use venv or uv).

## Config

Both flags live under `agent.` in config.yaml, default True:

    agent:
      task_completion_guidance: true   # universal "finish the job" block
      environment_probe: true          # local Python toolchain hints

Neither addition required a `_config_version` bump — deep-merge fills
defaults in for existing user configs.

## Validation

| Test surface | Result |
|---|---|
| tests/tools/test_env_probe.py | 10/10 pass (probe unit) |
| tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py — new classes | 8/8 pass (integration) |
| TestToolUseEnforcementConfig | 17/17 pass (no regression) |
| TestBuildSystemPrompt | 9/9 pass (no regression) |
| TestInvalidateSystemPrompt | 2/2 pass (no regression) |
| tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py | 124/124 pass (no regression) |
| tests/hermes_cli/ | 5662/5662 pass (config defaults) |
| E2E AIAgent build (broken env) | Both blocks present, 2,178 chars |
| E2E AIAgent build (clean env) | 771-char net overhead, env probe silent |
2026-05-28 22:26:09 -07:00
Teknium 75d2c081c9 fix(logging): recover gateway.log handler from external rotation (#34349)
External rotation (logrotate, manual `mv gateway.log gateway.log.1`,
another process rotating the file) leaves `_ManagedRotatingFileHandler`'s
open fd pinned to the renamed inode. All subsequent writes go to the
rotated backup instead of the file every operator expects to read,
producing the symptom 'gateway.log frozen mid-write while agent.log
keeps growing with gateway.* records'.

PR #16229 fixed the original CLI->gateway init-order bug (#8404) so the
handler attaches in the first place. This is the sibling fix for what
happens after attach, when something external rotates underneath us.

Adds a WatchedFileHandler-style inode check on emit(): if baseFilename
no longer matches the open stream's (dev,ino), close the stale fd and
reopen at the expected path. doRollover() refreshes the snapshot so our
own rollover isn't misidentified as external.

Five regression tests cover the matrix: external rename, external
unlink, external truncate (must NOT trigger reopen — inode unchanged),
normal doRollover() (must still work), and the end-to-end
Allen-reproduction (rotate + re-call setup_logging).

55/55 tests in tests/test_hermes_logging.py pass; 5972/5972 in
tests/gateway/ pass.
2026-05-28 22:26:00 -07:00
Teknium a30480bd2b fix(compression): prevent session-id fork from concurrent compressions (#34351)
* fix(compression): prevent session-id fork from concurrent compressions

When two AIAgent instances share the same session_id (most commonly the
parent-turn agent and its background-review fork, which inherits
session_id verbatim via background_review.py L451), both can call
compress_context() on overlapping snapshots of the same conversation.
Each ends the parent and creates its own NEW child session in state.db,
both parented to the same old id. The gateway SessionEntry only catches
one rotation; the other becomes an orphan that silently accumulates
writes — Damien's incident shape (parent 20260527_234659_e65f0e → two
children, only one visible).

Adds a state.db-backed per-session compression lock. Acquired before
the rotation in conversation_compression.compress_context(); on
failure, the caller returns messages unchanged so the auto-compress
retry loop stops cleanly. TTL (5min default) reclaims locks abandoned
by crashed compressors. Lock holder identity (pid:tid:agent:nonce) is
preserved for diagnostics via get_compression_lock_holder().

Schema bumped 13 -> 14 to track the new compression_locks table.
Reconciled additively via the existing declarative-column pattern;
no data migration needed for existing DBs.

Regression test reproduces Damien's shape: two threads racing
_compress_context on a shared parent_sid. Without the lock the test
deterministically produces 2 child sessions; with the lock, exactly 1.

Covers all six compression entry points (preflight in conversation_loop,
mid-turn fallback, hygiene compression in gateway, /compact, CLI
/compress, TUI /compress). ACP /compress was already protected by
nulling out _session_db before its compress call.

* ci: trigger rerun (transient GitHub API rate limit on CodeQL workflow)
2026-05-28 21:40:39 -07:00
liuhao1024 28bb7e0a8e fix(web): bridge Tailwind --font-sans to --theme-font-sans (#20406)
Tailwind v4 defines its own --font-sans and --font-mono tokens
independently of the Hermes theme variables. Components using
font-sans/font-mono utility classes bypass --theme-font-sans and
--theme-font-mono, so theme font changes have no effect.

Add --font-sans and --font-mono bridges in the @theme inline block
so Tailwind's font tokens follow the active Hermes theme.

Fixes #20380
2026-05-29 00:19:06 -04:00
teknium1 100536134c refactor(gateway): generalize topic recovery via adapter hook
Replace the runner-introspection trick in #32998 with an explicit
`set_topic_recovery_fn` setter on `BasePlatformAdapter`. The gateway
runner installs it once at adapter init; the adapter calls
`_apply_topic_recovery(event)` before any session keying.

Also apply the hook in `BasePlatformAdapter.handle_message` so the
running-agent guard and pending-message queue key off the recovered
thread_id too — not just the text-batch coalescence.

Net change vs #32998 alone: -2 files of indirection (no
`_message_handler.__self__` peek, no separate `_normalize_text_batch_source`),
+1 generic mechanism (other adapters can install their own hook later).
2026-05-28 21:18:39 -07:00
LeonSGP43 5407d25599 Fix Telegram DM topic text batch keying 2026-05-28 21:18:39 -07:00
Manzela 90f0f32eae docs(security): add network egress isolation guide for Docker deployments (#26385) 2026-05-29 14:09:10 +10:00
Ben Barclayandliuhao1024 40fa0c1d19 fix(docker): skip credential/skills/cache mounts when source is invalid (#24490) (#34331)
Salvages #24490 by @liuhao1024 against current main.

The Docker daemon will silently auto-create a directory at the host
path of any `-v <host>:<container>` bind mount when the host path
doesn't exist.  In Docker-in-Docker setups (where the outer host's
real credential file isn't visible inside the agent's parent
container), this leaves a directory at the credential mount source —
and the inner `docker run` then refuses to mount a directory over a
file destination with exit 125.

Add defensive shape guards to all three mount loops in
DockerEnvironment.__init__:

  * credentials (expected: file)  — skip + warn on directory or missing
  * skills      (expected: dir)   — skip + warn when not a directory
  * cache       (expected: dir)   — skip + warn when not a directory

Failed mounts surface as WARN logs rather than crashing the container
start.  Existing well-formed sources mount unchanged.

The original PR's branch was on a pre-container-reuse-rework base
(May 12) and conflicted with the post-May-28 driver work (label
tagging, container reuse, orphan reaper).  Reconstructed the same
intent on current main; the three guard blocks slot cleanly into
`tools/environments/docker.py` around the existing mount loops.

Three new tests pinned in `tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py`:
directory-source skip, missing-source skip, valid-file mounts.  Test-
first regression verification: reverted just the production code to
`origin/main` and confirmed the new tests fail with
`'deleted_token.json' is contained here: /root/.hermes/...` — the
fixed code makes them pass.  Full file passes (54/54).

Closes #24490

Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <11816344+liuhao1024@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 14:09:04 +10:00
Teknium 69b74c15a3 fix(kanban): CLI dispatch honors max_in_progress/max_spawn from config; swap missing 'avoid-ai-writing' skill for bundled humanizer (#33488, #29415) (#34337)
Two small bugs in the kanban dispatcher's CLI surface that were
silently degrading two distinct workflows. Bundled because the test
files and the surrounding code surface overlap.

## #33488: hermes kanban dispatch ignored kanban.max_in_progress / max_spawn

The CLI wrapper in hermes_cli/kanban.py:_cmd_dispatch only passed
default_assignee and max_in_progress_per_profile through to
dispatch_once. The global concurrency cap (kanban.max_in_progress)
and the per-tick spawn limit (kanban.max_spawn) were silently dropped,
so operators using 'hermes kanban dispatch' as a one-shot or in a
custom loop couldn't reach either cap from config — only the gateway
embedded dispatcher honored them.

Fix: read both keys from config in the same coerce-positive-int
helper that already handled max_in_progress_per_profile. CLI --max
still wins over config kanban.max_spawn when both are present
(explicit operator signal beats default), but absent --max falls
back to config.

## #29415: synthesizer crashed in retry loop on missing skill

hermes_cli/kanban_swarm.py:212 hardcoded skills=['avoid-ai-writing'],
a skill that doesn't exist in the bundled skills/ directory or any
registered hub source. Every synthesizer worker spawn failed at CLI
startup with 'Unknown skill(s): avoid-ai-writing' before the agent
loop even started — the dispatcher retried up to failure_limit
(default 2), then auto-blocked the task, then dependency rules could
re-promote it, looping forever until manual intervention.

Fix: replace with 'humanizer' which is bundled at
skills/creative/humanizer/SKILL.md (description: 'Humanize text:
strip AI-isms and add real voice'). That's the obvious intent behind
the 'avoid-ai-writing' name, and the skill is platform-portable
(linux/macos/windows) so it works on every supported runtime.

## Tests

tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_cli_dispatch_passthrough.py — 4 cases:
- CLI passes max_in_progress / max_spawn / default_assignee /
  max_in_progress_per_profile from config to dispatch_once
- CLI --max flag overrides config kanban.max_spawn
- Invalid cap values (0, -1, 'abc', '1.5') silently fall through to None
- kanban_swarm.py no longer references 'avoid-ai-writing' AND the
  replacement 'humanizer' skill exists at the expected on-disk path

Kanban suite: 468/468 pass (was 464; +4 new regression tests).
2026-05-28 21:00:46 -07:00
teknium1 8cf6b3da9d fix(opencode-go): cap mimo-v2.5-pro max_tokens at 131072
The opencode-go relay defaults max_tokens to 262144 when none is sent,
but Xiami mimo-v2.5-pro only supports 131072 completion tokens — every
request 400s with "max_tokens is too large: 262144" before the agent
can do anything.

Add a get_max_tokens(model) hook on ProviderProfile (default returns
default_max_tokens) so profiles fronting multiple upstreams can vary
the cap per-model. Wire chat_completions transport through the hook.
Override on OpenCodeGoProfile with mimo-v2.5-pro=131072.

Only mimo-v2.5-pro is capped — other opencode-go models (kimi, glm,
qwen, minimax, other mimo variants) unchanged.
2026-05-28 20:49:53 -07:00
teknium1 bfecfabd0f Revert "feat(skills): integrate NVIDIA/skills as a trusted skills hub tap"
This reverts commit 9992e32db3.
2026-05-28 20:39:39 -07:00
liuhao1024 44df52005a fix(tools): guard Path.home() against PermissionError in has_direct_modal_credentials (#33528)
When HOME=/root (Docker containers) and the process runs as unprivileged
user (hermes, uid 10000), Path.home() / '.modal.toml' raises PermissionError
because /root/ is inaccessible. This crashes the dashboard /api/skills endpoint.

Catch PermissionError/OSError and treat as 'no config file'. Env vars still
take priority (tested).

Fixes #33525
2026-05-29 13:35:39 +10:00
Teknium 9992e32db3 feat(skills): integrate NVIDIA/skills as a trusted skills hub tap
NVIDIA's verified skills catalog (https://github.com/NVIDIA/skills) ships
NVIDIA-signed skills for CUDA-X, AIQ, cuOpt, cuPyNumeric, DeepStream, NeMo,
NemoClaw and the Skill Card Generator — each bundle carrying a detached
`skill.oms.sig` signature, a governance `skill-card.md`, and `evals/`. The
sync pipeline drops any skill missing those artifacts before publishing.

Changes:
- tools/skills_hub.py: add NVIDIA/skills to GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS so
  it lights up in `hermes skills browse`, `hermes skills search <q>`, the
  twice-daily skills-index build, and the docs-site Skills Hub page
  (https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/skills) automatically.
- tools/skills_guard.py: add NVIDIA/skills to TRUSTED_REPOS so installs
  resolve to trust_level="trusted" (looser install policy than community).
- website/scripts/extract-skills.py: map the `github` source id to a
  friendly "NVIDIA" pill label for the docs hub page.
- website/src/pages/skills/index.tsx: register the NVIDIA pill (green
  #76b900) and slot it into SOURCE_ORDER after HuggingFace.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/skills.md (+ zh-Hans i18n): document
  the new default tap and the expanded trusted-repos list.
- tests/tools/test_skills_guard.py: assert NVIDIA/skills resolves to
  "trusted" (including the skills-sh-wrapped form).
- tests/tools/test_skills_hub.py: invariant — every TRUSTED_REPOS entry
  must be reachable via GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS (prevents future
  trusted repos from being declared but never browseable).

Validation:
- Live GitHub fetch: `src.fetch('NVIDIA/skills/skills/aiq-deploy')` pulled
  17 files including SKILL.md (13 KB), skill-card.md, skill.oms.sig, and
  the full references/ + evals/ tree. trust_level="trusted".
- Live inspect resolved name, description, and trust correctly.
- All 193 existing skills_guard + skills_hub tests still pass.
2026-05-28 20:35:13 -07:00
hinotoi-agent 042c1d6bb0 test: cover fallback dropped-turn handoff 2026-05-28 20:34:40 -07:00
Hinotoi Agent 6dc068ef04 fix: broaden deterministic compression fallback coverage 2026-05-28 20:34:40 -07:00
Hinotoi Agent e785c0ad70 fix: preserve context when summary generation fails 2026-05-28 20:34:40 -07:00
Dusk c834624f7d fix(voice): honor PIPEWIRE_REMOTE in PortAudio fallback checks (#33473) 2026-05-29 13:30:17 +10:00
Брагарник ДмитроandSarbai 54bf798765 approval: add docker restart/stop/kill to DANGEROUS_PATTERNS (#33438)
When docker.sock is mounted (common Docker Compose pattern), the agent
can restart/stop/kill containers without user approval. hermes gateway
restart is already protected, but docker restart, docker stop,
docker kill, and their docker compose equivalents were not.

This caused repeated self-termination: the agent ran docker restart
hermes, killed its own container, Docker restarted it (restart policy),
and the agent resumed the same session — creating a restart loop.

Added patterns mirror the existing gateway lifecycle protection:
- docker compose restart/stop/kill/down
- docker restart/stop/kill

Co-authored-by: Sarbai <sarbai@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 13:26:54 +10:00
ninjmnkyandninjmnky 593e4b435e Add iputils-ping (ping) to Docker image (#32015)
ping is a fundamental network diagnostic tool that most users expect to have available in the container. This adds iputils-ping to the apt install list in the Dockerfile.

Co-authored-by: ninjmnky <ninjmnky@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-29 13:25:32 +10:00
Ben a618789dba fix(dashboard-auth): share /api/* public allowlist between legacy and OAuth gates
Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.

Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.

Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.

Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):

* /api/status            — version, gateway state, active session count,
                           auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults   — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema     — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info        — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes  — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard

No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.

Tests:

* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
  fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
  over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
  never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
  test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
  remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
  portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
  /api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
  can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
  disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
  dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
  test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
  /api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
  test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
  /api/status is reachable cold)

Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
2026-05-29 12:17:12 +10:00
Teknium 3b6347af15 feat(kanban): default_assignee fallback + per-profile concurrency cap (#27145, #21582) (#34244)
Two related dispatcher behaviors that have been missing for a while.

## kanban.default_assignee (#27145)

Reporter (@agarzon): dashboard creates a task without an assignee, task
parks in 'ready' forever even though the operator's intent ('default')
is perfectly clear. The dispatcher already had a 'skipped_unassigned'
bucket but no fallback routing — users had to manually type 'default'
in the assignee field every time.

Behavior: when 'kanban.default_assignee' is set in config.yaml, the
dispatcher applies that assignee to any unassigned ready task before
deciding whether to spawn. The row is mutated (assignee column + an
'assigned' event with source='kanban.default_assignee' for the audit
trail). Empty/whitespace config value = no fallback, preserving the
existing skipped_unassigned behavior.

Dry-run mode reports what WOULD happen via the new
'auto_assigned_default' bucket on DispatchResult, but does NOT mutate
the DB — operators using 'hermes kanban dispatch --dry-run' see the
routing decision before committing.

## kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile (#21582)

Reporter (@edwardchenchen, @simlu, 4 reactions): fan-out workloads
saturate one profile's local model / API quota / browser pool while
other profiles sit idle. The existing global 'max_in_progress' caps
total workers but doesn't balance across profiles.

Behavior: when 'kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile' is set to a
positive int, the dispatcher tracks per-assignee running counts (one
query at tick start) and refuses to spawn for any assignee already at
the cap. Tasks blocked this way go to a new
'skipped_per_profile_capped' bucket on DispatchResult as
(task_id, assignee, current_running_count) tuples — NOT an
operator-actionable failure, just 'try again next tick when the
profile has capacity'.

Pre-existing 'running' tasks count against the cap (verified via
regression test). The cap respects dry_run mode by incrementing
its in-memory counter on each would-be spawn so dry_run reports
the same balanced subset that a real tick would.

Invalid cap values (0, negative, non-int, None) are treated as 'no
cap', preserving the existing behavior. Backward-compatible for
installs that don't set the config.

## Surfaces

- 'hermes kanban dispatch' CLI now prints 'Auto-assigned to
  kanban.default_assignee=X: ...' and 'Deferred (X at per-profile cap,
  N running): ...' lines, plus matching JSON keys in --json output.
- Gateway dispatcher logs the configured values at startup
  ('default_assignee=X', 'max_in_progress_per_profile=N').
- 'kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile' added to DEFAULT_CONFIG with
  inline docs.

## Validation

- tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_default_assignee.py (6 cases): no-cap
  baseline, auto-assign + DB mutation, dry-run reports without
  mutating, whitespace treated as None, explicit assignees untouched,
  DispatchResult field schema.
- tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_per_profile_cap.py (9 cases including
  4 parametrized): no-cap baseline, balanced 2-profile fan-out,
  pre-existing running counts against cap, invalid cap values
  (0/-1/'abc'/None), capped tasks dispatched on next tick after
  running task completes, DispatchResult field schema.
- Broader kanban suite: 464/464 pass (was 449 baseline; +15 new
  regression tests across both features).

## Credit

#27145 — Jimmy Johansson reported the dispatcher skipped-unassigned
gap; @agarzon scoped the simpler 'honor kanban.default_assignee' fix
that matches the existing config knob.
#21582 — @edwardchenchen filed the per-profile cap ask after hitting
model 429s on fan-out research projects; @simlu confirmed the same
pain on local-model setups.
2026-05-28 19:02:55 -07:00
Ben 42612aa350 docs(docker): refresh user-guide page for s6-overlay reality
The page was last meaningfully rewritten in the pre-s6 (tini) era and had
drifted on five points that no longer matched the image:

1. "Running the dashboard" claimed the entrypoint backgrounds
   `hermes dashboard` and prefixes its output with `[dashboard]`. That
   was the pre-s6 entrypoint.sh path; under s6 the dashboard is a
   supervised s6-rc service (`docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/run`) with no
   sed-prefix pipeline. Rewrote the section accordingly.

2. The default for `HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST` was documented as
   `127.0.0.1`. The s6 run script defaults it to `0.0.0.0`
   (`dash_host="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST:-0.0.0.0}"`). Fixed the table
   and the surrounding prose.

3. Multi-profile was documented as "not recommended in Docker — run
   one container per profile." That advice was load-bearing when
   there was no in-container supervisor, but the s6 architecture
   explicitly adds per-profile gateway supervision: each profile
   created via `hermes profile create <name>` gets a slot under
   `/run/service/gateway-<name>/`, the `02-reconcile-profiles`
   cont-init script restores them across `docker restart` from
   `gateway_state.json`, and `hermes gateway start/stop/restart` is
   intercepted by `_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6` to route
   through `s6-svc`. Pivoted the section to "one container, many
   supervised profile gateways" as the default, with a comparison
   table and a "When you DO want a separate container" escape
   hatch for the genuine resource-isolation / network-segmentation
   cases.

4. The Compose example trailer also claimed `[dashboard]` log
   prefixing. Replaced with the actual log routing.

5. Added a new "Where the logs go" section covering all four log
   surfaces: per-profile gateways (tee'd to `docker logs` AND
   `${HERMES_HOME}/logs/gateways/<profile>/current` since PR
   b34532319), dashboard (`docker logs`, no prefix), boot reconciler
   (`container-boot.log`), and `hermes logs`. The gateway-mode and
   Compose sections cross-reference this rather than each carrying
   their own routing prose.

Added a new "docker exec automatically drops to the hermes user"
subsection under "What the Dockerfile does", next to the existing
Privilege model warning. Documents the `/opt/hermes/bin/hermes` shim
(landed via the docker-exec privilege-drop work) — operators don't
need to remember `--user hermes` for `docker exec hermes login`,
`docker exec hermes profile create …`, etc. The historical footgun
(`auth.json` written as `root:root`, supervised gateway then can't
read its own auth file) is mentioned only as context for what the
fail-loud `exit 126` is protecting against, not as a problem the
reader needs to solve. The `HERMES_DOCKER_EXEC_AS_ROOT=1` opt-out is
documented for diagnostic sessions.

The "Permission denied" troubleshooting subsection now carries a
single-line pointer to the new section instead of duplicating it.

The `--insecure` framing reflects PR #fb5125362 (opt-in via
`HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE`, not derived from bind host): the OAuth
gate is the authority, the bind host alone never implies
`--insecure`, and opting out is an explicit security trade-off.

Anchors verified resolve. i18n zh-Hans mirror left for the
translation flow to catch up.
2026-05-29 11:55:01 +10:00
Ben 3c6e70aef1 docs(docker): document new persist-across-processes contract and orphan reaper (#20561)
Updates the Docker Backend section of the user-guide configuration page
to match the actual behavior shipped in PR #33645. Pre-PR the docs
claimed "container is stopped and removed on shutdown," which was
never quite true for the documented happy path and is now actively
wrong: in default mode the container survives across Hermes processes
so background processes (npm watchers, dev servers, long-running
pytest) carry over the way the "ONE long-lived container shared
across sessions" promise requires.

Changes to `website/docs/user-guide/configuration.md`:

* Reworked the intro paragraph at the top of the Docker Backend
  section to describe the actual cross-process reuse contract.
* Expanded the YAML example with the new keys
  `docker_persist_across_processes` and `docker_orphan_reaper`, plus
  the pre-existing-but-undocumented `docker_env`, `timeout`, and
  `lifetime_seconds`.  Clarified the `container_persistent` comment
  to disambiguate from `docker_persist_across_processes`.
* Added a `docker_env` vs `docker_forward_env` explainer (one
  injects literal KEY=value, the other forwards values from the
  host/.env — easy to confuse).
* Replaced the one-line "Container lifecycle" paragraph with a full
  subsection covering:
    - the three labels Hermes tags every container with
      (hermes-agent, hermes-task-id, hermes-profile)
    - the label-probe reuse mechanism on startup
    - a teardown-trigger table with four rows for every situation
      that destroys the container in default mode
    - edge cases (OOM kill, profile switching)
* Added an "Environment variable overrides" table covering all
  TERMINAL_* env vars relevant to the Docker backend, including the
  previously-undocumented `TERMINAL_DOCKER_ENV` and
  `HERMES_DOCKER_BINARY`.

Changes to `website/docs/user-guide/docker.md`:

* Extended the cross-link admonition (around l.227) so the
  Hermes-in-Docker page points at the new terminal-backend keys
  (`docker_env`, `docker_persist_across_processes`,
  `docker_orphan_reaper`) alongside the ones already mentioned.

No code changes.  Behavior already covered by tests added in earlier
commits on this branch (#33645 commits 1-5).

Refs #20561
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Ben 2f0f03c40d fix(docker): cleanup_vm() default honors persist mode (don't kill container on session close)
Commit 4 made cleanup_vm() default to force_remove=True, which was wrong:
cleanup_vm() is called from AIAgent.close() (TUI session close at
tui_gateway/server.py:2991, gateway session teardown at gateway/run.py:3569)
and from per-turn cleanup (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py:1517). All
three are session-lifecycle events that should honor persist mode, not
explicit user-initiated teardown.

Ben reported the symptom: container shared between multiple TUI sessions
(good) but killed as soon as any session closed (bad). With force_remove=True
as the default, every `session.close` JSON-RPC tore down the container.

The fix is to flip cleanup_vm()'s force_remove default back to False.
The kwarg still exists for future explicit-teardown paths (`/reset`-style
flows, "destroy my sandbox" commands) that haven't been wired up yet.

Two new unit tests pin the behavior:

* `test_cleanup_vm_default_honors_persist_mode` — asserts
  `cleanup_vm(task_id)` does neither docker stop nor docker rm on a
  persist-mode container (the regression Ben caught).
* `test_cleanup_vm_force_remove_tears_down_persist_container` —
  asserts the kwarg still flows through the runtime-signature-inspection
  plumbing to the backend's cleanup().

E2E verified against real Docker (in addition to all 17 existing checks):

  ✓ Default cleanup_vm() leaves persist-mode container running
  ✓ cleanup_vm(force_remove=True) removed the container

Refs #20561
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Ben 5c2170a7c6 fix(docker): persist-mode cleanup is no-op; add force_remove kwarg (#20561)
The first iteration of this PR did docker stop on every cleanup in
persist mode (only skipping docker rm). Ben caught this as
contradicting the documented "ONE long-lived container shared across
sessions" semantics: stopping the container on every Hermes /quit kills
any background processes inside (npm watchers, pytest watchers,
long-running scripts) — exactly the case persist mode is supposed to
protect.

This commit splits the cleanup paths cleanly:

* **Persist mode (default)** — cleanup() is a NO-OP for the
  container. Container stays running, processes survive, next Hermes
  process attaches via the existing label probe in ~ms instead of
  waiting for docker start. Resource reclamation happens via the
  orphan reaper at next startup (2 × lifetime_seconds threshold), which
  covers the SIGKILL / OOM / abandoned-laptop cases.
* **Opt-out mode (persist_across_processes=False)** — unchanged:
  docker stop + docker rm -f on cleanup as before.
* **Explicit teardown** — new cleanup(force_remove=True) kwarg
  overrides persist mode and tears the container down unconditionally.
  cleanup_vm(task_id) now defaults to force_remove=True since
  it's the user-driven reset path (called from AIAgent.close(),
  /reset-style flows, and the idle reaper's per-turn cleanup).

The idle reaper in _cleanup_inactive_envs calls env.cleanup()
directly with no kwargs, so idle persist-mode envs are no-op'd — the
container survives the in-process pop and the next tool call re-probes
via labels. No state leak: _container_id is still cleared on the
in-process handle.

E2E verified against real Docker:

  ✓ Container is still running after cleanup()
  ✓ Background process (sleep loop) survived cleanup()
  ✓ Filesystem state preserved across cleanup()
  ✓ In-process container_id cleared (next __init__ will re-probe)
  ✓ Background process visible from reused env (no docker start happened)
  ✓ force_remove=True removed the container even in persist mode
  ✓ cleanup_vm() removed the container (defaults to force_remove=True)

Test changes:

* Replaces `test_cleanup_with_persist_only_stops_no_rm` with
  `test_cleanup_with_persist_is_noop_for_container` — asserts neither
  stop nor rm runs in persist mode, and the in-process handle is
  cleared so re-probe works.
* Adds `test_cleanup_force_remove_stops_and_rms_even_in_persist_mode`
  — covers the new kwarg.
* Updates `test_cleanup_uses_subprocess_run_not_detached_shell` and
  `test_wait_for_cleanup_after_cleanup_returns_true` to pass
  `force_remove=True` so they actually exercise the docker code path
  (default no-op would trivially pass).

cleanup_vm() forwards `force_remove` only to backends whose cleanup()
accepts the kwarg (currently just DockerEnvironment) via runtime
signature inspection — Modal/Daytona/SSH `cleanup()` signatures are
unchanged.

Refs #20561
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Ben d77d877665 fix(docker): startup orphan reaper for crashed-process containers
The cleanup-fix in the previous commit handles the graceful-exit leak: a
Hermes process that runs ``atexit`` will now actually wait on the docker
stop/rm worker thread, so containers either survive (persist mode) or are
fully removed (opt-out mode) by the time the interpreter exits.

But ``atexit`` doesn't fire on SIGKILL, OOM-kill, or terminal-window
close. Containers from those exits stay parked with no surviving Python
process to reuse or remove them, so they accumulate until the operator
intervenes with ``docker rm -f``. The cleanup-fix doesn't help this class
— there's no live cleanup() to fix.

This commit adds the safety net: a startup orphan reaper that runs once
per Hermes process and removes long-Exited hermes-labeled containers
that the prior commit couldn't reach.

Implementation:

* New ``reap_orphan_containers()`` in ``tools/environments/docker.py``.
  Filters: ``label=hermes-agent=1`` + ``status=exited`` + (optional)
  ``label=hermes-profile=<current>``. Per-container ``docker inspect``
  parses ``State.FinishedAt`` (with nanosecond-precision trimming for
  Python's microsecond-bound ``fromisoformat``); containers older than
  the threshold get ``docker rm -f``'d. The ``status=exited`` filter is
  load-bearing — a running container may belong to a sibling Hermes
  process whose reuse path will pick it up; killing it would crash the
  sibling mid-command. Single-container failures are logged and the
  sweep continues to the next candidate.

* New ``_maybe_reap_docker_orphans()`` helper in
  ``tools/terminal_tool.py``. Wired into ``_create_environment()`` for
  ``env_type == "docker"``. Gated by:

    - ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper: true`` (default; opt-out for
      operators running multiple Hermes processes in the same profile
      who don't trust the conservative defaults)
    - ``_docker_orphan_reaper_ran`` module flag with double-checked
      locking — parallel subagents and RL rollouts don't trigger N
      concurrent docker ps storms
    - Age threshold = ``2 × TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS`` with a 60s floor
      (so ``TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS=0`` doesn't race the user's own
      setup)
    - Profile scoping — a research profile NEVER reaps the default
      profile's stragglers
    - Exception swallow — a janitor failure must never block container
      creation

* New config ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper`` wired through all four
  config-bridge sites (cli.py, gateway/run.py, hermes_cli/config.py,
  tests/conftest.py) and pinned by
  ``test_docker_orphan_reaper_is_bridged_everywhere``.

Coverage:

* 9 new unit tests in test_docker_environment.py — happy path, recent-
  container sparing, profile scoping, unparseable-timestamp safety,
  docker-ps-failure handling, partial-failure continuation, nanosecond
  timestamp parsing, zero-value FinishedAt rejection.
* 6 new integration tests in test_docker_orphan_reaper_integration.py
  — once-per-process gate, disable-flag respected, lifetime doubling
  with 60s floor, current-profile filter wiring, exception swallow.
* 1 new bridge-invariant regression test.

Closes #20561 (combined with the two prior commits on this branch).
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Ben ac8e238bc8 fix(docker): reuse containers across processes + fix cleanup leaks
The Docker backend docs claim "Single persistent container — ONE long-
lived container shared across sessions, /new, /reset, and delegate_task
subagents. Stopped/removed on shutdown." In practice the code only
honored that contract within a single Python process via the in-memory
\`_active_environments[task_id]\` cache. Every \`hermes chat\` invocation
spawned a fresh \`hermes-<hex>\` container; older containers piled up in
\`Exited\` state and accumulated until manual \`docker rm\` (issue #20561).

Three root causes, all addressed by this commit:

1. No cross-process container discovery.
2. \`cleanup()\` used fire-and-forget \`subprocess.Popen("... &", shell=True)\`
   which raced with parent-process exit — when Python exited promptly the
   detached shell child got killed mid-\`docker stop\`, leaving stopped
   containers behind.
3. The \`docker rm\` step in cleanup was gated on \`not self._persistent\`
   (the bind-mount-persistence flag). Default config sets
   \`container_persistent: true\`, so the default happy path skipped \`rm\`
   entirely — even when the user explicitly didn't want cross-process
   reuse, containers leaked.

Fix:

* Add \`DockerEnvironment.__init__(persist_across_processes=True)\`. When
  true, init probes
  \`docker ps -a --filter label=hermes-agent=1
                  --filter label=hermes-task-id=<task>
                  --filter label=hermes-profile=<profile>\`
  and reuses a matching container (running → attach; stopped →
  \`docker start\` → attach; \`docker start\` failure → fall through to a
  fresh \`docker run\`). Multiple matches prefer the running one, with the
  stragglers left for the orphan reaper (next commit) to clean up.

* Rewrite \`cleanup()\`. Uses \`subprocess.run(..., timeout=30)\` on a
  daemon \`threading.Thread\`, not the racy \`Popen(... &)\`. The
  \`_persistent\` guard is dropped on the \`rm\` step — \`rm\` now runs
  whenever \`persist_across_processes\` is false, regardless of the
  bind-mount-persistence setting. The leak class is gone in all
  combinations.

* Add \`wait_for_cleanup(timeout)\`. \`tools/terminal_tool.py\`'s atexit
  hook calls this on every active env, blocking up to 15s for the
  cleanup thread before interpreter exit. Without this, \`hermes /quit\`
  raced the daemon-thread teardown and dropped the stop/rm work.

* New config \`terminal.docker_persist_across_processes\` (default
  \`true\` — restores the documented contract). Set \`false\` for hard
  per-process isolation. Wired through all four config-bridge sites
  (cli.py env_mappings, gateway/run.py _terminal_env_map,
  hermes_cli/config.py _config_to_env_sync, tests/conftest.py env-strip
  list); regression-pinned by
  \`test_docker_persist_across_processes_is_bridged_everywhere\` matching
  the existing pattern for docker_run_as_host_user / docker_env.

Reuse intentionally does NOT compare image / mounts / resources — only
the labels. Operators changing those settings should set
\`docker_persist_across_processes: false\` (or \`docker rm -f\` the
labeled container) to force a fresh start. This keeps the probe cheap
and the failure mode obvious.

Coverage: 12 new unit tests in tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py
covering reuse paths (running, stopped, fallback, opt-out, duplicate
preference) and cleanup behavior (persist-mode no-rm, opt-out always-rm,
no-Popen, wait_for_cleanup semantics, partial-init safety). Plus one
config-bridge regression pin.

Refs #20561
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Ben 8d129d013b fix(docker): tag containers with hermes-agent labels for identification
Issue #20561 (Docker containers accumulate) needs a way to identify
hermes-created containers from the outside — both for the orphan reaper
(a follow-up commit) and for operators triaging `docker ps -a | grep
hermes-` after a SIGKILL leaves stragglers. The previous `hermes-<hex>`
name prefix was the only signal, which broke down under cross-process
reuse (planned) and against any custom `--name` someone might pass via
`docker_extra_args`.

This commit adds three labels at `docker run` time:

  --label hermes-agent=1                # global sweep target
  --label hermes-task-id=<sanitized>    # per-task reuse key
  --label hermes-profile=<sanitized>    # per-profile isolation key

Values are sanitized to `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]` and truncated to 63 chars so the
label round-trips cleanly through `docker ps --filter label=key=value`.
Empty or non-string inputs collapse to "unknown" rather than producing
an unqueryable empty value.

No behavior change: the labels are pure metadata. The follow-up commits
in this PR (cleanup-fix + orphan reaper) are what use them.

Refs #20561
2026-05-29 11:49:54 +10:00
Teknium 300140e006 test(tui_gateway): stop reloading server module in fixture teardown (#34217)
tui_gateway.server registers two atexit hooks at module load time:
ThreadPoolExecutor shutdown (line 170) and _shutdown_sessions (line 336).
Three test files reloaded the module on each fixture teardown to reset
per-test state. Each reload re-runs module-level code, including the
atexit registrations — duplicates accumulate across the test session.

At pytest interpreter shutdown the duplicated atexit hooks race the
stderr buffer flush:

    Fatal Python error: _enter_buffered_busy: could not acquire lock
    for <_io.BufferedWriter name='<stderr>'> at interpreter shutdown,
    possibly due to daemon threads

pytest reports 'tests passed but the slice exited non-zero', and the
shard turns red on CI. Surfaced today on PR #34193's test slice 1
(204 files, 3572 tests passed, then Fatal Python error during exit).

Fix: drop importlib.reload(mod) from the three fixtures that have it.
Per-test reset is handled by clearing the mutable session dicts
(_sessions, _pending, _answers). _methods is also no longer cleared —
it's populated at module import time and would only be re-populated by
a reload, so clearing it without reload broke session.resume /
command.dispatch / slash.exec method registration across tests.

Affected fixtures:
- tests/tui_gateway/test_goal_command.py
- tests/tui_gateway/test_protocol.py
- tests/tui_gateway/test_review_summary_callback.py

The second reload in test_protocol.py at line 211 (reload of
tui_gateway.transport) is preserved — transport.py has no atexit hooks
or threads, so reload is safe there.

Tests: 84/84 in tests/tui_gateway/ pass cleanly with exit code 0; no
Fatal Python error at interpreter shutdown.
2026-05-28 18:16:54 -07:00
Teknium e71a2bd11b chore: release v0.15.1 (2026.5.29) (#34222)
Publish to PyPI / Build distribution 📦 (push) Has been cancelled
Publish to PyPI / Publish to PyPI (push) Has been cancelled
Publish to PyPI / Sign and attach to GitHub Release (push) Has been cancelled
2026-05-28 18:11:49 -07:00
Teknium 769ee86cd2 feat(kanban): attach images referenced in task bodies to worker vision (#34210)
Kanban workers now scan the task body for local image paths and
http(s) image URLs and attach them to the worker's first user turn —
matching the CLI/gateway behaviour for inbound images. Before, a
user pasting `/home/me/screenshot.png` or `https://example.com/img.png`
into a kanban task description had it sent to the model as plain
text and the pixels were never seen.

How it works:
* agent/image_routing.py gains extract_image_refs(text) → (paths, urls)
  that mirrors gateway/platforms/base.py:extract_local_files (absolute /
  ~-relative paths, image extensions only, ignores fenced/inline code).
* build_native_content_parts() accepts an optional image_urls= kwarg
  and emits passthrough image_url parts for remote URLs alongside the
  base64 data: URLs used for local paths.
* cli.py (single-query/quiet branch — the path every dispatcher-spawned
  worker takes) detects HERMES_KANBAN_TASK, reads the task body via
  kanban_db.get_task, runs extract_image_refs, and threads the results
  into the existing image-routing decision (native vs text). Best-effort:
  enrichment failures never block worker startup.

Tested:
* tests/agent/test_image_routing.py — 22 new tests for extract_image_refs
  and URL pass-through in build_native_content_parts.
* tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_worker_image_extraction.py — 10 new tests
  driving real kanban_db round-trip (create task → read body → extract
  refs → build parts).
* E2E: created a fake kanban task with a body referencing both a local
  PNG and an https URL; verified the worker pipeline produces a
  multimodal user turn with 1 text part + 2 image_url parts (data URL
  for the local file, passthrough URL for the remote).
2026-05-28 17:50:42 -07:00
Ben 1b1e30510a test(docker): repair dashboard tests broken by the insecure-opt-in fix
The Docker integration test job started failing on main after
fb5125362 ("docker: opt in to dashboard --insecure via env var").
Two distinct failures, both fallout from that change being more
behaviour-changing than the existing test harness anticipated.

Failure 1 — test_dashboard_port_override (silent regression in an
already-existing test)
The test starts the container with just HERMES_DASHBOARD=1, defaults
to host=0.0.0.0, no HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, no
HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE. Pre-fix that combination got --insecure
auto-injected by the s6 run script (anything non-loopback was
implicitly insecure), so the OAuth gate stayed off and start_server
bound the port. Post-fix the gate engages, no provider is
registered, and start_server raises SystemExit before binding —
under s6 the dashboard goes into a restart loop and the test's
/proc/net/tcp poll finds nothing.

Same silent regression was masking three sibling tests
(test_dashboard_slot_reports_up_when_enabled, test_dashboard_opt_in_starts,
test_dashboard_restarts_after_crash) — they all only sample pgrep
or s6-svstat and so caught the supervised process mid-restart
loop, appearing to pass while the dashboard was actually never
reaching a healthy state.

Fix: pin HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE=1 on every test that enables
the dashboard but doesn't itself exercise the auth gate. Each
pinned site carries an inline comment pointing back to
test_dashboard_slot_reports_up_when_enabled for the full
rationale.

Failure 2 — test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engages_on_non_loopback_bind
(bug in the test I added in fb5125362)
The probe used urllib.request.urlopen() against /api/status. Under
the now-engaged OAuth gate /api/status no longer answers
unauthenticated callers (the gate middleware runs upstream of the
legacy _SESSION_TOKEN allowlist and 401s anything without a valid
session cookie). urlopen() raises HTTPError on the 401, the wrapper
treated that as "not ready yet", and the poll loop hit
timeout.

Fix: split the probe into a generic _http_probe() helper that
returns (status_code, body) for any HTTP response — including 401,
which IS the gate-engaged success signal. The helper feeds a
multi-line Python program over stdin via a POSIX heredoc so the
try/except branch reads naturally; far less fragile than the
earlier semicolon-laden -c one-liner.

The OAuth-gate test now verifies two independent observable
consequences of the gate being on:

  1. GET /api/auth/providers (publicly reachable through the gate
     so the login page can bootstrap) returns 200 with `nous` in
     the provider list — proves the bundled provider registered.
  2. GET /api/status returns 401 — proves the OAuth gate runs
     upstream of the legacy public-paths allowlist and is
     actively intercepting unauthenticated callers.

The insecure-opt-out test still hits /api/status, but now
asserts status_code == 200 first (proves the gate is bypassed)
before parsing the JSON for auth_required: false (proves the
gate-state flag is also correctly off).

Verified locally end-to-end against a fresh image build on a
real Docker daemon: all 41 tests under tests/docker/ pass in
2m38s, including the two formerly-failing dashboard tests and
the three sibling tests that were passing by accident.
2026-05-29 10:30:52 +10:00
Teknium f3acdd94fe Merge pull request #30698 from NousResearch/refactor/use-ds-primitives
refactor(web): consume DS primitives, remove local component copies
2026-05-28 17:29:28 -07:00
Teknium 78a54d2c00 fix(skills-page): source pills and category sidebar collapsed to All only (#34194)
Regression from PR #33809 (lazy-fetch refactor). The `sources` and
`categoryEntries` useMemo blocks were derived from `allSkillsLocal`
but had empty/incomplete deps arrays — so they computed once at mount
when the catalog was still `[]`, then never recomputed when the fetch
resolved.

Symptom: live site shows only the "All 87,639" source button and
"All Skills 87,639" category — no per-source pills (ClawHub, skills.sh,
LobeHub, etc.) and no category breakdown. Filtering by source/category
is unusable.

Fix: add `allSkillsLocal` to both deps arrays so they recompute when
data arrives. Local build green on en + zh-Hans.
2026-05-28 17:11:40 -07:00
Ben e7c99651fb fix(mcp): resolve bare npx/npm/node against /usr/local/bin
When the Hermes Docker image runs an stdio MCP server configured with an
explicit env.PATH that omits /usr/local/bin (a common pattern when users
hand-author PATH for sandboxing), the MCP env-filter passes that narrow
PATH straight through to the subprocess. _resolve_stdio_command's
fallback for bare 'npx' / 'npm' / 'node' commands only checked
$HERMES_HOME/node/bin/ and ~/.local/bin/, so execvp() failed with
'[Errno 2] No such file or directory: npx' on every Node-based stdio
MCP server (Railway, Anthropic, GitHub Copilot, etc.).

The naive workaround — symlink /usr/local/bin/npx into the user's PATH —
fails one layer deeper because npx's shebang re-execs /usr/bin/env node
and node also lives at /usr/local/bin/node.

Fix: add /usr/local/bin/<cmd> as a third candidate in the fallback list.
This is the canonical install location for Node on:
  - Linux from-source builds
  - the upstream node:bookworm-slim image, which the Hermes Docker
    image copies node + npm + corepack from since #4977 (the Node 22 LTS
    refactor that exposed this)
  - macOS Homebrew on Intel

Because the resolver already calls _prepend_path(resolved_env, command_dir)
after locating the command, /usr/local/bin gets prepended to the env's
PATH automatically, which also fixes the second-layer shebang failure
(npx-cli.js can now find node).

Scope is intentionally narrow: the fix activates only when the bare
command isn't otherwise locatable through the user's PATH. Users who
explicitly narrowed PATH for a non-Node MCP server see no change in
behavior.

Tested:
  - tests/tools/test_mcp_tool_issue_948.py: new test
    test_resolve_stdio_command_falls_back_to_usr_local_bin (mirrors the
    existing hermes-node-bin fallback test)
  - Full MCP test suite: 254/254 pass across 7 test files
  - E2E against a freshly-built Docker image: reproduced the original
    failure mode (env.PATH=/opt/data/bin:/usr/bin:/bin), confirmed the
    resolver returns /usr/local/bin/npx and prepends /usr/local/bin to
    PATH; subprocess.run of the resolved command prints '10.9.8' and
    exits 0 with empty stderr
  - Negative E2E on the host (where Node is already on PATH via mise):
    resolver still hits the mise install dir, /usr/local/bin candidate
    is not consulted, PATH is unchanged
2026-05-29 10:05:42 +10:00
Ben fb51253620 docker: opt in to dashboard --insecure via env var, never derive from bind host
The s6 dashboard run script flipped `--insecure` on whenever
`HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST` was anything other than 127.0.0.1 / localhost.
That comment ("the dashboard refuses otherwise") predates the OAuth
auth gate: back when it was written, `start_server` would SystemExit
on any non-loopback bind, so the run script's `--insecure` was the
only way to make in-container deployments work at all.

The gate has since been replaced by `should_require_auth(host,
allow_public)`, which engages the OAuth flow when a
`DashboardAuthProvider` is registered (the bundled `dashboard_auth/nous`
provider auto-registers on `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`) and
fails closed with a specific operator-facing error when none is. The
host-derived `--insecure` ran upstream of all that and silently
disabled the gate on every container-deployed dashboard.

Most visible under the portal's wildcard-subdomain rollout: every Fly
machine binds 0.0.0.0 so the edge can reach Flycast, every machine
boots with the correct `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, the nous
provider registers — and `/api/status` still returns
`{"auth_required": false, "auth_providers": ["nous"]}` because the
run script disabled the gate before `start_server` ever saw the
request. The dashboard SPA was served to anyone, no `/login` redirect,
no OAuth challenge.

Fix: derive `--insecure` from an explicit opt-in env var,
`HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE` (truthy values matching the rest of the
s6 boolean envs: 1, true, TRUE, True, yes, YES, Yes). Operators on
trusted LANs behind a reverse proxy without the OAuth contract
(the existing `docker-compose.windows.yml` use case) opt in
explicitly; portal-managed agent deployments leave it unset and let
the gate engage.

`docker-compose.windows.yml` already passes `--insecure` on the
`command:` array directly (line 38), so it doesn't depend on the s6
auto-injection. No compose-file change required.

Tests:
* `tests/test_docker_home_override_scripts.py` — extends the existing
  static-text guard with a regression assertion that the legacy
  host-derived case-statement is gone and the new env-var opt-in is
  present (locks against accidental revert).
* `tests/docker/test_dashboard.py` — adds two Docker-in-Docker tests
  exercising the actual `/api/status` round-trip:
  - 0.0.0.0 bind + `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID` → gate engaged
  - 0.0.0.0 bind + `HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE=1` → gate disabled

Docs:
* `website/docs/user-guide/docker.md` + zh-Hans i18n — adds the new
  env var to the table, replaces the stale prose ("the entrypoint
  no longer auto-enables insecure mode" — which until this PR was
  flat-out wrong) with an accurate description of the gate's
  trigger conditions and the explicit opt-out.

shellcheck clean. Python static-text test passes locally. Behavioural
test will run against any future image build (CI's Docker harness).
2026-05-29 09:56:40 +10:00
Evo ef009a987a docs(reference): document --no-supervise / HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE from #33583 (#33751)
* docs(reference): document --no-supervise / HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE (en)

* docs(reference): document --no-supervise / HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE (en)

* docs(reference): document --no-supervise / HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE (zh)

* docs(reference): document --no-supervise / HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE (zh)
2026-05-29 09:44:53 +10:00
BROCCOLO1D 130396c658 ci(docker): avoid gha cache on arm64 PR builds 2026-05-29 09:43:48 +10:00
Austin PickettandCursor a5c1f925b5 fix(web): stop /api/auth/me 401 from triggering a reload loop
In loopback mode the dashboard's identity probe (/api/auth/me) returns
401 by design — AuthWidget swallows it and renders nothing. But the
probe routed through fetchJSON, whose loopback 401 handler treats a 401
as a rotated session token and full-page-reloads to pick up a fresh one.
That reload is guarded by a one-shot sessionStorage flag which every
*successful* request clears, so with auth/me reliably 401ing and the
other dashboard calls (status/config/sessions) reliably succeeding, the
guard never sticks and the page reload-loops indefinitely (the "boot
flash").

Add an allowUnauthorized option to fetchJSON that skips only the loopback
stale-token reload (the 401 still throws so AuthWidget can catch it, and
the gated-mode login_url envelope redirect is unaffected), and use it for
getAuthMe.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-28 16:58:42 -04:00
Austin PickettandCursor 0acb7f4583 fix(nix): update hermes-web npmDepsHash for @nous-research/ui 0.18.2
The web/package-lock.json changed when bumping @nous-research/ui to
0.18.2, so the fetchNpmDeps fixed-output hash in nix/web.nix was stale.
Update it to the hash prefetch-npm-deps computes for the new lockfile.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-28 16:24:01 -04:00
Austin PickettandCursor a3cd974ee7 chore(web): bump @nous-research/ui to 0.18.2
Picks up the deferred GPU-tier detection fix (design-language) that
stops the synchronous WebGL probe from blocking first paint, which was
causing a boot-time flash in the dashboard backdrop.

nix/web.nix npmDepsHash is a placeholder here and is corrected in the
follow-up commit using the hash reported by the Nix CI job.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-28 16:20:14 -04:00
Austin PickettandCursor 102eb4adc0 fix(nix): update hermes-web npmDepsHash for bumped @nous-research/ui
The web/package-lock.json changed when bumping @nous-research/ui to 0.18.0,
so the fetchNpmDeps fixed-output hash in nix/web.nix was stale and the nix
build failed. Update it to the hash prefetch-npm-deps computes for the new
lockfile.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-28 14:27:08 -04:00
Austin Pickett c661fefa08 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into refactor/use-ds-primitives
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

# Conflicts:
#	web/src/components/BottomPickSheet.tsx
#	web/src/components/SidebarFooter.tsx
#	web/src/components/ui/card.tsx
#	web/src/components/ui/confirm-dialog.tsx
#	web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx
2026-05-28 14:20:49 -04:00
Austin PickettandCursor c9e5a9bb08 refactor(web): consume DS primitives, remove local component copies
Replace locally-forked UI components and hooks with their newly
promoted counterparts from @nous-research/ui:

Deleted local components (now in DS):
- components/ui/input.tsx, label.tsx, separator.tsx, card.tsx,
  confirm-dialog.tsx
- components/Toast.tsx, BottomPickSheet.tsx, NouiTypography.tsx
- hooks/useToast.ts, useModalBehavior.ts, useBelowBreakpoint.ts,
  useConfirmDelete.ts

Import updates across 25 files to use DS deep imports:
- @nous-research/ui/ui/components/{input,label,separator,card,
  confirm-dialog,toast,bottom-sheet}
- @nous-research/ui/ui/components/typography (replaces NouiTypography)
- @nous-research/ui/hooks/{use-toast,use-modal-behavior,
  use-below-breakpoint,use-confirm-delete}

Requires design-language >= feat/promote-hermes-web-primitives.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-22 21:57:59 -04:00
817 changed files with 18043 additions and 4147 deletions
+20 -4
View File
@@ -196,10 +196,26 @@ jobs:
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3
# Build once, load into the local daemon for smoke testing. Cached
# to gha with a per-arch scope; the push step below reuses every
# layer from this build.
- name: Build image (arm64, smoke test)
# Build once, load into the local daemon for smoke testing. PR arm64
# builds deliberately avoid the gha cache: cold-cache arm64 builds can
# outlive GitHub's short-lived Azure cache SAS token, then fail while
# reading or writing cache blobs before the smoke test can run.
- name: Build image (arm64, smoke test, uncached PR)
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
uses: docker/build-push-action@bcafcacb16a39f128d818304e6c9c0c18556b85f # v7.1.0
with:
context: .
file: Dockerfile
load: true
platforms: linux/arm64
tags: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:test
build-args: |
HERMES_GIT_SHA=${{ github.sha }}
# Main/release builds still use the per-arch gha cache so the digest
# push below can reuse layers from this smoke-test build.
- name: Build image (arm64, smoke test, cached publish)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
uses: docker/build-push-action@bcafcacb16a39f128d818304e6c9c0c18556b85f # v7.1.0
with:
context: .
+4
View File
@@ -92,3 +92,7 @@ docs/superpowers/*
# also created in-repo when an agent operates in this checkout). Plans, audit
# logs, and per-session caches are never artifacts of the codebase.
.hermes/
# Tool Search live-test harness output — non-deterministic model transcripts,
# regenerated by scripts/tool_search_livetest.py. Never an artifact of the repo.
scripts/out/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ENV PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/opt/hermes/.playwright
# hermes process, the dashboard, and per-profile gateways.
RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates curl python3 python-is-python3 ripgrep ffmpeg gcc python3-dev libffi-dev procps git openssh-client docker-cli xz-utils && \
ca-certificates curl iputils-ping python3 python-is-python3 ripgrep ffmpeg gcc python3-dev libffi-dev procps git openssh-client docker-cli xz-utils && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# ---------- s6-overlay install ----------
+5
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
graft skills
graft optional-skills
# Bundled plugin manifests (plugin.yaml / plugin.yml). Without these the
# PluginManager scan (hermes_cli/plugins.py) finds zero plugins on installs
# built from the sdist (e.g. Homebrew, downstream packagers). package-data
# below covers the wheel; this covers the sdist. See #34034 / #28149.
recursive-include plugins plugin.yaml plugin.yml
global-exclude __pycache__
global-exclude *.py[cod]
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# Hermes Agent v0.15.1 (v2026.5.29)
**Release Date:** May 29, 2026
**Since v0.15.0:** 28 commits · 21 merged PRs · hotfix release · 9 contributors
> **The Patch Release.** A same-day hotfix for v0.15.0. Headline fix: the dashboard infinite-reload loop that hit anyone running v0.15.0 in loopback mode (Docker, hosted Hermes, fresh installs). A handful of other v0.15.0 follow-ups go along for the ride — kanban worker SIGTERM, `/model` picker unification, `/yolo` session bypass, the full 19,932-entry skills.sh catalog, `.md` media delivery restoration, gateway probe-stepdown safety, web-URL redaction passthrough, kanban worker vision on referenced images, hindsight observation-default. Docker users get an explicit `--insecure` opt-in env var (no more bind-host inference), MCP server bare-command PATH resolution, and arm64 PR-build cache fixes.
---
## ✨ Highlights
- **Dashboard 401 reload loop fixed** — In loopback mode the dashboard's identity probe (`/api/auth/me`) returns 401 by design, but v0.15.0's stale-token reload guard treated every 401 as a rotated session token and full-page-reloaded to pick up a fresh one. Every successful sibling call cleared the one-shot reload guard, so the page reload-looped forever (Firefox: "Navigated to /sessions" storm; Chrome: React re-render storm). Fix adds an `allowUnauthorized` opt-out to `fetchJSON` that skips only the loopback stale-token reload — 401 still throws so `AuthWidget` swallows it, gated-mode `login_url` redirects are unaffected. Closes [#34206](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/34206), [#34202](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/34202). ([#30698](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/30698) — @austinpickett)
- **Docker dashboard `--insecure` is now an explicit env opt-in, never derived from bind host** — Previously the Docker entrypoint inferred `--insecure` when the dashboard bound to a non-loopback host. That conflated "I want LAN access" with "I want to disable the same-origin guard." The fix splits them: bind host is bind host, and disabling the dashboard's loopback auth requires an explicit `HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE=1`. Existing setups that genuinely wanted insecure binding must now set the env var. ([#34188](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34188), [#34204](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34204) — @benbarclay)
- **MCP bare command resolution under Docker** — MCP servers configured with bare commands (`npx`, `npm`, `node`) now resolve against `/usr/local/bin` so they actually launch inside the Docker image where those binaries live. v0.15.0 left these failing silently in containers when the agent's effective PATH didn't include the Node toolchain location. ([#34186](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34186) — @benbarclay)
- **Skills page sidebar / source pills restored** — A stale `useMemo` dependency in the new dashboard skills page collapsed the source pills and category sidebar to "All" only. Fixed; both surfaces now reflect the live catalog state. ([#34194](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34194))
- **Kanban worker can be killed again** — `SIGTERM` on a kanban worker was being absorbed by an intermediate process and the worker stayed running. Closes [#28181](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/28181). ([#34045](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34045))
- **Full skills.sh catalog (858 → 19,932 entries)** — The skills hub page was pulling a partial paginated catalog. The fetch now walks the sitemap, so all 19,932 skills.sh entries surface in the picker instead of just the first 858. ([#34025](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34025))
---
## 🐛 Bug Fixes
### Dashboard / Web
- **`/api/auth/me` 401 no longer triggers reload loop** in loopback mode — ([#30698](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/30698) — @austinpickett)
- **Skills page source pills + category sidebar restored** — stale `useMemo` dep ([#34194](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34194))
### Docker
- **`--insecure` is now explicit opt-in via env var**, not derived from bind host ([#34188](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34188) — @benbarclay)
- **Dashboard test suite repaired** to match the insecure-opt-in fix ([#34204](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34204) — @benbarclay)
- **arm64 PR builds skip the GHA cache** to avoid cache-thrash on cross-arch builders ([#33704](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33704) — @BROCCOLO1D)
### MCP
- **Bare `npx`/`npm`/`node` resolve against `/usr/local/bin`** for Docker compatibility ([#34186](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34186) — @benbarclay)
### Kanban
- **Worker SIGTERM actually terminates the process** ([#34045](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34045))
- **Workers receive images referenced in task bodies** for vision-capable models ([#34210](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34210))
### Gateway
- **`.md` files deliver again** — media-delivery validation defaults to denylist-only instead of an overly-narrow allowlist ([#34022](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34022))
- **Probe stepdown safety** — on a context-overflow without an explicit provider context limit, the agent no longer steps down to a smaller model based on an unknown ceiling (salvage of [#33673](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33673)) ([#33826](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33826))
### CLI
- **`/yolo` mid-session enables the per-session bypass** instead of just toggling the env var (which the running agent had already snapshotted) ([#33931](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33931) — @kshitijk4poor)
- **`/model` and `hermes model` show the same list**, plus disk cache for picker startup ([#33867](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33867))
### Skills
- **Full skills.sh catalog via sitemap** — 858 → 19,932 entries ([#34025](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34025))
### Redaction
- **Web URLs pass through unchanged** — the redactor was eating query parameters that looked credential-shaped ([#34029](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34029))
---
## ✨ Small Features
- **Hindsight default narrowed to observation-only** for `recall_types` — tool path is also narrowed ([#34079](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34079) — @nicoloboschi, follow-up [#34091](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/4df62d239e38bf8c212a595721c9c01e176f6c3a) — @kshitijk4poor)
- **Memory providers receive completed-turn message context** — salvage of [#28065](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/28065) ([#34097](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34097) — @kshitijk4poor, credit to @devwdave)
---
## 📚 Documentation
- **`--no-supervise` / `HERMES_GATEWAY_NO_SUPERVISE` documented** in the reference docs (follow-up to [#33583](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33583)) ([#33751](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/33751) — @r266-tech)
---
## 🛠️ Infrastructure
- **Vercel deploy workflow accepts `workflow_dispatch`** so docs deploys can be manually triggered ([#34081](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34081))
- **`@nous-research/ui` bumped to 0.18.2** (Nix `npmDepsHash` also updated to match) ([#34193](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/34193) follow-ups — @austinpickett)
---
## 👥 Contributors
### Core
- @teknium1
### Community
- @austinpickett — dashboard 401 reload-loop fix (the headline), `@nous-research/ui` bump, Nix `npmDepsHash` updates
- @benbarclay — Docker `--insecure` opt-in, MCP bare-command resolution, dashboard test repair
- @kshitijk4poor`/yolo` session bypass, completed-turn memory context salvage, hindsight follow-up docs
- @nicoloboschi — hindsight `recall_types` observation default
- @BROCCOLO1D — arm64 PR build cache fix
- @r266-tech — `--no-supervise` reference docs
- @yangguangjin — probe stepdown safety (salvage of @yanghd's #33673)
- @devwdave — completed-turn memory context (credited via salvage)
- @andrewhosf — co-author
### Issue Reporters (the 401 loop)
- @routesmith ([#34206](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/34206))
- @beeaton ([#34202](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/34202))
---
**Full Changelog**: [v2026.5.28...v2026.5.29](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/compare/v2026.5.28...v2026.5.29)
-66
View File
@@ -907,72 +907,6 @@ def _build_polished_completion_content(
return [_text(text)]
def _build_patch_mode_content(patch_text: str) -> List[Any]:
"""Parse V4A patch mode input into ACP diff blocks when possible."""
if not patch_text:
return [acp.tool_content(acp.text_block(""))]
try:
from tools.patch_parser import OperationType, parse_v4a_patch
operations, error = parse_v4a_patch(patch_text)
if error or not operations:
return [acp.tool_content(acp.text_block(patch_text))]
content: List[Any] = []
for op in operations:
if op.operation == OperationType.UPDATE:
old_chunks: list[str] = []
new_chunks: list[str] = []
for hunk in op.hunks:
old_lines = [line.content for line in hunk.lines if line.prefix in {" ", "-"}]
new_lines = [line.content for line in hunk.lines if line.prefix in {" ", "+"}]
if old_lines or new_lines:
old_chunks.append("\n".join(old_lines))
new_chunks.append("\n".join(new_lines))
old_text = "\n...\n".join(chunk for chunk in old_chunks if chunk)
new_text = "\n...\n".join(chunk for chunk in new_chunks if chunk)
if old_text or new_text:
content.append(
acp.tool_diff_content(
path=op.file_path,
old_text=old_text or None,
new_text=new_text or "",
)
)
continue
if op.operation == OperationType.ADD:
added_lines = [line.content for hunk in op.hunks for line in hunk.lines if line.prefix == "+"]
content.append(
acp.tool_diff_content(
path=op.file_path,
new_text="\n".join(added_lines),
)
)
continue
if op.operation == OperationType.DELETE:
content.append(
acp.tool_diff_content(
path=op.file_path,
old_text=f"Delete file: {op.file_path}",
new_text="",
)
)
continue
if op.operation == OperationType.MOVE:
content.append(
acp.tool_content(acp.text_block(f"Move file: {op.file_path} -> {op.new_path}"))
)
return content or [acp.tool_content(acp.text_block(patch_text))]
except Exception:
return [acp.tool_content(acp.text_block(patch_text))]
def _strip_diff_prefix(path: str) -> str:
raw = str(path or "").strip()
if raw.startswith(("a/", "b/")):
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"id": "hermes-agent",
"name": "Hermes Agent",
"version": "0.15.0",
"version": "0.15.1",
"description": "Self-improving open-source AI agent by Nous Research with ACP editor integration, persistent memory, skills, and rich tool support.",
"repository": "https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent",
"website": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/acp",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
"license": "MIT",
"distribution": {
"uvx": {
"package": "hermes-agent[acp]==0.15.0",
"package": "hermes-agent[acp]==0.15.1",
"args": ["hermes-acp"]
}
}
+12 -4
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ import threading
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlunparse
@@ -37,7 +36,6 @@ from agent.memory_manager import StreamingContextScrubber
from agent.model_metadata import (
MINIMUM_CONTEXT_LENGTH,
fetch_model_metadata,
get_model_context_length,
is_local_endpoint,
query_ollama_num_ctx,
)
@@ -52,7 +50,6 @@ from agent.tool_guardrails import (
from hermes_cli.config import cfg_get
from hermes_cli.timeouts import get_provider_request_timeout
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
from model_tools import check_toolset_requirements, get_tool_definitions
from utils import base_url_host_matches
# Use the same logger name as run_agent so tests patching ``run_agent.logger``
@@ -1201,6 +1198,18 @@ def init_agent(
_agent_section = {}
agent._tool_use_enforcement = _agent_section.get("tool_use_enforcement", "auto")
# Universal task-completion guidance toggle. Default True. Surfaced
# as a separate flag from tool_use_enforcement because the guidance
# applies to ALL models, not just the model families enforcement
# targets.
agent._task_completion_guidance = bool(_agent_section.get("task_completion_guidance", True))
# Local Python toolchain probe toggle. Default True. When False,
# the probe is skipped entirely (no subprocess calls, no system-prompt
# line). Useful for users on exotic setups where the probe heuristics
# are noisy.
agent._environment_probe = bool(_agent_section.get("environment_probe", True))
# App-level API retry count (wraps each model API call). Default 3,
# overridable via agent.api_max_retries in config.yaml. See #11616.
try:
@@ -1462,7 +1471,6 @@ def init_agent(
# Reject models whose context window is below the minimum required
# for reliable tool-calling workflows (64K tokens).
from agent.model_metadata import MINIMUM_CONTEXT_LENGTH
_ctx = getattr(agent.context_compressor, "context_length", 0)
if _ctx and _ctx < MINIMUM_CONTEXT_LENGTH:
raise ValueError(
+4 -9
View File
@@ -25,24 +25,17 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import copy
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import threading
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from hermes_cli.timeouts import get_provider_request_timeout
from agent.message_sanitization import (
_repair_tool_call_arguments,
_sanitize_surrogates,
)
from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import _trajectory_normalize_msg, make_tool_result_message
from agent.trajectory import convert_scratchpad_to_think
from agent.credential_pool import STATUS_EXHAUSTED
from agent.error_classifier import classify_api_error, FailoverReason
from agent.error_classifier import FailoverReason
from utils import base_url_host_matches, base_url_hostname, env_var_enabled, atomic_json_write
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -1699,6 +1692,8 @@ def invoke_tool(agent, function_name: str, function_args: dict, effective_task_i
session_id=agent.session_id or "",
enabled_tools=list(agent.valid_tool_names) if agent.valid_tool_names else None,
skip_pre_tool_call_hook=True,
enabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "enabled_toolsets", None),
disabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "disabled_toolsets", None),
)
+9 -17
View File
@@ -894,20 +894,6 @@ def read_claude_code_credentials() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
return None
def read_claude_managed_key() -> Optional[str]:
"""Read Claude's native managed key from ~/.claude.json for diagnostics only."""
claude_json = Path.home() / ".claude.json"
if claude_json.exists():
try:
data = json.loads(claude_json.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
primary_key = data.get("primaryApiKey", "")
if isinstance(primary_key, str) and primary_key.strip():
return primary_key.strip()
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError, IOError) as e:
logger.debug("Failed to read ~/.claude.json: %s", e)
return None
def is_claude_code_token_valid(creds: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""Check if Claude Code credentials have a non-expired access token."""
import time
@@ -1256,10 +1242,16 @@ def run_hermes_oauth_login_pure() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
print()
try:
webbrowser.open(auth_url)
print(" (Browser opened automatically)")
from hermes_cli.auth import _can_open_graphical_browser as _can_open_gui
except Exception:
pass
_can_open_gui = lambda: True # noqa: E731 — degrade to prior behavior
if _can_open_gui():
try:
webbrowser.open(auth_url)
print(" (Browser opened automatically)")
except Exception:
pass
print()
print("After authorizing, you'll see a code. Paste it below.")
+70 -28
View File
@@ -700,12 +700,20 @@ class _CodexCompletionsAdapter:
# xAI's Responses endpoint rejects ``pattern`` and ``format`` JSON Schema
# keywords (HTTP 400). Strip them here to match the parity guarantee that
# chat_completion_helpers.py provides for the main-agent xAI path.
#
# Deep-copy before sanitizing — ``list(tools)`` is only a shallow
# copy of the outer list, but the sanitizers mutate the inner
# parameter dicts in place. Without a deep copy the caller's
# tool registry permanently loses its slash-containing enum
# constraints after the first auxiliary xAI call. See #27907.
try:
import copy as _copy
from tools.schema_sanitizer import (
strip_pattern_and_format,
strip_slash_enum,
)
tools, _ = strip_pattern_and_format(list(tools))
tools = _copy.deepcopy(list(tools))
tools, _ = strip_pattern_and_format(tools)
tools, _ = strip_slash_enum(tools)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
@@ -1235,8 +1243,23 @@ def _read_nous_auth() -> Optional[dict]:
def _nous_api_key(provider: dict) -> str:
"""Extract the Nous runtime credential from the compatibility field."""
return provider.get("agent_key") or provider.get("access_token", "")
"""Extract a usable Nous inference JWT from stored auth state."""
from hermes_cli.auth import _nous_invoke_jwt_is_usable
for token_key, expiry_key in (
("agent_key", "agent_key_expires_at"),
("access_token", "expires_at"),
):
token = provider.get(token_key)
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token.strip():
continue
if _nous_invoke_jwt_is_usable(
token,
scope=provider.get("scope"),
expires_at=provider.get(expiry_key),
):
return token
return ""
def _nous_base_url() -> str:
@@ -1248,25 +1271,16 @@ def _resolve_nous_runtime_api(*, force_refresh: bool = False) -> Optional[tuple[
"""Return fresh Nous runtime credentials when available.
This mirrors the main agent's 401 recovery path and keeps auxiliary
clients aligned with the singleton auth store + JWT/mint flow instead of
clients aligned with the singleton auth store + JWT refresh flow instead of
relying only on whatever raw tokens happen to be sitting in auth.json
or the credential pool.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import (
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO,
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
resolve_nous_runtime_credentials,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_runtime_credentials
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800"))),
timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "15")),
inference_auth_mode=(
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY
if force_refresh
else NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO
),
force_refresh=force_refresh,
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Auxiliary Nous runtime credential resolution failed: %s", exc)
@@ -1550,13 +1564,9 @@ def _try_nous(vision: bool = False) -> Tuple[Optional[OpenAI], Optional[str]]:
_mark_provider_unhealthy("nous", ttl=60)
return None, None
if runtime is None and nous:
# Runtime credential mint failed but stored Nous auth is still present.
# Falls back to the raw stored token below; surface a debug line so
# operators investigating expired/invalid sessions have a breadcrumb,
# without blocking the fallback path the rest of this function relies on.
logger.debug(
"Auxiliary Nous: runtime credential mint failed; falling back to "
"stored auth.json token."
"Auxiliary Nous: runtime JWT refresh failed; checking stored "
"auth.json token."
)
global auxiliary_is_nous
auxiliary_is_nous = True
@@ -1594,6 +1604,13 @@ def _try_nous(vision: bool = False) -> Tuple[Optional[OpenAI], Optional[str]]:
api_key, base_url = runtime
else:
api_key = _nous_api_key(nous or {})
if not api_key:
logger.warning(
"Auxiliary Nous client unavailable: no usable inference JWT found "
"(run: hermes auth add nous)."
)
_mark_provider_unhealthy("nous", ttl=60)
return None, None
base_url = str((nous or {}).get("inference_base_url") or _nous_base_url()).rstrip("/")
return (
OpenAI(
@@ -2357,7 +2374,16 @@ def _is_auth_error(exc: Exception) -> bool:
if status == 401:
return True
err_lower = str(exc).lower()
return "error code: 401" in err_lower or "authenticationerror" in type(exc).__name__.lower()
if "error code: 401" in err_lower or "authenticationerror" in type(exc).__name__.lower():
return True
# xAI returns HTTP 403 with "unauthenticated:bad-credentials" when an OAuth2
# access token has expired or is invalid — semantically a 401 auth failure,
# even though the status code is 403 (PermissionDenied).
if status == 403 and "bad-credentials" in err_lower:
return True
if "unauthenticated" in err_lower and "bad-credentials" in err_lower:
return True
return False
def _is_unsupported_parameter_error(exc: Exception, param: str) -> bool:
@@ -2510,6 +2536,8 @@ def _recoverable_pool_provider(
return "copilot"
if base_url_host_matches(base, "api.kimi.com"):
return "kimi-coding"
if base_url_host_matches(base, "api.x.ai"):
return "xai-oauth"
# For api_key providers not in the hardcoded list (e.g. opencode-go), match
# the client base URL against all registered api_key providers so that
# credential-pool rotation works for any provider the user configured.
@@ -2706,15 +2734,11 @@ def _refresh_provider_credentials(provider: str) -> bool:
_evict_cached_clients(normalized)
return True
if normalized == "nous":
from hermes_cli.auth import (
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
resolve_nous_runtime_credentials,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_runtime_credentials
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800"))),
timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "15")),
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
force_refresh=True,
)
if not str(creds.get("api_key", "") or "").strip():
return False
@@ -2731,6 +2755,24 @@ def _refresh_provider_credentials(provider: str) -> bool:
return False
_evict_cached_clients(normalized)
return True
if normalized == "xai-oauth":
# Preference: pool-level refresh (uses refresh_token from pool entry),
# then fall back to singleton auth-store resolver.
pool = load_pool(normalized)
if pool and pool.has_credentials():
# Ensure a current entry is selected before trying to refresh.
pool.select()
refreshed = pool.try_refresh_current()
if refreshed is not None and str(getattr(refreshed, "runtime_api_key", "") or "").strip():
_evict_cached_clients(normalized)
return True
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_xai_oauth_runtime_credentials
creds = resolve_xai_oauth_runtime_credentials(force_refresh=True)
if not str(creds.get("api_key", "") or "").strip():
return False
_evict_cached_clients(normalized)
return True
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Auxiliary provider credential refresh failed for %s: %s", normalized, exc)
return False
-12
View File
@@ -1167,18 +1167,6 @@ def _extract_provider_from_arn(arn: str) -> str:
"""
match = re.search(r"foundation-model/([^.]+)", arn)
return match.group(1) if match else ""
def get_bedrock_model_ids(region: str) -> List[str]:
"""Return a flat list of available Bedrock model IDs for the given region.
Convenience wrapper around ``discover_bedrock_models()`` for use in
the model selection UI.
"""
models = discover_bedrock_models(region)
return [m["id"] for m in models]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Error classification — Bedrock-specific exceptions
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-31
View File
@@ -186,37 +186,6 @@ def _resolve(configured: Optional[str]) -> Optional[BrowserProvider]:
return None
def get_active_browser_provider() -> Optional[BrowserProvider]:
"""Resolve the currently-active cloud browser provider.
Reads ``browser.cloud_provider`` from config.yaml; falls back per the
module docstring. Returns None for local mode or when no provider is
available.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import read_raw_config
cfg = read_raw_config()
browser_cfg = cfg.get("browser", {})
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Could not read browser config: %s", exc)
browser_cfg = {}
configured: Optional[str] = None
if isinstance(browser_cfg, dict) and "cloud_provider" in browser_cfg:
try:
from tools.tool_backend_helpers import normalize_browser_cloud_provider
configured = normalize_browser_cloud_provider(
browser_cfg.get("cloud_provider")
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("normalize_browser_cloud_provider failed: %s", exc)
configured = None
return _resolve(configured)
def _reset_for_tests() -> None:
"""Clear the registry. **Test-only.**"""
with _lock:
+22 -44
View File
@@ -15,49 +15,23 @@ sites unchanged. Symbols that tests patch on ``run_agent`` (e.g.
from __future__ import annotations
import concurrent.futures
import contextvars
import copy
import json
import logging
import os
import random
import re
import sys
import threading
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlunparse
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from hermes_cli.timeouts import get_provider_request_timeout, get_provider_stale_timeout
from hermes_constants import PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID, FINISH_REASON_LENGTH
from agent.error_classifier import classify_api_error, FailoverReason
from agent.error_classifier import FailoverReason
from agent.model_metadata import is_local_endpoint
from agent.message_sanitization import (
_sanitize_surrogates,
_sanitize_messages_surrogates,
_sanitize_structure_surrogates,
_sanitize_messages_non_ascii,
_sanitize_tools_non_ascii,
_sanitize_structure_non_ascii,
_strip_images_from_messages,
_strip_non_ascii,
_repair_tool_call_arguments,
_escape_invalid_chars_in_json_strings,
)
from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import (
_is_multimodal_tool_result,
_multimodal_text_summary,
)
from agent.retry_utils import jittered_backoff
from agent.tool_guardrails import (
ToolGuardrailDecision,
append_toolguard_guidance,
toolguard_synthetic_result,
)
from tools.terminal_tool import is_persistent_env
from utils import base_url_host_matches, base_url_hostname
@@ -175,13 +149,6 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = threading.get_ident()
return client
def _take_request_client():
with request_client_lock:
client = request_client_holder.get("client")
request_client_holder["client"] = None
request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
return client
def _close_request_client_once(reason: str) -> None:
# #29507: dispatch on the calling thread.
#
@@ -310,8 +277,15 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
else:
_codex_idle_timeout_default = 12.0
# No-byte TTFB cutoff. The OpenAI SDK's own streaming read timeout is far
# longer (openai 2.x DEFAULT_TIMEOUT.read = 600s), so a tight 12s default
# killed subscription-backed Codex requests mid-prefill before the backend
# had a chance to emit its first SSE event. Default to 120s — long enough to
# clear normal backend admission / prompt prefill, short enough to still
# reconnect promptly when the socket is genuinely wedged. Set
# HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=0 to disable this watchdog entirely.
_ttfb_enabled = _codex_watchdog_enabled
_ttfb_timeout = _env_float("HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 12.0)
_ttfb_timeout = _env_float("HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", 120.0)
if _ttfb_timeout <= 0:
_ttfb_enabled = False
elif _openai_codex_backend:
@@ -333,7 +307,7 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
_ttfb_disable_above,
)
else:
_ttfb_cap = _env_float("HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_MAX_SECONDS", 20.0)
_ttfb_cap = _env_float("HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_MAX_SECONDS", 120.0)
if _ttfb_cap > 0 and _ttfb_timeout > _ttfb_cap:
logger.info(
"Capping openai-codex no-byte TTFB timeout from %.0fs to %.0fs "
@@ -614,12 +588,23 @@ def build_api_kwargs(agent, api_messages: list) -> dict:
# It also rejects ``enum`` values containing ``/`` (HuggingFace IDs
# like ``Qwen/Qwen3.5-0.8B`` shipped by MCP servers) — same 400 with
# the same opaque message; strip those enums too.
#
# Deep-copy ``tools_for_api`` before sanitizing: the sanitizers
# mutate in place (documented contract on ``strip_slash_enum`` /
# ``strip_pattern_and_format``), and ``tools_for_api`` is a direct
# reference to ``agent.tools``. Without the copy, the first xAI
# request permanently strips constraints from the shared per-agent
# tool registry — every subsequent non-xAI call from the same
# agent (auxiliary task routed to Anthropic, OpenRouter fallback,
# main-model swap) sees the already-stripped schema. See #27907.
if is_xai_responses:
try:
import copy as _copy
from tools.schema_sanitizer import (
strip_pattern_and_format,
strip_slash_enum,
)
tools_for_api = _copy.deepcopy(tools_for_api)
tools_for_api, _ = strip_pattern_and_format(tools_for_api)
tools_for_api, _ = strip_slash_enum(tools_for_api)
except Exception as exc:
@@ -1636,13 +1621,6 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = threading.get_ident()
return client
def _take_request_client():
with request_client_lock:
client = request_client_holder.get("client")
request_client_holder["client"] = None
request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
return client
def _close_request_client_once(reason: str) -> None:
# See #29507 explanation in the non-streaming variant above. A
# stranger thread (the interrupt-check / stale-stream detector loop)
+43 -4
View File
@@ -980,6 +980,48 @@ def _extract_responses_reasoning_text(item: Any) -> str:
return ""
def _format_responses_error(error_obj: Any, response_status: str) -> str:
"""Build a human-readable error string from a Responses ``response.error`` payload.
The OpenAI Responses API carries failure details under ``response.error``
on terminal ``response.failed`` events, in the shape
``{"code": "rate_limit_exceeded", "message": "Slow down", "param": ...}``.
Earlier code only surfaced ``message``, which left users staring at bare
strings like ``"Slow down"`` while the failure mode (rate limit vs
context-length vs internal_error vs model-overloaded) was hidden in
``code``. We now prefix ``code`` when both are present so consumers can
distinguish failure modes without parsing the bare message.
Falls back to ``code`` alone when ``message`` is empty, and to a stable
default referencing the response status when no error payload is
available at all. Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.
"""
# Pull code and message from either dict or attribute-style payloads.
code: Any = None
message: Any = None
if isinstance(error_obj, dict):
code = error_obj.get("code")
message = error_obj.get("message")
elif error_obj is not None:
code = getattr(error_obj, "code", None)
message = getattr(error_obj, "message", None)
code_str = str(code).strip() if isinstance(code, str) else (str(code).strip() if code else "")
message_str = str(message).strip() if isinstance(message, str) else (str(message).strip() if message else "")
if code_str and message_str:
return f"{code_str}: {message_str}"
if message_str:
return message_str
if code_str:
return code_str
if error_obj:
# Last-resort: stringify whatever the provider sent so it's at least
# visible in logs/UI rather than silently swallowed.
return str(error_obj)
return f"Responses API returned status '{response_status}'"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Full response normalization
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1023,10 +1065,7 @@ def _normalize_codex_response(
if response_status in {"failed", "cancelled"}:
error_obj = getattr(response, "error", None)
if isinstance(error_obj, dict):
error_msg = error_obj.get("message") or str(error_obj)
else:
error_msg = str(error_obj) if error_obj else f"Responses API returned status '{response_status}'"
error_msg = _format_responses_error(error_obj, response_status)
raise RuntimeError(error_msg)
content_parts: List[str] = []
-1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ compatibility.
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import time
+244 -16
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,44 @@ _IMAGE_TOKEN_ESTIMATE = 1600
_IMAGE_CHAR_EQUIVALENT = _IMAGE_TOKEN_ESTIMATE * _CHARS_PER_TOKEN
_SUMMARY_FAILURE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 600
# Hard ceiling for the deterministic summary-failure handoff. The fallback is
# only meant to preserve continuity anchors from the dropped window, not to
# become another unbounded transcript copy after the LLM summarizer failed.
_FALLBACK_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS = 8_000
_FALLBACK_TURN_MAX_CHARS = 700
_PATH_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r"(?:/|~/?|[A-Za-z]:\\)[^\s`'\")\]}<>]+")
def _dedupe_append(items: list[str], value: str, *, limit: int) -> None:
value = value.strip()
if value and value not in items and len(items) < limit:
items.append(value)
def _extract_tool_call_name_and_args(tool_call: Any) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Return a best-effort ``(name, arguments)`` pair for dict/object tool calls."""
if isinstance(tool_call, dict):
fn = tool_call.get("function") or {}
return str(fn.get("name") or "unknown"), str(fn.get("arguments") or "")
fn = getattr(tool_call, "function", None)
if fn is None:
return "unknown", ""
return str(getattr(fn, "name", None) or "unknown"), str(getattr(fn, "arguments", None) or "")
def _extract_tool_call_id(tool_call: Any) -> str:
if isinstance(tool_call, dict):
return str(tool_call.get("id") or "")
return str(getattr(tool_call, "id", "") or "")
def _collect_path_mentions(text: str, relevant_files: list[str], *, limit: int = 12) -> None:
for match in _PATH_MENTION_RE.findall(text):
_dedupe_append(relevant_files, match.rstrip(".,:;"), limit=limit)
def _content_length_for_budget(raw_content: Any) -> int:
"""Return the effective char-length of a message's content for token budgeting.
@@ -537,8 +575,8 @@ class ContextCompressor(ContextEngine):
self.quiet_mode = quiet_mode
# When True, summary-generation failure aborts compression entirely
# (returns messages unchanged, sets _last_compress_aborted=True).
# When False (default = historical behavior), insert a static
# "summary unavailable" placeholder and drop the middle window.
# When False (default = historical behavior), insert a
# deterministic "summary unavailable" handoff and drop the middle window.
self.abort_on_summary_failure = abort_on_summary_failure
self.context_length = get_model_context_length(
@@ -884,6 +922,195 @@ class ContextCompressor(ContextEngine):
return "\n\n".join(parts)
def _build_static_fallback_summary(
self,
turns_to_summarize: List[Dict[str, Any]],
reason: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Build a deterministic handoff when the LLM summarizer is unavailable.
This is intentionally much less rich than an LLM-written summary, but it
is still better than a bare "N messages were removed" marker. It keeps
the most useful continuity anchors that can be extracted locally:
recent user asks, assistant/tool actions, files/commands mentioned in
tool calls, and any error text. The result uses the normal summary
structure so downstream prompts can recover gracefully after a provider
outage or summary-model failure.
"""
user_asks: list[str] = []
assistant_actions: list[str] = []
tool_actions: list[str] = []
relevant_files: list[str] = []
blockers: list[str] = []
last_dropped_turns: list[str] = []
def _compact_fallback_turn(value: Any) -> str:
text = redact_sensitive_text(_content_text_for_contains(value))
text = re.sub(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{8,}\b", "[REDACTED]", text)
text = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", text).strip()
if len(text) > _FALLBACK_TURN_MAX_CHARS:
text = text[: _FALLBACK_TURN_MAX_CHARS - 15].rstrip() + " ...[truncated]"
return re.sub(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "[REDACTED]", text)
def _remember_dropped_turn(label: str, text: str, *, limit: int = 8) -> None:
text = text.strip()
if not text:
return
last_dropped_turns.append(f"{label}: {text}")
if len(last_dropped_turns) > limit:
del last_dropped_turns[0]
def _collect_paths_from_jsonish(obj: Any) -> None:
if isinstance(obj, dict):
for key, val in obj.items():
if key in {"path", "workdir", "file_path", "output_path"} and isinstance(val, str):
_dedupe_append(relevant_files, val, limit=12)
_collect_paths_from_jsonish(val)
elif isinstance(obj, list):
for val in obj:
_collect_paths_from_jsonish(val)
elif isinstance(obj, str):
_collect_path_mentions(obj, relevant_files)
call_id_to_tool: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
for msg in turns_to_summarize:
if msg.get("role") == "assistant" and msg.get("tool_calls"):
for tc in msg.get("tool_calls") or []:
name, raw_args = _extract_tool_call_name_and_args(tc)
args = redact_sensitive_text(raw_args)
call_id = _extract_tool_call_id(tc)
if call_id:
call_id_to_tool[call_id] = (name, args)
if args:
try:
parsed = json.loads(args)
except Exception:
parsed = args
_collect_paths_from_jsonish(parsed)
for msg in turns_to_summarize:
role = msg.get("role", "unknown")
text = _compact_fallback_turn(msg.get("content"))
_collect_path_mentions(text, relevant_files)
turn_text = text
turn_tool_names: list[str] = []
if role == "assistant" and msg.get("tool_calls"):
for tc in msg.get("tool_calls") or []:
name, _args = _extract_tool_call_name_and_args(tc)
turn_tool_names.append(name)
if turn_tool_names:
prefix = "tool calls: " + ", ".join(turn_tool_names[:6])
turn_text = f"{prefix}; {turn_text}" if turn_text else prefix
_remember_dropped_turn(str(role).upper(), turn_text)
if len(text) > 600:
text = text[:420].rstrip() + " ... " + text[-160:].lstrip()
if role == "user" and text:
user_asks.append(text)
elif role == "assistant":
tool_names: list[str] = []
for tc in msg.get("tool_calls") or []:
name, _args = _extract_tool_call_name_and_args(tc)
tool_names.append(name)
if tool_names:
assistant_actions.append(
"Called tool(s): " + ", ".join(tool_names[:6])
)
elif text:
assistant_actions.append(text)
elif role == "tool":
call_id = str(msg.get("tool_call_id") or "")
tool_name, tool_args = call_id_to_tool.get(call_id, ("unknown", ""))
tool_actions.append(
_summarize_tool_result(tool_name, tool_args, text or "")
)
if re.search(
r"\b(error|failed|exception|traceback|timeout|timed out|fatal)\b",
text,
re.I,
):
blockers.append(text[:500])
def _bullets(items: list[str], limit: int = 8) -> str:
unique: list[str] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for item in items:
item = item.strip()
if not item or item in seen:
continue
seen.add(item)
unique.append(item)
if len(unique) >= limit:
break
return "\n".join(f"- {item}" for item in unique) if unique else "None."
completed: list[str] = []
for idx, item in enumerate((assistant_actions + tool_actions)[:12], start=1):
completed.append(f"{idx}. {item}")
active_task = (
f"User asked: {user_asks[-1]!r}"
if user_asks
else "Unknown from deterministic fallback."
)
previous_summary_note = ""
if self._previous_summary:
previous_summary_note = (
"\n\nPrevious compaction summary was present and should still be treated as "
"background continuity context, but the latest LLM summary update failed."
)
reason_text = f" Summary failure reason: {reason}." if reason else ""
body = f"""## Active Task
{active_task}
## Goal
Recovered from a deterministic fallback because the LLM context summarizer was unavailable. Continue from the protected recent messages after this summary and use current file/system state for exact details.{previous_summary_note}
## Constraints & Preferences
- This fallback was generated locally without an LLM summary call.
- Secrets and credentials were redacted before preservation.
- The summary may be incomplete; prefer verifying current files, git state, processes, and test results instead of assuming omitted details.
## Completed Actions
{chr(10).join(completed) if completed else "None recoverable from compacted turns."}
## Active State
Unknown from deterministic fallback. Inspect current repository/session state if needed.
## In Progress
{active_task}
## Blocked
{_bullets(blockers, limit=5)}
## Key Decisions
None recoverable from deterministic fallback.
## Resolved Questions
None recoverable from deterministic fallback.
## Pending User Asks
{active_task}
## Relevant Files
{_bullets(relevant_files, limit=12)}
## Remaining Work
Continue from the most recent unfulfilled user ask and protected tail messages. Verify state with tools before making claims.
## Last Dropped Turns
{_bullets(last_dropped_turns, limit=8)}
## Critical Context
Summary generation was unavailable, so this is a best-effort deterministic fallback for {len(turns_to_summarize)} compacted message(s).{reason_text}"""
summary = self._with_summary_prefix(redact_sensitive_text(body.strip()))
if len(summary) > _FALLBACK_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS:
summary = summary[: _FALLBACK_SUMMARY_MAX_CHARS - 42].rstrip() + "\n...[fallback summary truncated]"
return summary
def _fallback_to_main_for_compression(self, e: Exception, reason: str) -> None:
"""Switch from a separate ``summary_model`` back to the main model.
@@ -911,7 +1138,11 @@ class ContextCompressor(ContextEngine):
self.summary_model = "" # empty = use main model
self._summary_failure_cooldown_until = 0.0 # no cooldown — retry immediately
def _generate_summary(self, turns_to_summarize: List[Dict[str, Any]], focus_topic: str = None) -> Optional[str]:
def _generate_summary(
self,
turns_to_summarize: List[Dict[str, Any]],
focus_topic: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Generate a structured summary of conversation turns.
Uses a structured template (Goal, Progress, Decisions, Resolved/Pending
@@ -1608,9 +1839,9 @@ The user has requested that this compaction PRIORITISE preserving all informatio
# True → ABORT compression entirely. Return messages unchanged
# and set _last_compress_aborted=True so callers can warn
# the user and stop the auto-compress retry loop.
# False → Fall through to the legacy fallback path below: insert
# a static "summary unavailable" placeholder and drop the
# middle window. Records _last_summary_fallback_used /
# False → Fall through to the default fallback path below: insert
# a deterministic "summary unavailable" handoff and drop
# the middle window. Records _last_summary_fallback_used /
# _last_summary_dropped_count for gateway hygiene to
# surface a warning.
# Default is False (historical behavior).
@@ -1643,21 +1874,18 @@ The user has requested that this compaction PRIORITISE preserving all informatio
)
compressed.append(msg)
# Legacy fallback path: LLM summary failed and abort_on_summary_failure
# is False (the default). Insert a static placeholder so the model
# knows context was lost rather than silently dropping everything.
# If LLM summary failed, insert a deterministic fallback so the model
# gets at least locally recoverable continuity anchors instead of a
# content-free "N messages were removed" marker.
if not summary:
if not self.quiet_mode:
logger.warning("Summary generation failed — inserting static fallback context marker")
logger.warning("Summary generation failed — inserting deterministic fallback context summary")
n_dropped = compress_end - compress_start
self._last_summary_dropped_count = n_dropped
self._last_summary_fallback_used = True
summary = (
f"{SUMMARY_PREFIX}\n"
f"Summary generation was unavailable. {n_dropped} message(s) were "
f"removed to free context space but could not be summarized. The removed "
f"messages contained earlier work in this session. Continue based on the "
f"recent messages below and the current state of any files or resources."
summary = self._build_static_fallback_summary(
turns_to_summarize,
reason=self._last_summary_error,
)
_merge_summary_into_tail = False
+130 -1
View File
@@ -34,13 +34,33 @@ import tempfile
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, List, Optional, Tuple
from typing import Any, Optional, Tuple
from agent.model_metadata import estimate_request_tokens_rough
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _compression_lock_holder(agent: Any) -> str:
"""Build a unique holder id for the lock: pid:tid:agent-instance:uuid.
The pid+tid prefix lets ops tell crashed/abandoned holders apart from
live ones (expiry-based recovery uses the timestamp, but ``holder``
is what shows up in diagnostics + log lines). The agent instance id
and a per-acquire uuid disambiguate two co-resident agents on the
same thread (background_review forks run on a worker thread, but
on machines where compression itself dispatches to a thread pool
we want each acquire to be unique).
"""
import threading
return (
f"pid={os.getpid()}"
f":tid={threading.get_ident()}"
f":agent={id(agent):x}"
f":nonce={uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
)
def check_compression_model_feasibility(agent: Any) -> None:
"""Warn at session start if the auxiliary compression model's context
window is smaller than the main model's compression threshold.
@@ -305,6 +325,103 @@ def compress_context(
"🗜️ Compacting context — summarizing earlier conversation so I can continue..."
)
# ── Compression lock ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Atomic, state.db-backed lock per session_id. Without this, two
# AIAgent instances that share the same session_id (most commonly the
# parent-turn agent and its background-review fork — see
# ``agent/background_review.py``: ``review_agent.session_id =
# agent.session_id``) can each call compress() on overlapping
# snapshots of the same conversation. Both succeed, both rotate
# ``agent.session_id`` to a fresh id, both create child sessions in
# state.db parented to the same old id. The gateway's SessionEntry
# only catches one rotation, so the other child becomes an orphan
# that silently accumulates writes — Damien's repro shape.
#
# Acquire keyed on the OLD session_id (the rotation target's parent),
# because that's the id that competing paths see and read from
# SessionEntry at the start of their own compression attempt.
#
# If we can't acquire the lock, another path is mid-compression on
# this session. Aborting is correct: the messages are unchanged, the
# other path's rotation will produce the canonical new session_id,
# and our caller's auto-compress loop sees ``len(returned) == len(input)``
# and stops retrying for this cycle. The session is NOT corrupted —
# we just sit out this round and let the winner finish.
_lock_db = getattr(agent, "_session_db", None)
_lock_sid = agent.session_id or ""
_lock_holder: Optional[str] = None
# Probe whether the lock subsystem is actually available on this
# SessionDB instance. A process running mismatched module versions
# (e.g. ``conversation_compression.py`` reloaded after a pull but the
# long-lived ``hermes_state.SessionDB`` class still bound to the
# pre-#34351 version in memory) has the call site but not the method.
# In that case ``try_acquire_compression_lock`` raises AttributeError —
# NOT a ``sqlite3.Error`` — so the method's own fail-open guard never
# runs and the exception propagates to the outer agent loop, which
# prints the error and retries. Because compression never succeeds,
# the token count never drops and the loop re-triggers compaction
# forever (the "API call #47/#48/#49 ... has no attribute
# try_acquire_compression_lock" spin). Fail OPEN here: if the lock
# subsystem is missing or broken in any unexpected way, skip locking
# and proceed with compression. Skipping the lock risks a rare
# concurrent-compression session fork; an infinite no-progress loop
# that never compresses at all is strictly worse.
if _lock_db is not None and _lock_sid:
_lock_holder = _compression_lock_holder(agent)
try:
_lock_acquired = _lock_db.try_acquire_compression_lock(
_lock_sid, _lock_holder
)
except Exception as _lock_err:
# Broken/absent lock subsystem (version skew, etc.). Log once
# per session and proceed WITHOUT the lock rather than letting
# the exception spin the outer loop.
_lock_holder = None # we don't own anything to release
if getattr(agent, "_last_compression_lock_error_sid", None) != _lock_sid:
agent._last_compression_lock_error_sid = _lock_sid
logger.warning(
"compression lock subsystem unavailable for session=%s "
"(%s: %s) — proceeding without lock. This usually means a "
"stale in-memory module after an update; restart the "
"process (or `hermes update`) to resync.",
_lock_sid, type(_lock_err).__name__, _lock_err,
)
_lock_acquired = True # treat as acquired-but-unlocked; proceed
if not _lock_acquired:
try:
existing = _lock_db.get_compression_lock_holder(_lock_sid)
except Exception:
existing = None
logger.warning(
"compression skipped: another path is compressing session=%s "
"(holder=%s) — returning messages unchanged to avoid session fork",
_lock_sid, existing,
)
_lock_holder = None # don't release a lock we don't own
# Surface to the user once — quiet for downstream auto-compress loops
if getattr(agent, "_last_compression_lock_warning_sid", None) != _lock_sid:
agent._last_compression_lock_warning_sid = _lock_sid
try:
agent._emit_warning(
"⚠ Skipping concurrent compression — another path "
"is already compressing this session. Will retry "
"after it finishes."
)
except Exception:
pass
_existing_sp = getattr(agent, "_cached_system_prompt", None)
if not _existing_sp:
_existing_sp = agent._build_system_prompt(system_message)
return messages, _existing_sp
def _release_lock() -> None:
"""Release the lock keyed on the OLD session_id (before rotation)."""
if _lock_db is not None and _lock_sid and _lock_holder:
try:
_lock_db.release_compression_lock(_lock_sid, _lock_holder)
except Exception as _rel_err:
logger.debug("compression lock release failed: %s", _rel_err)
# Notify external memory provider before compression discards context
if agent._memory_manager:
try:
@@ -318,6 +435,11 @@ def compress_context(
# Plugin context engine with strict signature that doesn't accept
# focus_topic / force — fall back to calling without them.
compressed = agent.context_compressor.compress(messages, current_tokens=approx_tokens)
except BaseException:
# ANY exception during compress() must release the lock so the
# session isn't permanently blocked from future compression.
_release_lock()
raise
# If compression aborted (aux LLM failed to produce a usable summary)
# the compressor returns the input messages unchanged. Surface the
@@ -336,6 +458,7 @@ def compress_context(
_existing_sp = getattr(agent, "_cached_system_prompt", None)
if not _existing_sp:
_existing_sp = agent._build_system_prompt(system_message)
_release_lock() # compression aborted — no rotation will happen
return messages, _existing_sp
summary_error = getattr(agent.context_compressor, "_last_summary_error", None)
@@ -480,6 +603,12 @@ def compress_context(
agent.session_id or "none", _pre_msg_count, len(compressed),
f"{_compressed_est:,}",
)
# Release the lock on the OLD session_id only AFTER rotation completed
# and all post-rotation bookkeeping (memory manager, context engine,
# file dedup) ran. A concurrent path that wakes up the moment we
# release will see the NEW session_id in state.db / SessionEntry and
# acquire on that — no race against our just-finished work.
_release_lock()
return compressed, new_system_prompt
+37 -32
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ import time
import uuid
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _is_oauth_token
from agent.auxiliary_client import set_runtime_main
from agent.codex_responses_adapter import _summarize_user_message_for_log
from agent.display import KawaiiSpinner
from agent.error_classifier import FailoverReason, classify_api_error
@@ -53,20 +51,13 @@ from agent.model_metadata import (
parse_available_output_tokens_from_error,
save_context_length,
)
from agent.nous_rate_guard import (
clear_nous_rate_limit,
is_genuine_nous_rate_limit,
nous_rate_limit_remaining,
record_nous_rate_limit,
)
from agent.process_bootstrap import _install_safe_stdio
from agent.prompt_caching import apply_anthropic_cache_control
from agent.retry_utils import jittered_backoff
from agent.trajectory import has_incomplete_scratchpad
from agent.usage_pricing import estimate_usage_cost, normalize_usage
from hermes_constants import display_hermes_home as _dhh_fn, PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID
from hermes_constants import PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID
from hermes_logging import set_session_context
from tools.schema_sanitizer import strip_pattern_and_format
from tools.skill_provenance import set_current_write_origin
from utils import base_url_host_matches, env_var_enabled
@@ -212,15 +203,13 @@ def _print_billing_or_entitlement_guidance(
def _try_refresh_nous_paid_entitlement_credentials(agent) -> bool:
"""Refresh Nous runtime credentials after a fresh paid-entitlement check."""
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY
from hermes_cli.nous_account import get_nous_portal_account_info
account_info = get_nous_portal_account_info(force_fresh=True)
if account_info.paid_service_access is not True:
return False
return agent._try_refresh_nous_client_credentials(
force=False,
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
force=True,
)
except Exception:
return False
@@ -409,7 +398,6 @@ def run_conversation(
# Tag all log records on this thread with the session ID so
# ``hermes logs --session <id>`` can filter a single conversation.
from hermes_logging import set_session_context
set_session_context(agent.session_id)
# Bind the skill write-origin ContextVar for this thread so tool
@@ -418,7 +406,6 @@ def run_conversation(
# a foreground user-directed turn. Set at the top of each call;
# the review fork runs on its own thread with a fresh context,
# so the foreground value here does not leak into it.
from tools.skill_provenance import set_current_write_origin
set_current_write_origin(getattr(agent, "_memory_write_origin", "assistant_tool"))
# If the previous turn activated fallback, restore the primary
@@ -4314,36 +4301,54 @@ def run_conversation(
)
final_response = agent._handle_max_iterations(messages, api_call_count)
# If running as a kanban worker, block the task so the dispatcher
# knows the worker could not complete (rather than treating it as a
# If running as a kanban worker, signal the dispatcher that the
# worker could not complete (rather than treating it as a
# protocol violation). The agent loop strips tools before calling
# _handle_max_iterations, so the model cannot call kanban_block
# itself — we must do it on its behalf.
#
# We route through ``_record_task_failure(outcome="timed_out")``
# rather than ``kanban_block`` so this counts toward the
# ``consecutive_failures`` counter and the dispatcher's
# ``failure_limit`` circuit breaker (#29747 gap 2). Without this,
# a task whose worker keeps exhausting its budget would block
# silently each run, get auto-promoted by the operator (or never
# surface), and re-block in an endless loop with no signal.
_kanban_task = os.environ.get("HERMES_KANBAN_TASK")
if _kanban_task:
try:
_ra().handle_function_call(
"kanban_block",
{
"task_id": _kanban_task,
"reason": (
from hermes_cli import kanban_db as _kb
_conn = _kb.connect()
try:
_kb._record_task_failure(
_conn,
_kanban_task,
error=(
f"Iteration budget exhausted "
f"({api_call_count}/{agent.max_iterations}) — "
"task could not complete within the allowed "
"iterations"
),
},
task_id=effective_task_id,
)
logger.info(
"kanban_block called for task %s after iteration "
"exhaustion (%d/%d)",
_kanban_task, api_call_count, agent.max_iterations,
)
outcome="timed_out",
release_claim=True,
end_run=True,
event_payload_extra={
"budget_used": api_call_count,
"budget_max": agent.max_iterations,
},
)
logger.info(
"recorded budget-exhausted failure for task %s (%d/%d)",
_kanban_task, api_call_count, agent.max_iterations,
)
finally:
try:
_conn.close()
except Exception:
pass
except Exception:
logger.warning(
"Failed to call kanban_block after iteration "
"exhaustion for task %s",
"Failed to record budget-exhausted failure for task %s",
_kanban_task,
exc_info=True,
)
+141 -22
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from hermes_constants import OPENROUTER_BASE_URL
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value, load_env
from hermes_cli.config import load_env
from agent.credential_persistence import (
is_borrowed_credential_source,
sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload,
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ from agent.credential_persistence import (
import hermes_cli.auth as auth_mod
from hermes_cli.auth import (
CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS,
DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS,
PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
_auth_store_lock,
_codex_access_token_is_expiring,
@@ -55,6 +54,38 @@ def _load_config_safe() -> Optional[dict]:
STATUS_OK = "ok"
STATUS_EXHAUSTED = "exhausted"
# Terminal failure — the credential will never recover on its own. Used for
# upstream-permanent OAuth states like ``token_invalidated`` / ``token_revoked``
# where retrying after a TTL cooldown is guaranteed to fail. ``DEAD`` entries
# are excluded from rotation unconditionally and only clear when an explicit
# write-side sync (e.g. ``_save_codex_tokens`` after a fresh device-code
# login) rewrites the tokens.
STATUS_DEAD = "dead"
# OAuth error reasons that indicate the credential is permanently invalid
# server-side and cannot be recovered by retry/refresh. Sourced from
# OpenAI Codex Responses API, Anthropic, xAI, and Google OAuth spec.
_TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS = frozenset({
"token_invalidated", # OpenAI Codex: "Your authentication token has been invalidated."
"token_revoked", # OAuth 2.0 RFC 7009: token explicitly revoked
"invalid_token", # RFC 6750: bearer token is malformed/expired/revoked
"invalid_grant", # RFC 6749: refresh_token rejected during refresh
"unauthorized_client", # RFC 6749: client no longer authorized
"refresh_token_reused", # Single-use refresh token consumed by another process
})
# How long a DEAD manual credential is preserved before being pruned.
# Manual entries (``manual:*``) are independent credentials with no singleton
# to re-seed from, so pruning them after a quiet window cleans up dead state
# without losing recoverability — the user always has the option to re-add
# via ``hermes auth add``.
#
# Singleton-seeded entries (``device_code``, ``loopback_pkce``, ``claude_code``)
# are NOT pruned because ``_seed_from_singletons`` would just re-create them
# on the next ``load_pool()`` with the same stale singleton tokens, defeating
# the cleanup. They remain in the pool marked DEAD until an explicit re-auth
# write-side sync (``_save_codex_tokens`` etc.) clears the status.
DEAD_MANUAL_PRUNE_TTL_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60 # 24 hours
AUTH_TYPE_OAUTH = "oauth"
AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY = "api_key"
@@ -171,8 +202,22 @@ class PooledCredential:
def runtime_api_key(self) -> str:
if self.provider == "nous":
# Nous stores the runtime inference credential in agent_key for
# compatibility. It may be a NAS invoke JWT or legacy opaque key.
return str(self.agent_key or self.access_token or "")
# compatibility. It must be a NAS invoke JWT.
for token, expires_at in (
(self.agent_key, self.agent_key_expires_at),
(self.access_token, self.expires_at),
):
if (
isinstance(token, str)
and token.strip()
and auth_mod._nous_invoke_jwt_is_usable(
token,
scope=getattr(self, "scope", None),
expires_at=expires_at,
)
):
return token.strip()
return ""
return str(self.access_token or "")
@property
@@ -438,6 +483,29 @@ class CredentialPool:
[entry.to_dict() for entry in self._entries],
)
def _is_terminal_auth_failure(
self,
status_code: Optional[int],
normalized_error: Dict[str, Any],
) -> bool:
"""Detect upstream-permanent OAuth failures that won't recover on TTL.
Only fires for 401 responses whose error code/reason matches a known
terminal OAuth state (token_invalidated, token_revoked, invalid_grant,
etc.). Distinguishes permanent failures from transient ones like
token_expired (refreshable) or generic 401 without a specific reason
(could be a server-side glitch worth retrying).
Returns False for non-401 status codes 429 rate limits and 402
billing failures are transient by nature and should keep TTL semantics.
"""
if status_code != 401:
return False
reason = normalized_error.get("reason")
if not isinstance(reason, str):
return False
return reason.strip().lower() in _TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS
def _mark_exhausted(
self,
entry: PooledCredential,
@@ -445,9 +513,20 @@ class CredentialPool:
error_context: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
) -> PooledCredential:
normalized_error = _normalize_error_context(error_context)
# Permanent OAuth failures (token_invalidated, token_revoked, etc.)
# transition to STATUS_DEAD instead of STATUS_EXHAUSTED. Without this,
# a revoked credential gets a 1-hour TTL cooldown and then re-enters
# rotation, failing immediately every hour until the user manually
# removes it (issue #32849). DEAD entries are excluded from rotation
# unconditionally and only clear via an explicit re-auth write-side
# sync (``_save_codex_tokens`` after a fresh device-code login).
if self._is_terminal_auth_failure(status_code, normalized_error):
terminal_status = STATUS_DEAD
else:
terminal_status = STATUS_EXHAUSTED
updated = replace(
entry,
last_status=STATUS_EXHAUSTED,
last_status=terminal_status,
last_status_at=time.time(),
last_error_code=status_code,
last_error_reason=normalized_error.get("reason"),
@@ -852,12 +931,7 @@ class CredentialPool:
if synced is not entry:
entry = synced
auth_mod.resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS,
inference_auth_mode=(
auth_mod.NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY
if force
else auth_mod.NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO
),
force_refresh=force,
)
updated = self._sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store(entry)
else:
@@ -1139,7 +1213,7 @@ class CredentialPool:
auth_mod.XAI_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS,
)
if self.provider == "nous":
# Nous refresh/mint can require network access and should happen when
# Nous refresh can require network access and should happen when
# runtime credentials are actually resolved, not merely when the pool
# is enumerated for listing, migration, or selection.
return False
@@ -1158,13 +1232,14 @@ class CredentialPool:
"""
now = time.time()
cleared_any = False
entries_to_prune: List[str] = []
available: List[PooledCredential] = []
for entry in self._entries:
# For anthropic claude_code entries, sync from the credentials file
# before any status/refresh checks. This picks up tokens refreshed
# by other processes (Claude Code CLI, other Hermes profiles).
if (self.provider == "anthropic" and entry.source == "claude_code"
and entry.last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED):
and entry.last_status in {STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD}):
synced = self._sync_anthropic_entry_from_credentials_file(entry)
if synced is not entry:
entry = synced
@@ -1175,7 +1250,7 @@ class CredentialPool:
# exhausted status stale.
if (self.provider == "nous"
and entry.source == "device_code"
and entry.last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED):
and entry.last_status in {STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD}):
synced = self._sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store(entry)
if synced is not entry:
entry = synced
@@ -1187,7 +1262,7 @@ class CredentialPool:
# future for ChatGPT weekly windows).
if (self.provider == "openai-codex"
and entry.source == "device_code"
and entry.last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED):
and entry.last_status in {STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD}):
synced = self._sync_codex_entry_from_auth_store(entry)
if synced is not entry:
entry = synced
@@ -1198,11 +1273,41 @@ class CredentialPool:
# xAI Grok OAuth login) has since rotated in auth.json.
if (self.provider == "xai-oauth"
and entry.source == "loopback_pkce"
and entry.last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED):
and entry.last_status in {STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD}):
synced = self._sync_xai_oauth_entry_from_auth_store(entry)
if synced is not entry:
entry = synced
cleared_any = True
if entry.last_status == STATUS_DEAD:
# Manual DEAD credentials get pruned after a 24h quiet window
# so the pool doesn't accumulate dead entries forever. The
# user can always re-add via ``hermes auth add``. Singleton-
# seeded DEAD entries are kept so the audit trail (label,
# last_error_reason, timestamps) stays visible — pruning them
# would just be undone by ``_seed_from_singletons`` on the
# next load anyway.
if _is_manual_source(entry.source):
dead_at = entry.last_status_at or 0
if dead_at and now - dead_at > DEAD_MANUAL_PRUNE_TTL_SECONDS:
_label = entry.label or entry.id[:8]
logger.warning(
"credential pool: pruning DEAD manual entry %s "
"(reason=%s, age=%.1fh) — re-add via `hermes auth add %s`",
_label,
entry.last_error_reason or "unknown",
(now - dead_at) / 3600.0,
self.provider,
)
# Mark for removal after the loop completes; we can't
# mutate self._entries while iterating.
entries_to_prune.append(entry.id)
cleared_any = True
# Permanently failed credentials never re-enter rotation via
# TTL. They only clear when a write-side re-auth sync rewrites
# the tokens (e.g. ``_save_codex_tokens`` after a fresh
# device-code login). The auth.json-sync paths below handle
# the re-auth case for OAuth singletons.
continue
if entry.last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED:
exhausted_until = _exhausted_until(entry)
if exhausted_until is not None and now < exhausted_until:
@@ -1226,6 +1331,9 @@ class CredentialPool:
continue
entry = refreshed
available.append(entry)
if entries_to_prune:
pruned_ids = set(entries_to_prune)
self._entries = [e for e in self._entries if e.id not in pruned_ids]
if cleared_any:
self._persist()
return available
@@ -1293,11 +1401,22 @@ class CredentialPool:
if entry is None:
return None
_label = entry.label or entry.id[:8]
logger.info(
"credential pool: marking %s exhausted (status=%s), rotating",
_label, status_code,
)
self._mark_exhausted(entry, status_code, error_context)
# Re-read the updated entry to log the correct terminal state.
updated_entry = next(
(e for e in self._entries if e.id == entry.id), entry,
)
if updated_entry.last_status == STATUS_DEAD:
logger.warning(
"credential pool: marking %s DEAD (status=%s, reason=%s) — "
"permanently failed, will NOT re-enter rotation until re-auth",
_label, status_code, updated_entry.last_error_reason or "unknown",
)
else:
logger.info(
"credential pool: marking %s exhausted (status=%s), rotating",
_label, status_code,
)
self._current_id = None
next_entry = self._select_unlocked()
if next_entry:
@@ -1637,9 +1756,9 @@ def _seed_from_singletons(provider: str, entries: List[PooledCredential]) -> Tup
"inference_base_url": state.get("inference_base_url"),
"agent_key": state.get("agent_key"),
"agent_key_expires_at": state.get("agent_key_expires_at"),
# Carry the mint/refresh timestamps into the pool so
# Carry the refresh timestamps into the pool so
# freshness-sensitive consumers (self-heal hooks, pool
# pruning by age) can distinguish just-minted credentials
# pruning by age) can distinguish just-refreshed credentials
# from stale ones. Without these, fresh device_code
# entries get obtained_at=None and look older than they
# are (#15099).
-3
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import shutil
import tarfile
import tempfile
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+4
View File
@@ -249,6 +249,10 @@ def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
".env",
"webhook_subscriptions.json",
os.path.join("auth", "google_oauth.json"),
# Bitwarden Secrets Manager disk cache: stores plaintext secret values
# to avoid re-fetching across back-to-back CLI invocations. The file
# was introduced by #31968 but not added to this guard.
os.path.join("cache", "bws_cache.json"),
)
for hd in hermes_dirs:
for name in credential_file_names:
-1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ import json
import logging
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+9 -1
View File
@@ -899,7 +899,15 @@ def start_oauth_flow(
try:
import webbrowser
webbrowser.open(auth_url, new=1, autoraise=True)
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_can_open_graphical_browser as _can_open_gui,
)
except Exception:
_can_open_gui = lambda: True # noqa: E731
if _can_open_gui():
webbrowser.open(auth_url, new=1, autoraise=True)
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("webbrowser.open failed: %s", exc)
+134 -14
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import logging
import mimetypes
import os
import re
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
@@ -46,6 +48,102 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_VALID_MODES = frozenset({"auto", "native", "text"})
# Image extensions used by extract_image_refs(). Kept tight on purpose — we
# only auto-attach things the model can actually see. Documents/archives are
# excluded because the gateway's broader extract_local_files() also routes
# them differently (send_document), and we don't want to attach a PDF as a
# vision part.
_IMAGE_EXTS = (
".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp", ".bmp", ".tiff", ".tif", ".heic",
)
_IMAGE_EXT_PATTERN = "|".join(e.lstrip(".") for e in _IMAGE_EXTS)
# Absolute / home-relative local image path. Matches the same shape gateway's
# extract_local_files() uses: anchors to ``~/`` or ``/``, ignores matches inside
# URLs (the ``(?<![/:\w.])`` lookbehind), and case-insensitive on the extension.
_LOCAL_IMAGE_PATH_RE = re.compile(
r"(?<![/:\w.])(?:~/|/)(?:[\w.\-]+/)*[\w.\-]+\.(?:" + _IMAGE_EXT_PATTERN + r")\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# http(s) URL ending in an image extension (optionally followed by a
# query string). Case-insensitive on the extension. Strict ``http(s)://``
# scheme so we don't accidentally grab ``file://`` URLs or other shapes.
_IMAGE_URL_RE = re.compile(
r"https?://[^\s<>\"']+?\.(?:" + _IMAGE_EXT_PATTERN + r")(?:\?[^\s<>\"']*)?",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
def extract_image_refs(text: str) -> Tuple[List[str], List[str]]:
"""Scan free-form text for image references the model should see.
Returns ``(local_paths, urls)``:
* ``local_paths`` absolute (``/``) or home-relative (``~/``) paths
whose suffix is an image extension AND whose expanded form exists
on disk as a file. Order-preserving, deduplicated.
* ``urls`` ``http(s)://`` URLs whose path ends in an image
extension (a ``?query`` is allowed after the extension).
Order-preserving, deduplicated.
Matches inside fenced code blocks (``` ``` ```) and inline backticks
(`` `` ``) are skipped so that snippets pasted into a task body for
reference aren't mistaken for live attachments. This mirrors the
behaviour of ``gateway.platforms.base.BaseAdapter.extract_local_files``.
Local paths are validated against the filesystem; URLs are not
(the provider fetches them at request time).
"""
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return [], []
# Build spans covered by fenced code blocks and inline code so we can
# ignore references the author embedded purely as example text.
code_spans: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
for m in re.finditer(r"```[^\n]*\n.*?```", text, re.DOTALL):
code_spans.append((m.start(), m.end()))
for m in re.finditer(r"`[^`\n]+`", text):
code_spans.append((m.start(), m.end()))
def _in_code(pos: int) -> bool:
return any(s <= pos < e for s, e in code_spans)
local_paths: list[str] = []
seen_paths: set[str] = set()
for match in _LOCAL_IMAGE_PATH_RE.finditer(text):
if _in_code(match.start()):
continue
raw = match.group(0)
expanded = os.path.expanduser(raw)
try:
if not os.path.isfile(expanded):
continue
except OSError:
# ENAMETOOLONG / EINVAL on pathological inputs — skip rather than crash.
continue
if expanded in seen_paths:
continue
seen_paths.add(expanded)
local_paths.append(expanded)
urls: list[str] = []
seen_urls: set[str] = set()
for match in _IMAGE_URL_RE.finditer(text):
if _in_code(match.start()):
continue
url = match.group(0)
# Strip trailing punctuation that's almost certainly prose, not part
# of the URL (e.g. "see https://x.com/a.png." or "/a.png)").
url = url.rstrip(".,;:!?)]>")
if url in seen_urls:
continue
seen_urls.add(url)
urls.append(url)
return local_paths, urls
# Strict YAML/JSON boolean coercion for capability overrides.
#
# ``bool("false")`` is True in Python because non-empty strings are truthy, so
@@ -320,20 +418,29 @@ def _file_to_data_url(path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
def build_native_content_parts(
user_text: str,
image_paths: List[str],
image_urls: Optional[List[str]] = None,
) -> Tuple[List[Dict[str, Any]], List[str]]:
"""Build an OpenAI-style ``content`` list for a user turn.
Shape:
[{"type": "text", "text": "...\\n\\n[Image attached at: /local/path]"},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "data:image/png;base64,..."}},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "https://example.com/a.png"}},
...]
The local path of each successfully attached image is appended to the
text part as ``[Image attached at: <path>]``. The model still sees the
pixels via the ``image_url`` part (full native vision); the path note
just gives it a string handle so MCP/skill tools that take an image
path or URL argument can be invoked on the same image without an
extra round-trip. This parallels the text-mode hint produced by
Local paths are read from disk and embedded as base64 ``data:`` URLs.
Remote URLs (``http(s)://``) are passed through verbatim the provider
fetches them server-side. The model still sees the pixels either way.
For each successfully attached image, a hint is appended to the text
part:
* local path ``[Image attached at: <path>]``
* URL ``[Image attached: <url>]``
The hint gives the model a string handle so MCP/skill tools that take
an image path or URL argument can be invoked on the same image without
an extra round-trip. This parallels the text-mode hint produced by
``Runner._enrich_message_with_vision`` (``vision_analyze using image_url:
<path>``) so behaviour is consistent across both image input modes.
@@ -342,12 +449,14 @@ def build_native_content_parts(
ceiling), the agent's retry loop transparently shrinks and retries
once see ``run_agent._try_shrink_image_parts_in_messages``.
Returns (content_parts, skipped_paths). Skipped paths are files that
couldn't be read from disk and are NOT advertised in the path hints.
Returns (content_parts, skipped). Skipped entries are local paths
that couldn't be read from disk; URLs are never skipped (they're
not validated here).
"""
skipped: List[str] = []
image_parts: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
attached_paths: List[str] = []
attached_urls: List[str] = []
for raw_path in image_paths:
p = Path(raw_path)
@@ -364,16 +473,26 @@ def build_native_content_parts(
})
attached_paths.append(str(raw_path))
for url in image_urls or []:
url = (url or "").strip()
if not url:
continue
image_parts.append({
"type": "image_url",
"image_url": {"url": url},
})
attached_urls.append(url)
text = (user_text or "").strip()
# If at least one image attached, build a single text part that combines
# the user's caption (or a neutral default) with one path hint per image.
if attached_paths:
# the user's caption (or a neutral default) with one hint per image.
if attached_paths or attached_urls:
base_text = text or "What do you see in this image?"
path_hints = "\n".join(
f"[Image attached at: {p}]" for p in attached_paths
)
combined_text = f"{base_text}\n\n{path_hints}"
hint_lines: List[str] = []
hint_lines.extend(f"[Image attached at: {p}]" for p in attached_paths)
hint_lines.extend(f"[Image attached: {u}]" for u in attached_urls)
combined_text = f"{base_text}\n\n" + "\n".join(hint_lines)
parts: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [{"type": "text", "text": combined_text}]
parts.extend(image_parts)
return parts, skipped
@@ -388,4 +507,5 @@ def build_native_content_parts(
__all__ = [
"decide_image_input_mode",
"build_native_content_parts",
"extract_image_refs",
]
-2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import sys
from typing import Optional
def register_subparser(subparsers: argparse._SubParsersAction) -> None:
@@ -249,7 +248,6 @@ def _cmd_restart() -> int:
def _cmd_which(server_id: str) -> int:
from agent.lsp.install import INSTALL_RECIPES, hermes_lsp_bin_dir
import os
import shutil as _shutil
recipe = INSTALL_RECIPES.get(server_id)
-5
View File
@@ -39,25 +39,20 @@ import logging
import os
import threading
import time
from concurrent.futures import Future as ConcurrentFuture
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from agent.lsp import eventlog
from agent.lsp.client import (
DIAGNOSTICS_DOCUMENT_WAIT,
LSPClient,
file_uri,
)
from agent.lsp.servers import (
ServerContext,
ServerDef,
SpawnSpec,
find_server_for_file,
language_id_for,
)
from agent.lsp.workspace import (
clear_cache,
is_inside_workspace,
resolve_workspace_for_file,
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import shutil
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Sequence, Tuple
from agent.lsp.workspace import nearest_root, normalize_path
from agent.lsp.workspace import nearest_root
logger = logging.getLogger("agent.lsp.servers")
+57 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ assemble pieces, then combines them with memory and ephemeral prompts.
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import threading
from collections import OrderedDict
from pathlib import Path
@@ -236,6 +235,11 @@ KANBAN_GUIDANCE = (
"- Do not shell out to `hermes kanban <verb>` for board operations. Use "
"the `kanban_*` tools — they work across all terminal backends.\n"
"- Do not complete a task you didn't actually finish. Block it.\n"
"- Do not call `clarify` to ask questions. You are running headless — "
"there is no live user to answer. The call will time out and the task "
"will sit silently in `running` with no signal to the operator. Instead: "
"`kanban_comment` the context, then `kanban_block(reason=...)` so the "
"task surfaces on the board as needing input.\n"
"- Do not assign follow-up work to yourself. Assign it to the right "
"specialist profile.\n"
"- Do not call `delegate_task` as a board substitute. `delegate_task` is "
@@ -262,6 +266,37 @@ TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_GUIDANCE = (
# Add new patterns here when a model family needs explicit steering.
TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_MODELS = ("gpt", "codex", "gemini", "gemma", "grok", "glm", "qwen", "deepseek")
# Universal "finish the job" guidance — applied to ALL models, not gated
# by model family. Addresses two cross-model failure modes:
# 1. Stopping after a stub: writing a tiny file or running one command
# and then ending the turn with a description of the plan instead
# of the finished artifact. (Observed on Opus during a real
# Sarasota real-estate build task: 3 API calls, 85-byte file,
# one terminal command, finish_reason=stop.)
# 2. Fabricating output when a real path is blocked. When `pip` or a
# tool fails, some models will synthesize plausible-looking results
# (fake addresses, fake JSON, fake numbers) instead of reporting
# the blocker. (Observed on DeepSeek v4-flash on the same task:
# pushed through PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings.)
#
# Short on purpose. This block is shipped to every user, every session,
# in the cached system prompt — token cost is paid once at install and
# then amortised across all sessions via prefix caching. Keep it tight.
TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE = (
"# Finishing the job\n"
"When the user asks you to build, run, or verify something, the deliverable is "
"a working artifact backed by real tool output — not a description of one. "
"Do not stop after writing a stub, a plan, or a single command. Keep working "
"until you have actually exercised the code or produced the requested result, "
"then report what real execution returned.\n"
"If a tool, install, or network call fails and blocks the real path, say so "
"directly and try an alternative (different package manager, different "
"approach, ask the user). NEVER substitute plausible-looking fabricated "
"output (made-up data, invented file contents, synthesised API responses) "
"for results you couldn't actually produce. Reporting a blocker honestly "
"is always better than inventing a result."
)
# OpenAI GPT/Codex-specific execution guidance. Addresses known failure modes
# where GPT models abandon work on partial results, skip prerequisite lookups,
# hallucinate instead of using tools, and declare "done" without verification.
@@ -813,6 +848,27 @@ def build_environment_hints() -> str:
if is_wsl():
hints.append(WSL_ENVIRONMENT_HINT)
# Embedder-supplied environment description. Lets a host that wraps Hermes
# (e.g. a sandbox runner / managed platform) explain the environment the
# agent is running in — proxy, credential handling, mount layout — without
# forking the identity slot (SOUL.md). Read once at prompt-build time, so
# it's part of the stable, cache-safe system prompt. The env var is the
# build-time/embedder mechanism (set in a container ENV); config.yaml
# ``agent.environment_hint`` is the user-facing surface. Env var wins.
extra = (os.getenv("HERMES_ENVIRONMENT_HINT") or "").strip()
if not extra:
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
extra = str(
(load_config().get("agent", {}) or {}).get("environment_hint", "")
).strip()
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Could not read agent.environment_hint from config: %s", e)
if extra:
hints.append(extra)
return "\n\n".join(hints)
-1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ import platform
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
+27
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ from agent.prompt_builder import (
PLATFORM_HINTS,
SESSION_SEARCH_GUIDANCE,
SKILLS_GUIDANCE,
TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE,
TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_GUIDANCE,
TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_MODELS,
)
@@ -100,6 +101,15 @@ def build_system_prompt_parts(agent: Any, system_message: Optional[str] = None)
# Pointer to the hermes-agent skill + docs for user questions about Hermes itself.
stable_parts.append(HERMES_AGENT_HELP_GUIDANCE)
# Universal task-completion / no-fabrication guidance. Applied to ALL
# models regardless of tool_use_enforcement gating — the failure modes
# this targets (stopping after a stub; fabricating output when a real
# path is blocked) are not model-family specific. Gated only by
# config.yaml ``agent.task_completion_guidance`` (default True) so
# users who want a leaner prompt can turn it off.
if getattr(agent, "_task_completion_guidance", True) and agent.valid_tool_names:
stable_parts.append(TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE)
# Tool-aware behavioral guidance: only inject when the tools are loaded
tool_guidance = []
if "memory" in agent.valid_tool_names:
@@ -205,6 +215,23 @@ def build_system_prompt_parts(agent: Any, system_message: Optional[str] = None)
if _env_hints:
stable_parts.append(_env_hints)
# Local Python toolchain probe — names python/pip/uv/PEP-668 state when
# something is non-default so the model can pick the right install
# strategy without discovering by failure. Emits a single line; emits
# NOTHING when the environment is clean (no token cost). Skipped
# entirely for remote terminal backends (the host's Python state is
# irrelevant when tools run inside docker/modal/ssh). Gated by
# config.yaml ``agent.environment_probe`` (default True).
if getattr(agent, "_environment_probe", True):
try:
from tools.env_probe import get_environment_probe_line
_probe_line = get_environment_probe_line()
if _probe_line:
stable_parts.append(_probe_line)
except Exception:
# Probe failure must never block prompt build.
pass
# Active-profile hint — names the Hermes profile the agent is running
# under so it doesn't conflate ~/.hermes/skills/ (default profile) with
# ~/.hermes/profiles/<active>/skills/ (this profile's). Deterministic
+146 -56
View File
@@ -13,14 +13,13 @@ extracted functions reach back through the ``run_agent`` module via
from __future__ import annotations
import concurrent.futures
import contextvars
import json
import logging
import os
import random
import threading
import time
from typing import Any, Optional
from typing import Optional
from agent.display import (
KawaiiSpinner,
@@ -38,12 +37,9 @@ from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import (
make_tool_result_message,
)
from tools.terminal_tool import (
_get_approval_callback,
_get_sudo_password_callback,
set_approval_callback as _set_approval_callback,
set_sudo_password_callback as _set_sudo_password_callback,
get_active_env,
)
from tools.thread_context import propagate_context_to_thread
from tools.tool_result_storage import (
maybe_persist_tool_result,
enforce_turn_budget,
@@ -62,6 +58,55 @@ def _ra():
return run_agent
def _tool_search_scoped_names(agent) -> frozenset:
"""Return the deferrable tool names the session may invoke via tool_call.
The Tool Search unwrap dispatches the underlying tool directly, bypassing
the bridge branch (and its scope check) in
``model_tools.handle_function_call``. To keep a restricted-toolset session
(subagent, kanban worker, curated gateway session) from reaching tools it
was never granted, the unwrap validates the underlying name against this
set: the deferrable subset of the session's own enabled/disabled toolset
scope.
Result is cached on the agent and refreshed when the tool registry's
generation changes (e.g. an MCP server reconnects), so the common case is
a dict lookup, not a full tool-defs rebuild on every tool call.
"""
try:
import model_tools
from tools import tool_search as _ts
from tools.registry import registry as _registry
except Exception:
return frozenset()
enabled = getattr(agent, "enabled_toolsets", None)
disabled = getattr(agent, "disabled_toolsets", None)
cache_key = (
getattr(_registry, "_generation", 0),
frozenset(enabled) if enabled is not None else None,
frozenset(disabled) if disabled is not None else None,
)
cached = getattr(agent, "_tool_search_scope_cache", None)
if cached is not None and cached[0] == cache_key:
return cached[1]
try:
scoped_defs = model_tools.get_tool_definitions(
enabled_toolsets=enabled,
disabled_toolsets=disabled,
quiet_mode=True,
skip_tool_search_assembly=True,
) or []
names = _ts.scoped_deferrable_names(scoped_defs)
except Exception:
names = frozenset()
try:
agent._tool_search_scope_cache = (cache_key, names)
except Exception:
pass
return names
def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effective_task_id: str, api_call_count: int = 0) -> None:
"""Execute multiple tool calls concurrently using a thread pool.
@@ -100,6 +145,41 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
if not isinstance(function_args, dict):
function_args = {}
# ── Tool Search unwrap ────────────────────────────────────────
# When the model invokes the tool_call bridge, peel it open so
# every downstream check (checkpointing, guardrails, plugin
# pre-tool-call hooks, the display/activity feed, the post-call
# callback) sees the underlying tool — not the bridge. This is
# the OpenClaw lesson: hooks must observe the real tool name.
#
# The original tool_call entry on ``tool_call.function`` is left
# untouched so the conversation transcript and the matching
# tool_call_id are preserved exactly as the model emitted them.
#
# Scope gate: the unwrap dispatches the underlying tool directly
# (bypassing the bridge branch in handle_function_call and its
# scope check), so we enforce session toolset scope HERE. A tool
# the session was not granted is rejected before any checkpoint,
# hook, or dispatch fires.
_ts_scope_block = None
try:
from tools import tool_search as _ts
if function_name == _ts.TOOL_CALL_NAME:
_underlying, _underlying_args, _err = _ts.resolve_underlying_call(function_args)
if not _err and _underlying:
if _underlying in _tool_search_scoped_names(agent):
function_name = _underlying
function_args = _underlying_args
else:
_ts_scope_block = json.dumps({
"error": (
f"'{_underlying}' is not available in this session. "
"Use tool_search to find tools you can call."
),
}, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
pass
# Checkpoint for file-mutating tools
if function_name in {"write_file", "patch"} and agent._checkpoint_mgr.enabled:
try:
@@ -124,21 +204,25 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
block_result = None
blocked_by_guardrail = False
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_pre_tool_call_block_message
block_message = get_pre_tool_call_block_message(
function_name, function_args, task_id=effective_task_id or "",
)
except Exception:
block_message = None
if block_message is not None:
block_result = json.dumps({"error": block_message}, ensure_ascii=False)
if _ts_scope_block is not None:
# Out-of-scope tool_call: reject before hooks/guardrails/dispatch.
block_result = _ts_scope_block
else:
guardrail_decision = agent._tool_guardrails.before_call(function_name, function_args)
if not guardrail_decision.allows_execution:
block_result = agent._guardrail_block_result(guardrail_decision)
blocked_by_guardrail = True
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_pre_tool_call_block_message
block_message = get_pre_tool_call_block_message(
function_name, function_args, task_id=effective_task_id or "",
)
except Exception:
block_message = None
if block_message is not None:
block_result = json.dumps({"error": block_message}, ensure_ascii=False)
else:
guardrail_decision = agent._tool_guardrails.before_call(function_name, function_args)
if not guardrail_decision.allows_execution:
block_result = agent._guardrail_block_result(guardrail_decision)
blocked_by_guardrail = True
parsed_calls.append((tool_call, function_name, function_args, block_result, blocked_by_guardrail))
@@ -186,14 +270,6 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
agent._current_tool = tool_names_str
agent._touch_activity(f"executing {num_tools} tools concurrently: {tool_names_str}")
# Capture CLI callbacks from the agent thread so worker threads can
# register them locally. Without this, _get_approval_callback() in
# terminal_tool returns None in ThreadPoolExecutor workers, causing
# the dangerous-command prompt to fall back to input() — which
# deadlocks against prompt_toolkit's raw terminal mode (#13617).
_parent_approval_cb = _get_approval_callback()
_parent_sudo_cb = _get_sudo_password_callback()
def _run_tool(index, tool_call, function_name, function_args):
"""Worker function executed in a thread."""
# Register this worker tid so the agent can fan out an interrupt
@@ -220,18 +296,9 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
set_activity_callback(agent._touch_activity)
except Exception:
pass
# Propagate approval/sudo callbacks to this worker thread.
# Mirrors cli.py run_agent() pattern (GHSA-qg5c-hvr5-hjgr).
if _parent_approval_cb is not None:
try:
_set_approval_callback(_parent_approval_cb)
except Exception:
pass
if _parent_sudo_cb is not None:
try:
_set_sudo_password_callback(_parent_sudo_cb)
except Exception:
pass
# Approval/sudo callbacks (thread-local) and the agent turn's
# ContextVars are propagated by propagate_context_to_thread() at the
# submit site below (GHSA-qg5c-hvr5-hjgr, #13617).
start = time.time()
try:
result = agent._invoke_tool(
@@ -261,13 +328,6 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
_ra()._set_interrupt(False, _worker_tid)
except Exception:
pass
# Clear thread-local callbacks so a recycled worker thread
# doesn't hold stale references to a disposed CLI instance.
try:
_set_approval_callback(None)
_set_sudo_password_callback(None)
except Exception:
pass
# Start spinner for CLI mode (skip when TUI handles tool progress)
spinner = None
@@ -287,9 +347,12 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
max_workers = min(len(runnable_calls), _MAX_TOOL_WORKERS)
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers) as executor:
for i, tc, name, args in runnable_calls:
# Propagate ContextVars (e.g. _approval_session_key); mirrors asyncio.to_thread.
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
f = executor.submit(ctx.run, _run_tool, i, tc, name, args)
# Propagate the agent turn's ContextVars (e.g.
# _approval_session_key) AND thread-local approval/sudo
# callbacks into the worker thread; clears callbacks on exit.
f = executor.submit(
propagate_context_to_thread(_run_tool), i, tc, name, args
)
futures.append(f)
# Wait for all to complete with periodic heartbeats so the
@@ -497,16 +560,39 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
if not isinstance(function_args, dict):
function_args = {}
# Check plugin hooks for a block directive before executing.
_block_msg: Optional[str] = None
# Tool Search unwrap — see execute_tool_calls_concurrent for full
# rationale, including the scope gate (the unwrap dispatches the
# underlying tool directly, so session toolset scope is enforced here).
_ts_scope_block: Optional[str] = None
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_pre_tool_call_block_message
_block_msg = get_pre_tool_call_block_message(
function_name, function_args, task_id=effective_task_id or "",
)
from tools import tool_search as _ts
if function_name == _ts.TOOL_CALL_NAME:
_underlying, _underlying_args, _err = _ts.resolve_underlying_call(function_args)
if not _err and _underlying:
if _underlying in _tool_search_scoped_names(agent):
function_name = _underlying
function_args = _underlying_args
else:
_ts_scope_block = (
f"'{_underlying}' is not available in this session. "
"Use tool_search to find tools you can call."
)
except Exception:
pass
# Check plugin hooks for a block directive before executing.
_block_msg: Optional[str] = None
if _ts_scope_block is not None:
_block_msg = _ts_scope_block
else:
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_pre_tool_call_block_message
_block_msg = get_pre_tool_call_block_message(
function_name, function_args, task_id=effective_task_id or "",
)
except Exception:
pass
_guardrail_block_decision: ToolGuardrailDecision | None = None
if _block_msg is None:
guardrail_decision = agent._tool_guardrails.before_call(function_name, function_args)
@@ -752,6 +838,8 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
session_id=agent.session_id or "",
enabled_tools=list(agent.valid_tool_names) if agent.valid_tool_names else None,
skip_pre_tool_call_hook=True,
enabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "enabled_toolsets", None),
disabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "disabled_toolsets", None),
)
_spinner_result = function_result
except Exception as tool_error:
@@ -772,6 +860,8 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
session_id=agent.session_id or "",
enabled_tools=list(agent.valid_tool_names) if agent.valid_tool_names else None,
skip_pre_tool_call_hook=True,
enabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "enabled_toolsets", None),
disabled_toolsets=getattr(agent, "disabled_toolsets", None),
)
except Exception as tool_error:
function_result = f"Error executing tool '{function_name}': {tool_error}"
+7 -3
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ reasoning configuration, temperature handling, and extra_body assembly.
"""
import copy
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from typing import Any, Dict
from agent.lmstudio_reasoning import resolve_lmstudio_effort
from agent.moonshot_schema import is_moonshot_model, sanitize_moonshot_tools
@@ -476,13 +476,17 @@ class ChatCompletionsTransport(ProviderTransport):
ephemeral = params.get("ephemeral_max_output_tokens")
user_max = params.get("max_tokens")
anthropic_max = params.get("anthropic_max_output")
# Per-model default cap — profiles override get_max_tokens() when
# they front several backends with different completion-token limits
# (e.g. opencode-go: mimo-v2.5-pro = 131072).
profile_max = profile.get_max_tokens(model)
if ephemeral is not None and max_tokens_fn:
api_kwargs.update(max_tokens_fn(ephemeral))
elif user_max is not None and max_tokens_fn:
api_kwargs.update(max_tokens_fn(user_max))
elif profile.default_max_tokens and max_tokens_fn:
api_kwargs.update(max_tokens_fn(profile.default_max_tokens))
elif profile_max and max_tokens_fn:
api_kwargs.update(max_tokens_fn(profile_max))
elif anthropic_max is not None:
api_kwargs["max_tokens"] = anthropic_max
+1 -1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import subprocess
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, Callable, Optional
from typing import Any, Optional
# Default minimum codex version we test against. The PR sets this from the
# `codex --version` parsed at install time; bumping is a one-line change here.
+2 -1
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, Callable, Optional
from agent.codex_responses_adapter import _format_responses_error
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
from agent.transports.codex_app_server import (
CodexAppServerClient,
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ class CodexAppServerSession:
(note.get("params") or {}).get("turn") or {}
).get("error")
if err_obj:
err_msg = err_obj.get("message") or str(err_obj)
err_msg = _format_responses_error(err_obj, str(turn_status))
# If the turn failed for an auth/refresh reason,
# rewrite the error into a re-auth hint AND mark
# the session for retirement.
+88 -12
View File
@@ -74,10 +74,15 @@ except (ImportError, AttributeError):
_STEADY_CURSOR = None
try:
from hermes_cli.pt_input_extras import install_shift_enter_alias, install_ctrl_enter_alias
from hermes_cli.pt_input_extras import (
install_ctrl_enter_alias,
install_ignored_terminal_sequences,
install_shift_enter_alias,
)
install_shift_enter_alias()
install_ctrl_enter_alias()
del install_shift_enter_alias, install_ctrl_enter_alias
install_ignored_terminal_sequences()
del install_shift_enter_alias, install_ctrl_enter_alias, install_ignored_terminal_sequences
except Exception:
pass
import threading
@@ -382,6 +387,10 @@ def load_cli_config() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"inactivity_timeout": 120, # Auto-cleanup inactive browser sessions after 2 min
"record_sessions": False, # Auto-record browser sessions as WebM videos
"engine": "auto", # Browser engine: auto (Chrome), lightpanda, chrome
"camofox": {
"rewrite_loopback_urls": False,
"loopback_host_alias": "host.docker.internal",
},
},
"compression": {
"enabled": True, # Auto-compress when approaching context limit
@@ -576,6 +585,8 @@ def load_cli_config() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"docker_env": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ENV",
"docker_mount_cwd_to_workspace": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_MOUNT_CWD_TO_WORKSPACE",
"docker_run_as_host_user": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_RUN_AS_HOST_USER",
"docker_persist_across_processes": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_PERSIST_ACROSS_PROCESSES",
"docker_orphan_reaper": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ORPHAN_REAPER",
"sandbox_dir": "TERMINAL_SANDBOX_DIR",
# Persistent shell (non-local backends)
"persistent_shell": "TERMINAL_PERSISTENT_SHELL",
@@ -2475,8 +2486,9 @@ _TERMINAL_INPUT_MODE_RESET_SEQ = (
def _preserve_ctrl_enter_newline() -> bool:
"""Detect environments where Ctrl+Enter must produce a newline, not submit.
Native Windows, WSL, SSH sessions, and Windows Terminal all send Ctrl+Enter
as bare LF (c-j). On those terminals c-j must NOT be bound to submit;
Windows Terminal, WSL, SSH sessions, Ghostty, and some modern terminals
deliver Ctrl+Enter/Ctrl+J as bare LF (c-j). On those terminals c-j must
NOT be bound to submit;
binding it to submit makes Ctrl+Enter (intended as 'newline like Alt+Enter')
submit instead. Local POSIX TTYs that deliver Enter as LF (docker exec,
some thin PTYs without SSH) still need c-j bound to submit, so we keep
@@ -2490,6 +2502,12 @@ def _preserve_ctrl_enter_newline() -> bool:
return True
if os.environ.get("WT_SESSION"):
return True
if os.environ.get("GHOSTTY_RESOURCES_DIR") or os.environ.get("GHOSTTY_BIN_DIR"):
return True
if os.environ.get("TERM", "").lower() == "xterm-ghostty":
return True
if os.environ.get("TERM_PROGRAM", "").lower() == "ghostty":
return True
if "microsoft" in os.environ.get("WSL_DISTRO_NAME", "").lower():
return True
# WSL detection — env vars can be scrubbed under sudo, also peek /proc.
@@ -2510,7 +2528,7 @@ def _bind_prompt_submit_keys(kb, handler) -> None:
some thin PTYs (docker exec, certain SSH flavors) deliver Enter as LF
instead of CR without this, Enter appears dead on those terminals.
Exception: on Windows, WSL, SSH sessions, and Windows Terminal,
Exception: on Windows, WSL, SSH sessions, Windows Terminal, and Ghostty,
c-j is the wire encoding of Ctrl+Enter (a distinct keystroke from
plain Enter / c-m). We leave c-j unbound there so the c-j newline
handler registered separately can fire giving the user an
@@ -12704,7 +12722,21 @@ class HermesCLI:
# Key bindings for the input area
kb = KeyBindings()
from prompt_toolkit.keys import Keys as _IgnoreKeys
@kb.add(_IgnoreKeys.Ignore, eager=True)
def handle_ignored_terminal_sequence(event):
"""Consume parser-level ignored terminal sequences before self-insert.
install_ignored_terminal_sequences() in hermes_cli.pt_input_extras
registers focus reports (CSI I / CSI O) as Keys.Ignore at the
VT100 parser level. Without this no-op binding the default
self-insert path would still fire and the bytes would land in
the buffer.
"""
return None
def handle_enter(event):
"""Handle Enter key - submit input.
@@ -15125,13 +15157,50 @@ def main(
# Handle single query mode
if query or image:
query, single_query_images = _collect_query_images(query, image)
# Kanban workers spawn with ``hermes chat -q "work kanban task <id>"``;
# the actual task description lives in the task body. Mirror the
# gateway/CLI behaviour for inbound images by scanning the body for
# local image paths and http(s) image URLs and attaching them to the
# worker's first turn. Without this, users who paste a screenshot
# path or URL into a kanban task body never get it routed to the
# model's vision input.
single_query_image_urls: list[str] = []
_kanban_task_id = os.environ.get("HERMES_KANBAN_TASK", "").strip()
if _kanban_task_id:
try:
from hermes_cli import kanban_db as _kb
from agent.image_routing import extract_image_refs as _extract_refs
_conn = _kb.connect()
try:
_task = _kb.get_task(_conn, _kanban_task_id)
finally:
try:
_conn.close()
except Exception:
pass
_body = getattr(_task, "body", "") if _task is not None else ""
if _body:
_kb_paths, _kb_urls = _extract_refs(_body)
if _kb_paths:
# Dedupe against any --image the user already passed.
_seen = {str(p) for p in single_query_images}
for _p in _kb_paths:
if _p not in _seen:
_seen.add(_p)
single_query_images.append(Path(_p))
if _kb_urls:
single_query_image_urls.extend(_kb_urls)
except Exception as _exc:
# Best-effort enrichment; never block worker startup on it.
logger.debug("kanban image-ref extraction failed: %s", _exc)
if quiet:
# Quiet mode: suppress banner, spinner, tool previews.
# Only print the final response and parseable session info.
cli.tool_progress_mode = "off"
if cli._ensure_runtime_credentials():
effective_query: Any = query
if single_query_images:
if single_query_images or single_query_image_urls:
# Honour the same image-routing decision used by the
# interactive path. With a vision-capable model (incl.
# custom-provider models declared via
@@ -15160,19 +15229,26 @@ def main(
_parts, _skipped = _build_parts(
query if isinstance(query, str) else "",
[str(p) for p in single_query_images],
image_urls=list(single_query_image_urls) or None,
)
if any(p.get("type") == "image_url" for p in _parts):
effective_query = _parts
else:
# All images unreadable — text fallback.
# ``_preprocess_images_with_vision`` only knows
# about local files; URLs would be lost there,
# so keep the original query text intact when
# only URLs were supplied.
if single_query_images:
effective_query = cli._preprocess_images_with_vision(
query, single_query_images, announce=False,
)
except Exception:
if single_query_images:
effective_query = cli._preprocess_images_with_vision(
query, single_query_images, announce=False,
)
except Exception:
effective_query = cli._preprocess_images_with_vision(
query, single_query_images, announce=False,
)
else:
elif single_query_images:
effective_query = cli._preprocess_images_with_vision(
query,
single_query_images,
+14 -6
View File
@@ -30,13 +30,21 @@ cd /opt/data
dash_host="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST:-0.0.0.0}"
dash_port="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT:-9119}"
# Binding to anything other than localhost requires --insecure — the
# dashboard refuses otherwise because it exposes API keys. Inside a
# container this is the expected deployment.
# `--insecure` is opt-in via HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE. The dashboard's
# OAuth auth gate engages automatically on non-loopback binds when a
# DashboardAuthProvider is registered (e.g. the bundled dashboard_auth/nous
# provider, which auto-registers when HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is
# set). If no provider is registered, start_server fails closed with a
# specific operator-facing error.
#
# This used to derive --insecure from the bind host ("anything non-loopback
# implies insecure"), but that predates the OAuth gate and silently
# disabled it on every container-deployed dashboard. The gate is now the
# authority; operators on trusted LANs / behind a reverse proxy without
# the OAuth contract opt in explicitly.
insecure=""
case "$dash_host" in
127.0.0.1|localhost) ;;
*) insecure="--insecure" ;;
case "${HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE:-}" in
1|true|TRUE|True|yes|YES|Yes) insecure="--insecure" ;;
esac
# shellcheck disable=SC2086 # word-splitting of $insecure is intentional
+65
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@ INSTALL_DIR="/opt/hermes"
mkdir -p "$HERMES_HOME"
# --- UID/GID remap ---
# Accept PUID/PGID as aliases for HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID. NAS users (UGOS,
# Synology, unRAID) expect the LinuxServer.io PUID/PGID convention and
# bind-mount /opt/data from a host directory owned by their own UID; without
# this alias those vars are silently ignored and the s6-setuidgid drop to
# UID 10000 leaves the runtime unable to read the volume. HERMES_UID/
# HERMES_GID still win when both are set. See #15290, salvages #25872.
HERMES_UID="${HERMES_UID:-${PUID:-}}"
HERMES_GID="${HERMES_GID:-${PGID:-}}"
if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
echo "[stage2] Changing hermes UID to $HERMES_UID"
usermod -u "$HERMES_UID" hermes
@@ -44,6 +53,62 @@ if [ -n "${HERMES_GID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_GID" != "$(id -g hermes)" ]; then
groupmod -o -g "$HERMES_GID" hermes 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# --- Docker socket group membership (docker-in-docker / DooD) ---
# When the user bind-mounts the host Docker daemon socket
# (`-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock`) to use the `docker`
# terminal backend from inside the container, the socket is owned by the
# host's `docker` group (or root). The supervised hermes user (UID 10000)
# is not a member of any group that matches the socket's GID, so every
# `docker` invocation EACCES'es and `check_terminal_requirements()` fails.
# See #16703.
#
# Granting the supp group via `docker run --group-add <gid>` alone is
# NOT sufficient with our s6-setuidgid privilege drop: s6-setuidgid (and
# gosu, the older shim) calls initgroups() for the target user, which
# rebuilds the supplementary group list from /etc/group. Without an
# /etc/group entry whose GID matches the socket, the kernel-granted
# supp group is silently wiped between PID 1 and the dropped process.
# Confirmed empirically: `--group-add 998` alone leaves the dropped
# hermes process with `Groups: 10000` (998 gone); after this hook adds
# the entry, the dropped process has `Groups: 998 10000` as expected.
#
# Fix: detect the socket's GID at boot and ensure /etc/group has a
# matching entry that includes hermes. Idempotent across container
# restarts. Skipped silently when no socket is bind-mounted.
#
# Handles the awkward corner cases:
# - socket owned by GID 0 (root) — some Podman setups; usermod -aG root
# - socket GID already used by a known container group (e.g. tty=5):
# reuse that group's name rather than creating a duplicate
# - hermes is already a member of the right group (idempotent restart)
# - chown/groupadd failures under rootless containers — non-fatal
for sock in /var/run/docker.sock /run/docker.sock; do
[ -S "$sock" ] || continue
sock_gid=$(stat -c '%g' "$sock" 2>/dev/null) || continue
[ -n "$sock_gid" ] || continue
# Already a member? Nothing to do.
if id -G hermes 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx "$sock_gid"; then
echo "[stage2] hermes already in group $sock_gid for $sock"
break
fi
# Resolve or create a group name for this GID.
sock_group=$(getent group "$sock_gid" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f1)
if [ -z "$sock_group" ]; then
sock_group="hostdocker"
if ! groupadd -g "$sock_gid" "$sock_group" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[stage2] Warning: groupadd -g $sock_gid $sock_group failed; skipping docker socket group setup"
break
fi
echo "[stage2] Created group $sock_group (GID $sock_gid) for Docker socket"
fi
if usermod -aG "$sock_group" hermes 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[stage2] Added hermes to group $sock_group (GID $sock_gid) for $sock"
else
echo "[stage2] Warning: usermod -aG $sock_group hermes failed; docker backend may fail with EACCES"
fi
break
done
# --- Fix ownership of data volume ---
# When HERMES_UID is remapped or the top-level $HERMES_HOME isn't owned by
# the runtime hermes UID, restore ownership to hermes — but ONLY for the
+195
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
# Network Egress Isolation for Docker Deployments
When running Hermes inside Docker, the default `network_mode: host` gives the
agent process unrestricted outbound network access. This guide shows how to
segment traffic so the agent core can only reach the services it needs, while
blocking arbitrary outbound connections.
This is primarily a defense against prompt injection attacks that attempt to
exfiltrate data via `curl`, `wget`, or raw HTTP from tool-generated shell
commands.
## Threat Model
The Hermes [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md) §2 defines the trust model. The
terminal backend is the primary execution boundary. However, when running with
`network_mode: host`, any command the agent executes can reach any endpoint on
the network, including external ones.
Network egress isolation adds a second layer: even if a malicious command
executes inside the container, it cannot reach endpoints outside the
explicitly allowlisted set.
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Docker Network: internal (no internet) │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ hermes-agent │ │ hermes-dashboard │ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ▼ │ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ │ │
│ │ hermes-gtw │◄───────────┘ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ │
│ │ │
└──────────┼───────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────┼───────────────────────────────────┐
│ Docker Network: egress (internet-capable) │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ egress-proxy │──► allowlisted hosts │
│ │ (squid / envoy) │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
Two Docker networks:
- **`internal`** — no default route, no internet access. The agent, dashboard,
and gateway run here.
- **`egress`** — has internet access. Only services that need to reach external
APIs are attached to this network.
The gateway service is dual-homed (attached to both networks) so it can
receive inbound messages from Telegram/Slack/etc. and forward them to the
agent on the internal network.
## Compose Configuration
Override the default `docker-compose.yml` with a
`docker-compose.override.yml`:
```yaml
# docker-compose.override.yml
# Network egress isolation for production deployments.
#
# Usage:
# HERMES_UID=$(id -u) HERMES_GID=$(id -g) docker compose up -d
#
# This overrides network_mode: host with isolated Docker networks.
networks:
internal:
driver: bridge
internal: true # no default route, no internet
egress:
driver: bridge
services:
gateway:
network_mode: "" # clear the host-mode default
networks:
- internal
- egress # needs outbound for Telegram, LLM APIs
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:9119:9119" # dashboard proxy, localhost only
dashboard:
network_mode: ""
networks:
- internal # internal only, no egress needed
```
### With an Egress Proxy (Recommended)
For tighter control, route all outbound traffic through an HTTP proxy with
an explicit allowlist:
```yaml
# docker-compose.override.yml (with egress proxy)
networks:
internal:
driver: bridge
internal: true
egress:
driver: bridge
services:
gateway:
network_mode: ""
networks:
- internal
- egress
environment:
- HTTP_PROXY=http://egress-proxy:3128
- HTTPS_PROXY=http://egress-proxy:3128
- NO_PROXY=hermes,hermes-dashboard,localhost
dashboard:
network_mode: ""
networks:
- internal
egress-proxy:
image: ubuntu/squid:6.10-24.04_edge
networks:
- egress
volumes:
- ./config/squid-allowlist.conf:/etc/squid/conf.d/allowlist.conf:ro
restart: unless-stopped
```
Example `config/squid-allowlist.conf`:
```
# Only allow HTTPS CONNECT to these hosts
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain api.openai.com
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain api.anthropic.com
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain openrouter.ai
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain generativelanguage.googleapis.com
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain api.telegram.org
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain api.github.com
acl allowed_hosts dstdomain discord.com
http_access allow CONNECT allowed_hosts
http_access deny all
```
Adjust the allowlist to match your LLM provider and messaging platform.
## Validating the Setup
After bringing up the stack, verify isolation:
```bash
# From the agent container: this should FAIL (no egress)
docker compose exec gateway \
curl -sf --max-time 5 https://example.com && echo "FAIL: egress not blocked" || echo "OK: egress blocked"
# From the agent container: this should SUCCEED (internal network)
docker compose exec gateway \
curl -sf --max-time 5 http://hermes-dashboard:9119/health && echo "OK: internal reachable" || echo "FAIL"
# If using egress proxy: this should SUCCEED (allowlisted)
docker compose exec gateway \
curl -sf --max-time 5 --proxy http://egress-proxy:3128 https://api.openai.com/v1/models && echo "OK" || echo "FAIL"
```
## Limitations
- **DNS resolution:** The `internal` network can still resolve external DNS
names unless you also run a local DNS resolver that blocks external queries.
For most threat models this is acceptable since DNS resolution alone does not
exfiltrate meaningful data.
- **Not a substitute for sandbox backends:** This guide isolates the agent
*container's* network. If you use the default local terminal backend, tool
commands execute inside the same container. For stronger isolation, combine
network segmentation with a sandboxed terminal backend (Docker, Modal,
Daytona).
- **Platform adapters need egress:** The gateway service needs outbound access
to reach messaging platform APIs. If you add new platform adapters, add their
API endpoints to the proxy allowlist.
## Related
- [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md) — Hermes trust model and vulnerability reporting
- [Terminal backends](../../README.md) — sandboxed execution targets
- [docker-compose.yml](../../docker-compose.yml) — default compose configuration
+103 -7
View File
@@ -472,6 +472,7 @@ def is_host_excluded_by_no_proxy(hostname: str, no_proxy_value: str | None = Non
return False
import dataclasses
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
@@ -847,6 +848,13 @@ MEDIA_DELIVERY_SAFE_ROOTS = (
_HERMES_HOME / "video_cache",
_HERMES_HOME / "document_cache",
_HERMES_HOME / "browser_screenshots",
# Canonical cache layout — listed alongside the legacy *_cache dirs so
# generated artifacts deliver on installs that have both (#31733).
_HERMES_HOME / "cache" / "images",
_HERMES_HOME / "cache" / "audio",
_HERMES_HOME / "cache" / "videos",
_HERMES_HOME / "cache" / "documents",
_HERMES_HOME / "cache" / "screenshots",
)
# Default recency window for trusting freshly-produced files (seconds).
@@ -1021,7 +1029,11 @@ def validate_media_delivery_path(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
if not candidate:
return None
expanded = Path(os.path.expanduser(candidate))
try:
expanded = Path(os.path.expanduser(candidate))
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
# expanduser raises ValueError("embedded null byte") for a ~\x00 path.
return None
if not expanded.is_absolute():
return None
@@ -1065,6 +1077,17 @@ def validate_media_delivery_path(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
return None
# Neutralise control chars and the Unicode line separators (NEL, LS, PS) that
# str.splitlines() / log aggregators treat as breaks, so a model-emitted path
# can't forge a second log line. Truncated to keep records bounded.
_LOG_UNSAFE_CHARS = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f\x85\u2028\u2029]")
def _log_safe_path(path: str) -> str:
"""Return a single-line, length-bounded path for log output."""
return _LOG_UNSAFE_CHARS.sub("?", str(path))[:200]
SUPPORTED_DOCUMENT_TYPES = {
".pdf": "application/pdf",
".md": "text/markdown",
@@ -1561,6 +1584,10 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
self.config = config
self.platform = platform
self._message_handler: Optional[MessageHandler] = None
# Optional hook (e.g. Telegram DM topic recovery) that rewrites
# ``event.source.thread_id`` before session keying. Returns the
# corrected thread_id or None to leave the source untouched.
self._topic_recovery_fn: Optional[Callable[[Any], Optional[str]]] = None
self._running = False
self._fatal_error_code: Optional[str] = None
self._fatal_error_message: Optional[str] = None
@@ -1628,6 +1655,29 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
"""
return len
@property
def enforces_own_access_policy(self) -> bool:
"""Whether this adapter gates inbound access before dispatch.
Some adapters (WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, QQBot) implement a documented
config-driven access surface ``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` /
``allow_from`` / ``group_allow_from`` in ``PlatformConfig.extra`` and
enforce it at intake: a message is dropped inside the adapter and never
reaches the gateway unless it already passed that policy.
The gateway's env-based allowlist check runs *after* the adapter, so for
these platforms a message arriving at ``_is_user_authorized`` has, by
definition, already been authorized by the adapter. Without this flag the
gateway would then deny it again (no env allowlist default deny),
silently breaking ``dm_policy: open`` and config-only allowlists.
Adapters that own their access policy override this to return ``True``.
The gateway treats that as "already authorized at intake" and skips the
env-allowlist default-deny. Adapters that delegate access control to the
gateway leave it ``False`` (the default).
"""
return False
def supports_draft_streaming(
self,
chat_type: Optional[str] = None,
@@ -1816,6 +1866,40 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
"""
self._message_handler = handler
def set_topic_recovery_fn(
self,
fn: Optional[Callable[[Any], Optional[str]]],
) -> None:
"""Install a thread_id-recovery hook (Telegram DM topic mode).
The hook is called with ``event.source`` before session keying;
a non-None return value replaces ``source.thread_id``. Pass
``None`` to clear the hook.
"""
# Guard against subclasses that initialize via ``object.__new__`` in
# tests and never run ``BasePlatformAdapter.__init__``.
self._topic_recovery_fn = fn # type: ignore[attr-defined]
def _apply_topic_recovery(self, event: MessageEvent) -> None:
"""Rewrite ``event.source.thread_id`` in place if the hook returns one."""
recover = getattr(self, "_topic_recovery_fn", None)
if recover is None:
return
source = getattr(event, "source", None)
if source is None:
return
try:
recovered = recover(source)
except Exception:
logger.debug("topic recovery hook failed", exc_info=True)
return
if recovered is None or str(recovered) == str(source.thread_id or ""):
return
try:
event.source = dataclasses.replace(source, thread_id=str(recovered))
except Exception:
logger.debug("topic recovery rewrite failed", exc_info=True)
def set_busy_session_handler(self, handler: Optional[Callable[[MessageEvent, str], Awaitable[bool]]]) -> None:
"""Set an optional handler for messages arriving during active sessions."""
self._busy_session_handler = handler
@@ -2399,11 +2483,12 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
"""Drop unsafe MEDIA paths and normalize accepted paths."""
safe_media: List[Tuple[str, bool]] = []
for media_path, is_voice in media_files or []:
safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(str(media_path))
raw = str(media_path)
safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(raw)
if safe_path:
safe_media.append((safe_path, bool(is_voice)))
else:
logger.warning("Skipping unsafe MEDIA directive path outside allowed roots")
logger.warning("Skipping unsafe MEDIA directive path: %s", _log_safe_path(raw))
return safe_media
@staticmethod
@@ -2411,11 +2496,12 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
"""Drop unsafe bare local file paths and normalize accepted paths."""
safe_paths: List[str] = []
for file_path in file_paths or []:
safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(str(file_path))
raw = str(file_path)
safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(raw)
if safe_path:
safe_paths.append(safe_path)
else:
logger.warning("Skipping unsafe local file path outside allowed roots")
logger.warning("Skipping unsafe local file path: %s", _log_safe_path(raw))
return safe_paths
@staticmethod
@@ -2466,7 +2552,12 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
path = path[1:-1].strip()
path = path.lstrip("`\"'").rstrip("`\"',.;:)}]")
if path:
media.append((os.path.expanduser(path), has_voice_tag))
try:
media.append((os.path.expanduser(path), has_voice_tag))
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
# Skip a crafted ~\x00 path rather than aborting extraction
# and dropping every other attachment in the response.
continue
# Remove MEDIA tags from content (including surrounding quote/backtick wrappers)
if media:
@@ -3332,7 +3423,12 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
return
coerce_plaintext_gateway_command(event)
# Rewrite ``event.source.thread_id`` via the installed recovery hook
# (Telegram DM topic mode) so the session key, guard checks, and
# downstream delivery all agree on the same lane.
self._apply_topic_recovery(event)
session_key = build_session_key(
event.source,
group_sessions_per_user=self.config.extra.get("group_sessions_per_user", True),
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2236,7 +2236,8 @@ class MatrixAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
if prompt and not prompt.resolved:
if room_id != prompt.chat_id:
return
if self._allowed_user_ids and sender not in self._allowed_user_ids:
_allow_all = os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}
if not _allow_all and not (self._allowed_user_ids and sender in self._allowed_user_ids):
logger.info(
"Matrix: ignoring approval reaction from unauthorized user %s on %s",
sender, reacts_to,
+5 -1
View File
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ from gateway.platforms.qqbot.chunked_upload import (
)
from gateway.platforms.qqbot.keyboards import (
ApprovalRequest,
ApprovalSender,
InlineKeyboard,
InteractionEvent,
build_approval_keyboard,
@@ -270,6 +269,11 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
def name(self) -> str:
return "QQBot"
@property
def enforces_own_access_policy(self) -> bool:
"""QQBot gates DM/group access at intake via dm_policy/group_policy."""
return True
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Connection lifecycle
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
+1 -1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import asyncio
import functools
import hashlib
import logging
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, List, Optional
+7 -2
View File
@@ -1690,7 +1690,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
BotCommandScopeAllPrivateChats,
BotCommandScopeAllGroupChats,
BotCommandScopeDefault,
BotCommandScopeChat,
)
from hermes_cli.commands import telegram_menu_commands
# Telegram allows up to 100 commands but has an undocumented
@@ -5027,8 +5026,14 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def _text_batch_key(self, event: MessageEvent) -> str:
"""Session-scoped key for text message batching."""
"""Session-scoped key for text message batching.
Applies the installed topic-recovery hook first so DM-topic batches
coalesce on (and dispatch to) the recovered lane rather than the
raw inbound ``message_thread_id`` Telegram may have attached.
"""
from gateway.session import build_session_key
self._apply_topic_recovery(event)
return build_session_key(
event.source,
group_sessions_per_user=self.config.extra.get("group_sessions_per_user", True),
+5
View File
@@ -847,6 +847,11 @@ class WeComAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
# Policy helpers
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@property
def enforces_own_access_policy(self) -> bool:
"""WeCom gates DM/group access at intake via dm_policy/group_policy."""
return True
def _is_dm_allowed(self, sender_id: str) -> bool:
if self._dm_policy == "disabled":
return False
+5 -46
View File
@@ -658,52 +658,6 @@ def _split_table_row(line: str) -> List[str]:
return [cell.strip() for cell in row.split("|")]
def _rewrite_headers_for_weixin(line: str) -> str:
match = _HEADER_RE.match(line)
if not match:
return line.rstrip()
level = len(match.group(1))
title = match.group(2).strip()
if level == 1:
return f"{title}"
return f"**{title}**"
def _rewrite_table_block_for_weixin(lines: List[str]) -> str:
if len(lines) < 2:
return "\n".join(lines)
headers = _split_table_row(lines[0])
body_rows = [_split_table_row(line) for line in lines[2:] if line.strip()]
if not headers or not body_rows:
return "\n".join(lines)
formatted_rows: List[str] = []
for row in body_rows:
pairs = []
for idx, header in enumerate(headers):
if idx >= len(row):
break
label = header or f"Column {idx + 1}"
value = row[idx].strip()
if value:
pairs.append((label, value))
if not pairs:
continue
if len(pairs) == 1:
label, value = pairs[0]
formatted_rows.append(f"- {label}: {value}")
continue
if len(pairs) == 2:
label, value = pairs[0]
other_label, other_value = pairs[1]
formatted_rows.append(f"- {label}: {value}")
formatted_rows.append(f" {other_label}: {other_value}")
continue
summary = " | ".join(f"{label}: {value}" for label, value in pairs)
formatted_rows.append(f"- {summary}")
return "\n".join(formatted_rows) if formatted_rows else "\n".join(lines)
def _normalize_markdown_blocks(content: str) -> str:
lines = content.splitlines()
result: List[str] = []
@@ -1443,6 +1397,11 @@ class WeixinAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
logger.info("[%s] inbound from=%s type=%s media=%d", self.name, _safe_id(sender_id), source.chat_type, len(media_paths))
await self.handle_message(event)
@property
def enforces_own_access_policy(self) -> bool:
"""Weixin gates DM/group access at intake via dm_policy/group_policy."""
return True
def _is_dm_allowed(self, sender_id: str) -> bool:
if self._dm_policy == "disabled":
return False
+68 -1
View File
@@ -2230,6 +2230,45 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
name = "media-resolve"
# --- Resource download cache (keyed by resourceId) ---
# Avoids redundant downloads of the same resource within the TTL window.
# The same resourceId can be referenced multiple times in a session (own
# attachment, then quoted again, then observed in a group backfill); each
# reference otherwise triggers a fresh token exchange + download.
_resource_cache: ClassVar[Dict[str, Tuple[str, str, float]]] = {} # rid -> (local_path, mime, ts)
_RESOURCE_CACHE_TTL_S: ClassVar[int] = 24 * 60 * 60 # 24 hours
_RESOURCE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE: ClassVar[int] = 256
@classmethod
def _get_cached_resource(cls, resource_id: str) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]:
"""Return cached ``(local_path, mime)`` if still valid and file exists, else None."""
if not resource_id:
return None
entry = cls._resource_cache.get(resource_id)
if entry is None:
return None
local_path, mime, ts = entry
if time.time() - ts > cls._RESOURCE_CACHE_TTL_S:
cls._resource_cache.pop(resource_id, None)
return None
# Verify the cached file still exists on disk (cache dir may be swept).
if not os.path.isfile(local_path):
cls._resource_cache.pop(resource_id, None)
return None
return local_path, mime
@classmethod
def _put_cached_resource(cls, resource_id: str, local_path: str, mime: str) -> None:
"""Store download result in cache. Evicts oldest entries when over capacity."""
if not resource_id:
return
if len(cls._resource_cache) >= cls._RESOURCE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE:
# Drop the oldest 25% of entries by timestamp.
sorted_keys = sorted(cls._resource_cache, key=lambda k: cls._resource_cache[k][2])
for k in sorted_keys[: cls._RESOURCE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE // 4]:
cls._resource_cache.pop(k, None)
cls._resource_cache[resource_id] = (local_path, mime, time.time())
@staticmethod
def _guess_image_ext_from_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Guess image extension from URL path."""
@@ -2327,8 +2366,23 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
async def _download_and_cache(
cls, adapter, *, fetch_url: str, kind: str,
file_name: Optional[str] = None, log_tag: str = "",
resource_id: str = "",
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]:
"""Download a Yuanbao resource and cache locally. Returns ``(local_path, mime)`` or ``None``."""
"""Download a Yuanbao resource and cache locally. Returns ``(local_path, mime)`` or ``None``.
When *resource_id* is provided, an in-memory cache keyed by resourceId
is consulted first to skip redundant downloads of the same resource
within the TTL window.
"""
if resource_id:
hit = cls._get_cached_resource(resource_id)
if hit is not None:
logger.debug(
"[%s] resource cache hit: rid=%s path=%s",
adapter.name, resource_id, hit[0],
)
return hit
try:
file_bytes, content_type = await media_download_url(
fetch_url, max_size_mb=adapter.MEDIA_MAX_SIZE_MB,
@@ -2353,6 +2407,7 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
mime = guess_mime_type(f"image{ext}")
if not mime.startswith("image/"):
mime = content_type if content_type.startswith("image/") else "image/jpeg"
cls._put_cached_resource(resource_id, local_path, mime)
return local_path, mime
# kind == "file"
@@ -2368,6 +2423,7 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
)
return None
mime = guess_mime_type(file_name) or content_type or "application/octet-stream"
cls._put_cached_resource(resource_id, local_path, mime)
return local_path, mime
@classmethod
@@ -2393,6 +2449,9 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
if kind not in _RESOLVABLE_MEDIA_KINDS or not url:
continue
# Extract resourceId from the placeholder URL for cache dedup.
rid = ExtractContentMiddleware._parse_resource_id(url)
try:
fetch_url = await cls._resolve_download_url(adapter, url)
except Exception as exc:
@@ -2408,6 +2467,7 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
kind=kind,
file_name=str(ref.get("name") or "").strip() or None,
log_tag=f"placeholder_url={url[:80]}",
resource_id=rid,
)
if cached is None:
continue
@@ -2480,6 +2540,7 @@ class MediaResolveMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
kind=kind,
file_name=filename or None,
log_tag=f"rid={rid}",
resource_id=rid,
)
if cached is None:
continue
@@ -2563,6 +2624,7 @@ class DispatchMiddleware(InboundMiddleware):
kind=kind,
file_name=filename or None,
log_tag=f"quote rid={rid}",
resource_id=rid,
)
if cached is None:
continue
@@ -4629,6 +4691,11 @@ class YuanbaoAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
# Abstract method implementations
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@property
def enforces_own_access_policy(self) -> bool:
"""Yuanbao gates DM/group access at intake via dm_policy/group_policy."""
return True
async def connect(self) -> bool:
"""Connect to Yuanbao WS gateway and authenticate.
+193 -2
View File
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ _hermes_home = get_hermes_home()
# Load environment variables from ~/.hermes/.env first.
# User-managed env files should override stale shell exports on restart.
from dotenv import load_dotenv # backward-compat for tests that monkeypatch this symbol
from dotenv import load_dotenv # noqa: F401 # backward-compat for tests that monkeypatch this symbol
from hermes_cli.env_loader import load_hermes_dotenv
_env_path = _hermes_home / '.env'
load_hermes_dotenv(hermes_home=_hermes_home, project_env=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / '.env')
@@ -831,6 +831,8 @@ if _config_path.exists():
"docker_env": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ENV",
"docker_mount_cwd_to_workspace": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_MOUNT_CWD_TO_WORKSPACE",
"docker_run_as_host_user": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_RUN_AS_HOST_USER",
"docker_persist_across_processes": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_PERSIST_ACROSS_PROCESSES",
"docker_orphan_reaper": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ORPHAN_REAPER",
"sandbox_dir": "TERMINAL_SANDBOX_DIR",
"persistent_shell": "TERMINAL_PERSISTENT_SHELL",
}
@@ -1805,7 +1807,34 @@ class GatewayRunner:
ensure_installed(log_failures=False)
except Exception:
pass # Non-fatal — fail-open at scan time if unavailable
# Startup heads-up (#30882): a gateway in manual approval mode with no
# automated risk assessor (tirith disabled AND no auxiliary.approval
# model) can only gate dangerous commands / execute_code scripts via
# live in-chat approval. With approval routing fixed, those actions now
# fail closed (block) rather than silently auto-running — surface that
# so operators knowingly enable tirith or configure auxiliary.approval
# for unattended gateways.
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_full_config
_appr_cfg = _load_full_config()
_appr_mode = str(
cfg_get(_appr_cfg, "approvals", "mode", default="manual") or "manual"
).strip().lower()
_tirith_on = bool(cfg_get(_appr_cfg, "security", "tirith_enabled", default=True))
_aux_approval = cfg_get(_appr_cfg, "auxiliary", "approval", default=None)
if _appr_mode == "manual" and not _tirith_on and not _aux_approval:
logger.warning(
"Gateway approvals.mode=manual with no automated risk "
"assessor (security.tirith_enabled is false and "
"auxiliary.approval is unset): dangerous commands and "
"execute_code scripts will BLOCK until a human approves "
"them in chat. Enable security.tirith_enabled or configure "
"auxiliary.approval for unattended operation."
)
except Exception:
logger.debug("approvals.mode startup check skipped", exc_info=True)
# Initialize session database for session_search tool support
self._session_db = None
try:
@@ -2301,6 +2330,32 @@ class GatewayRunner:
session_id=session_entry.session_id,
)
def _sync_telegram_topic_binding(
self,
source: SessionSource,
session_entry,
*,
reason: str,
) -> None:
"""Update the topic binding to point at ``session_entry.session_id``.
Telegram topic lanes persist a (chat_id, thread_id) -> session_id row
so reopening a topic in a fresh process resumes the right Hermes
session. When compression rotates ``session_entry.session_id`` mid-turn,
the binding goes stale and the next inbound message in that topic
reloads the oversized parent transcript instead of the compressed
child, retriggering preflight compression sometimes in a loop
(#20470, #29712, #33414).
"""
if not self._is_telegram_topic_lane(source):
return
try:
self._record_telegram_topic_binding(source, session_entry)
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"telegram topic binding refresh failed (%s)", reason, exc_info=True,
)
def _recover_telegram_topic_thread_id(
self,
source: SessionSource,
@@ -4157,6 +4212,7 @@ class GatewayRunner:
adapter.set_fatal_error_handler(self._handle_adapter_fatal_error)
adapter.set_session_store(self.session_store)
adapter.set_busy_session_handler(self._handle_active_session_busy_message)
adapter.set_topic_recovery_fn(self._recover_telegram_topic_thread_id)
adapter._busy_text_mode = self._busy_text_mode
# Try to connect
@@ -5418,6 +5474,49 @@ class GatewayRunner:
)
stale_timeout_seconds = 0
# Read kanban.default_assignee — fallback profile for tasks
# created without an explicit assignee (e.g. via the dashboard).
# When set, the dispatcher applies it to unassigned ready tasks
# instead of skipping them indefinitely (#27145). Empty string
# (the schema default) means "no fallback, keep skipping" —
# backward-compatible with existing installs.
default_assignee = (kanban_cfg.get("default_assignee") or "").strip() or None
if default_assignee:
logger.info(
"kanban dispatcher: default_assignee=%r (unassigned ready tasks "
"will route to this profile)",
default_assignee,
)
# Read kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile — per-profile concurrency
# cap (#21582). When set, no single profile gets more than N
# workers running at once, even if the global max_in_progress
# would allow it. Prevents one profile's local model / API quota
# / browser pool from being overwhelmed by a fan-out.
raw_per_profile = kanban_cfg.get("max_in_progress_per_profile", None)
max_in_progress_per_profile = None
if raw_per_profile is not None:
try:
max_in_progress_per_profile = int(raw_per_profile)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
logger.warning(
"kanban dispatcher: invalid kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile=%r; ignoring",
raw_per_profile,
)
max_in_progress_per_profile = None
else:
if max_in_progress_per_profile < 1:
logger.warning(
"kanban dispatcher: kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile=%r is below 1; ignoring",
raw_per_profile,
)
max_in_progress_per_profile = None
else:
logger.info(
"kanban dispatcher: max_in_progress_per_profile=%d",
max_in_progress_per_profile,
)
# Initial delay so the gateway finishes wiring adapters before the
# dispatcher spawns workers (those workers may hit gateway notify
# subscriptions etc.). Matches the notifier watcher's delay.
@@ -5509,6 +5608,8 @@ class GatewayRunner:
max_in_progress=max_in_progress,
failure_limit=failure_limit,
stale_timeout_seconds=stale_timeout_seconds,
default_assignee=default_assignee,
max_in_progress_per_profile=max_in_progress_per_profile,
)
except sqlite3.DatabaseError as exc:
if _is_corrupt_board_db_error(exc):
@@ -5817,6 +5918,7 @@ class GatewayRunner:
adapter.set_fatal_error_handler(self._handle_adapter_fatal_error)
adapter.set_session_store(self.session_store)
adapter.set_busy_session_handler(self._handle_active_session_busy_message)
adapter.set_topic_recovery_fn(self._recover_telegram_topic_thread_id)
adapter._busy_text_mode = self._busy_text_mode
success = await self._connect_adapter_with_timeout(adapter, platform)
@@ -6440,6 +6542,31 @@ class GatewayRunner:
return YuanbaoAdapter(config)
return None
def _adapter_enforces_own_access_policy(self, platform: Optional[Platform]) -> bool:
"""Whether the adapter for *platform* gates access at intake itself.
Mirrors ``BasePlatformAdapter.enforces_own_access_policy``. Adapters
such as WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, and QQBot evaluate their documented
``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` / ``allow_from`` config before a
message is dispatched to the gateway, so a message that reaches
``_is_user_authorized`` has already been authorized by the adapter.
Defaults to ``False`` when the adapter is unknown or doesn't expose
the flag.
"""
if not platform:
return False
# Some test helpers build a bare GatewayRunner via object.__new__ and
# never set ``adapters``; treat a missing/empty map as "no adapter"
# rather than raising (see pitfalls.md #17).
adapters = getattr(self, "adapters", None)
if not adapters:
return False
adapter = adapters.get(platform)
if adapter is None:
return False
return bool(getattr(adapter, "enforces_own_access_policy", False))
def _is_user_authorized(self, source: SessionSource) -> bool:
"""
Check if a user is authorized to use the bot.
@@ -6579,6 +6706,15 @@ class GatewayRunner:
global_allowlist = os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "").strip()
if not platform_allowlist and not group_user_allowlist and not group_chat_allowlist and not global_allowlist:
# No env allowlists configured. Adapters that own their own
# config-driven access policy (dm_policy / group_policy /
# allow_from / group_allow_from) already gated this message at
# intake — it would not have reached the gateway otherwise — so
# honor that decision instead of falling through to the
# env-only default-deny below, which would silently break
# `dm_policy: open` and config-only allowlists. (#34515)
if self._adapter_enforces_own_access_policy(source.platform):
return True
# No allowlists configured -- check global allow-all flag
return os.getenv("GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes"}
@@ -6686,6 +6822,20 @@ class GatewayRunner:
if config.unauthorized_dm_behavior != "pair": # non-default → explicit override
return config.unauthorized_dm_behavior
# Config-driven dm_policy (WeCom / Weixin / Yuanbao / QQBot). An
# allowlist or disabled DM policy means the operator restricted access,
# so unauthorized DMs should be dropped silently rather than answered
# with a pairing code. An explicit pairing policy opts back into codes.
if platform and config and hasattr(config, "platforms"):
platform_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform)
extra = getattr(platform_cfg, "extra", None) if platform_cfg else None
if isinstance(extra, dict):
dm_policy = str(extra.get("dm_policy") or "").strip().lower()
if dm_policy == "pairing":
return "pair"
if dm_policy in {"allowlist", "disabled"}:
return "ignore"
# No explicit override. Fall back to allowlist-aware default:
# if any allowlist is configured for this platform, silently drop
# unauthorized messages instead of sending pairing codes.
@@ -8230,6 +8380,28 @@ class GatewayRunner:
binding = None
if binding:
bound_session_id = str(binding.get("session_id") or "")
# Heal bindings that point at a pre-compression parent: walk
# the compression-continuation chain forward to its tip so the
# next message resumes the compressed child instead of
# reloading the oversized parent transcript (#20470/#29712/
# #33414). Returns the input unchanged when the session isn't
# a compression parent, so this is cheap and safe.
if bound_session_id and self._session_db is not None:
try:
canonical_session_id = self._session_db.get_compression_tip(
bound_session_id,
)
except Exception:
logger.debug(
"compression-tip lookup failed for %s",
bound_session_id, exc_info=True,
)
canonical_session_id = bound_session_id
if (
canonical_session_id
and canonical_session_id != bound_session_id
):
bound_session_id = canonical_session_id
if bound_session_id and bound_session_id != session_entry.session_id:
# Route the override through SessionStore so the session_key
# → session_id mapping is persisted to disk and the previous
@@ -8239,6 +8411,15 @@ class GatewayRunner:
switched = self.session_store.switch_session(session_key, bound_session_id)
if switched is not None:
session_entry = switched
# If the stored binding pointed at a parent, rewrite it to the
# canonical descendant now that we've followed the chain.
if (
bound_session_id
and bound_session_id != str(binding.get("session_id") or "")
):
self._sync_telegram_topic_binding(
source, session_entry, reason="compression-tip-walk",
)
else:
try:
self._record_telegram_topic_binding(source, session_entry)
@@ -8615,6 +8796,10 @@ class GatewayRunner:
if _hyg_new_sid != session_entry.session_id:
session_entry.session_id = _hyg_new_sid
self.session_store._save()
self._sync_telegram_topic_binding(
source, session_entry,
reason="hygiene-compression",
)
self.session_store.rewrite_transcript(
session_entry.session_id, _compressed
@@ -8880,6 +9065,9 @@ class GatewayRunner:
if agent_result.get("session_id") and agent_result["session_id"] != session_entry.session_id:
session_entry.session_id = agent_result["session_id"]
self.session_store._save()
self._sync_telegram_topic_binding(
source, session_entry, reason="agent-result-compression",
)
# Prepend reasoning/thinking if display is enabled (per-platform)
try:
@@ -12324,6 +12512,9 @@ class GatewayRunner:
if new_session_id != session_entry.session_id:
session_entry.session_id = new_session_id
self.session_store._save()
self._sync_telegram_topic_binding(
source, session_entry, reason="compress-command",
)
self.session_store.rewrite_transcript(new_session_id, compressed)
# Reset stored token count — transcript changed, old value is stale
-1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ piecemeal, the footer is sent as a separate trailing message via
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Iterable, Optional
_DEFAULT_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = ("model", "context_pct", "cwd")
+2 -2
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ Provides subcommands for:
import os
import sys
__version__ = "0.15.0"
__release_date__ = "2026.5.28"
__version__ = "0.15.1"
__release_date__ = "2026.5.29"
def _ensure_utf8():
+1 -3
View File
@@ -27,11 +27,9 @@ guarantee.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from typing import Optional, Sequence
from typing import Sequence
__all__ = [
"IS_WINDOWS",
+193 -516
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-4
View File
@@ -272,9 +272,6 @@ def auth_add_command(args) -> None:
print("Rehydrating Nous session from shared credentials...")
rehydrated = auth_mod._try_import_shared_nous_state(
timeout_seconds=getattr(args, "timeout", None) or 15.0,
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(
60, int(getattr(args, "min_key_ttl_seconds", 5 * 60))
),
)
if rehydrated is not None:
custom_label = (getattr(args, "label", None) or "").strip() or None
@@ -297,7 +294,6 @@ def auth_add_command(args) -> None:
timeout_seconds=getattr(args, "timeout", None) or 15.0,
insecure=bool(getattr(args, "insecure", False)),
ca_bundle=getattr(args, "ca_bundle", None),
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(60, int(getattr(args, "min_key_ttl_seconds", 5 * 60))),
)
# Honor `--label <name>` so nous matches other providers' UX. The
# helper embeds this into providers.nous so that label_from_token
-11
View File
@@ -50,17 +50,6 @@ def _skin_color(key: str, fallback: str) -> str:
return get_active_skin().get_color(key, fallback)
except Exception:
return fallback
def _skin_branding(key: str, fallback: str) -> str:
"""Get a branding string from the active skin, or return fallback."""
try:
from hermes_cli.skin_engine import get_active_skin
return get_active_skin().get_branding(key, fallback)
except Exception:
return fallback
# =========================================================================
# ASCII Art & Branding
# =========================================================================
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Subcommands:
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from typing import List, Optional
from typing import List
from rich.console import Console
from rich.table import Table
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import argparse
import time
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict
from typing import Any
def _fmt_bytes(n: int) -> str:
+69
View File
@@ -669,6 +669,27 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
# (force on/off for all models), or a list of model-name substrings
# to match (e.g. ["gpt", "codex", "gemini", "qwen"]).
"tool_use_enforcement": "auto",
# Universal "finish the job" guidance — short prompt block applied to
# all models that targets two cross-family failure modes: (1) stopping
# after a stub instead of finishing the artifact, (2) fabricating
# plausible-looking output when a real path is blocked. Costs ~80
# tokens in the cached system prompt. Set False to disable globally.
"task_completion_guidance": True,
# Local-environment toolchain probe — surfaces Python/pip/uv/PEP-668
# state in the system prompt when something non-default is detected
# (e.g. python3 has no pip module, pip→python version mismatch, PEP
# 668 enforcement without uv). Costs zero tokens when the env is
# clean (probe emits nothing). Skipped for remote terminal backends
# (docker/modal/ssh — they have their own probe). Set False to
# disable entirely.
"environment_probe": True,
# Embedder-supplied environment description appended to the system
# prompt's environment-hints block. Lets a host that wraps Hermes
# (sandbox runner, managed platform) explain the runtime environment
# — proxy, credential handling, mount layout — without editing the
# identity slot (SOUL.md). Empty by default. The HERMES_ENVIRONMENT_HINT
# env var overrides this (build-time/container mechanism).
"environment_hint": "",
# Staged inactivity warning: send a warning to the user at this
# threshold before escalating to a full timeout. The warning fires
# once per run and does not interrupt the agent. 0 = disable warning.
@@ -836,6 +857,11 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
"session_key": "",
# Rehydrate tab_id from Camofox before creating a new tab.
"adopt_existing_tab": False,
# Docker Camofox opens page URLs from inside the container. Enable
# this to rewrite loopback page URLs (localhost/127.0.0.1/::1) to a
# host alias while leaving CAMOFOX_URL itself unchanged.
"rewrite_loopback_urls": False,
"loopback_host_alias": "host.docker.internal",
},
},
@@ -1726,6 +1752,15 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
# assignee to any installed profile. When unset, falls back to the
# default profile. A task never ends up with assignee=None.
"default_assignee": "",
# Per-profile concurrency cap (#21582). When set to a positive int,
# no single profile can have more than N workers running at once,
# even if the global max_in_progress / max_spawn caps would allow
# it. Tasks blocked this way defer to the next dispatcher tick.
# Unset (None) means "no per-profile cap" — backward-compatible
# with existing installs. Useful for fan-out workflows that would
# otherwise saturate one profile's local model / API quota /
# browser pool while leaving other profiles idle.
"max_in_progress_per_profile": None,
# When true, the kanban dispatcher auto-runs the decomposer on
# tasks that land in Triage (every dispatcher tick). When false,
# decomposition is manual via `hermes kanban decompose <id>` or
@@ -1757,6 +1792,38 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
"mode": "project",
},
# Tool Search (progressive disclosure for large tool surfaces).
# When the model is connected to many MCP servers or non-core plugin
# tools, their JSON schemas can consume a substantial fraction of the
# context window on every turn. When enabled, those tools are replaced
# in the model-facing tools array with three bridge tools —
# tool_search / tool_describe / tool_call — and surfaced on demand.
#
# Core Hermes tools (terminal, read_file, write_file, patch,
# search_files, todo, memory, browser_*, etc.) are NEVER deferred.
# See tools/tool_search.py for full design notes and the
# openclaw-tool-search-report PDF in this PR for the rationale.
"tools": {
"tool_search": {
# "auto" (default) — activate only when deferrable tool schemas
# exceed ``threshold_pct`` of the active model's context length,
# so small toolsets pay no overhead.
# "on" — always activate when there is at least one deferrable
# tool. Use when you have many MCP servers and want maximum
# token reduction unconditionally.
# "off" — disable entirely. Tools-array assembly is a pass-through.
"enabled": "auto",
# Percentage of context length at which "auto" mode kicks in.
# 10 matches the Claude Code default. Range 0..100.
"threshold_pct": 10,
# When the model calls tool_search without a ``limit`` argument,
# how many hits to return. Range 1..max_search_limit.
"search_default_limit": 5,
# Hard upper bound the model can request via ``limit``. Range 1..50.
"max_search_limit": 20,
},
},
# Logging — controls file logging to ~/.hermes/logs/.
# agent.log captures INFO+ (all agent activity); errors.log captures WARNING+.
"logging": {
@@ -5551,6 +5618,8 @@ def set_config_value(key: str, value: str):
"terminal.daytona_image": "TERMINAL_DAYTONA_IMAGE",
"terminal.docker_mount_cwd_to_workspace": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_MOUNT_CWD_TO_WORKSPACE",
"terminal.docker_run_as_host_user": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_RUN_AS_HOST_USER",
"terminal.docker_persist_across_processes": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_PERSIST_ACROSS_PROCESSES",
"terminal.docker_orphan_reaper": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ORPHAN_REAPER",
"terminal.docker_env": "TERMINAL_DOCKER_ENV",
# terminal.cwd intentionally excluded — CLI resolves at runtime,
# gateway bridges it in gateway/run.py. Persisting to .env causes
+20 -1
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,15 @@ from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import ProviderError
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import read_session_cookies
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import PUBLIC_API_PATHS
_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Paths that bypass the auth gate. Order matters: prefix match.
# Prefixes that bypass the auth gate. Match via ``path == prefix`` or
# ``path.startswith(prefix)`` — so ``/assets/`` (with trailing slash)
# matches ``/assets/foo.css`` but not ``/assetsleak``. Auth-bootstrap
# (login page, OAuth round trip, provider listing) and static asset
# mounts go here.
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"/auth/login",
"/auth/callback",
@@ -45,6 +50,20 @@ _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
def _path_is_public(path: str) -> bool:
"""True if ``path`` bypasses the OAuth auth gate.
Two sources of public-ness:
* :data:`PUBLIC_API_PATHS` the shared ``/api/*`` allowlist that
the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` middleware also honours. Matched
exactly (no prefix expansion) so adding ``/api/status`` doesn't
accidentally expose ``/api/status/secret-extension``.
* :data:`_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES` auth-bootstrap routes and static
mounts. Prefix-matched so ``/assets/foo.css`` lights up via
``/assets/``.
"""
if path in PUBLIC_API_PATHS:
return True
return any(
path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix)
for prefix in _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
"""Shared allowlist of ``/api/*`` paths that bypass dashboard auth.
Two middlewares enforce dashboard auth and previously kept independent
copies of this list:
* ``hermes_cli.web_server.auth_middleware`` loopback / ``--insecure``
mode, gates on the ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN``.
* ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware.gated_auth_middleware``
non-loopback mode, gates on the OAuth session cookie.
When the lists drifted, ``/api/status`` ended up public under the legacy
gate but 401'd under the OAuth gate. That broke the portal's wildcard
liveness probe (``nous-account-service`` ``fly-provider.ts``
``getInstanceRuntimeStatus``), which fetches ``/api/status`` without a
cookie as its sole signal of "agent dashboard is alive": every healthy
wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down in the portal UI even
though the dashboard was serving correctly.
Centralising the allowlist here so both middlewares import the same
frozenset prevents the next drift. Keep this list minimal only truly
non-sensitive, read-only endpoints belong here. As a sanity check, every
entry should be safe to expose to:
* external uptime probes (Pingdom, Better Stack, NAS),
* the dashboard SPA before the user has logged in,
* anyone who happens to ``curl`` the hostname.
If a new endpoint doesn't pass all three tests, it should be gated and
the SPA should bootstrap it after login instead.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
PUBLIC_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
# Liveness probe target. Returns version, gateway state, active
# session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No bodies, no
# session content, no secrets. Documented as the portal's wildcard
# liveness probe in
# ``docs/agent-dashboard-public-url-contract.md`` (NAS side).
"/api/status",
# Read-only config-defaults / schema feeds for the SPA's Config page.
"/api/config/defaults",
"/api/config/schema",
# Read-only model metadata (context windows, etc.) — same shape as
# provider catalogs already exposed on the public internet.
"/api/model/info",
# Read-only theme + plugin manifests for the dashboard skin engine.
"/api/dashboard/themes",
"/api/dashboard/plugins",
})
-11
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ import logging
import re
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
@@ -260,15 +258,6 @@ def _schedule_auto_delete(urls: list[str], delay_seconds: int = _AUTO_DELETE_SEC
_record_pending(urls, delay_seconds=delay_seconds)
def _delete_hint(url: str) -> str:
"""Return a one-liner delete command for the given paste URL."""
paste_id = _extract_paste_id(url)
if paste_id:
return f"hermes debug delete {url}"
# dpaste.com — no API delete, expires on its own.
return "(auto-expires per dpaste.com policy)"
def _upload_paste_rs(content: str) -> str:
"""Upload to paste.rs. Returns the paste URL.
-1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import os
import sys
import subprocess
import shutil
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
from hermes_cli.config import get_project_root, get_hermes_home, get_env_path
-18
View File
@@ -3960,18 +3960,6 @@ def _setup_whatsapp():
cmd_whatsapp(argparse.Namespace())
def _setup_email():
"""Configure Email via the standard platform setup."""
email_platform = next(p for p in _PLATFORMS if p["key"] == "email")
_setup_standard_platform(email_platform)
def _setup_sms():
"""Configure SMS (Twilio) via the standard platform setup."""
sms_platform = next(p for p in _PLATFORMS if p["key"] == "sms")
_setup_standard_platform(sms_platform)
def _setup_dingtalk():
"""Configure DingTalk — QR scan (recommended) or manual credential entry."""
from hermes_cli.setup import (
@@ -4144,12 +4132,6 @@ def _setup_wecom():
print_success("💬 WeCom configured!")
def _setup_yuanbao():
"""Configure Yuanbao via the standard platform setup."""
yuanbao_platform = next(p for p in _PLATFORMS if p["key"] == "yuanbao")
_setup_standard_platform(yuanbao_platform)
def _is_service_installed() -> bool:
"""Check if the gateway is installed as a system service."""
if supports_systemd_services():
+68 -2
View File
@@ -548,6 +548,11 @@ def build_parser(parent_subparsers: argparse._SubParsersAction) -> argparse.Argu
help="Additional task ids to schedule with the same reason (bulk mode)")
p_unblock = sub.add_parser("unblock", help="Return one or more blocked/scheduled tasks to ready")
p_unblock.add_argument(
"--reason",
default=None,
help="Optional reason/note — recorded as a comment before unblocking. Quote multi-word reasons.",
)
p_unblock.add_argument("task_ids", nargs="+")
p_promote = sub.add_parser(
@@ -1978,14 +1983,20 @@ def _cmd_unblock(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
if not ids:
print("at least one task_id is required", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
reason = getattr(args, "reason", None)
if reason is not None:
reason = reason.strip() or None
author = _profile_author() if reason else None
failed: list[str] = []
with kb.connect_closing() as conn:
for tid in ids:
if reason:
kb.add_comment(conn, tid, author, f"UNBLOCK: {reason}")
if not kb.unblock_task(conn, tid):
failed.append(tid)
print(f"cannot unblock {tid} (not blocked/scheduled?)", file=sys.stderr)
else:
print(f"Unblocked {tid}")
print(f"Unblocked {tid}" + (f": {reason}" if reason else ""))
return 0 if not failed else 1
@@ -2087,12 +2098,52 @@ def _cmd_tail(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
def _cmd_dispatch(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
# Honour kanban.default_assignee as the fallback for unassigned ready
# tasks (#27145), kanban.max_in_progress as the global concurrency cap
# (#33488), kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile as the per-profile
# cap (#21582), and kanban.max_spawn as the per-tick spawn limit
# (#28805). Same semantics as the gateway dispatch path so behavior
# matches whether the user runs the CLI directly or relies on the
# gateway-embedded dispatcher.
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
_cfg = load_config()
_kanban_cfg = _cfg.get("kanban", {}) if isinstance(_cfg, dict) else {}
default_assignee = (_kanban_cfg.get("default_assignee") or "").strip() or None
def _coerce_positive_int(value):
if value is None:
return None
try:
ival = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
return ival if ival >= 1 else None
max_in_progress_per_profile = _coerce_positive_int(
_kanban_cfg.get("max_in_progress_per_profile")
)
max_in_progress = _coerce_positive_int(_kanban_cfg.get("max_in_progress"))
# CLI --max overrides config kanban.max_spawn when both are present;
# CLI is the more explicit signal so it wins.
cli_max = getattr(args, "max", None)
max_spawn = cli_max if cli_max is not None else _coerce_positive_int(
_kanban_cfg.get("max_spawn")
)
except Exception:
default_assignee = None
max_in_progress_per_profile = None
max_in_progress = None
max_spawn = getattr(args, "max", None)
with kb.connect_closing() as conn:
res = kb.dispatch_once(
conn,
dry_run=args.dry_run,
max_spawn=args.max,
max_spawn=max_spawn,
max_in_progress=max_in_progress,
failure_limit=getattr(args, "failure_limit", kb.DEFAULT_SPAWN_FAILURE_LIMIT),
default_assignee=default_assignee,
max_in_progress_per_profile=max_in_progress_per_profile,
)
if getattr(args, "json", False):
print(json.dumps({
@@ -2108,6 +2159,11 @@ def _cmd_dispatch(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
],
"skipped_unassigned": res.skipped_unassigned,
"skipped_nonspawnable": res.skipped_nonspawnable,
"skipped_per_profile_capped": [
{"task_id": tid, "assignee": who, "current": current}
for (tid, who, current) in res.skipped_per_profile_capped
],
"auto_assigned_default": res.auto_assigned_default,
}, indent=2))
return 0
print(f"Reclaimed: {res.reclaimed}")
@@ -2128,8 +2184,18 @@ def _cmd_dispatch(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
for tid, who, ws in res.spawned:
tag = " (dry)" if args.dry_run else ""
print(f" - {tid} -> {who} @ {ws or '-'}{tag}")
if res.auto_assigned_default:
print(
f"Auto-assigned to kanban.default_assignee={default_assignee!r}: "
f"{', '.join(res.auto_assigned_default)}"
)
if res.skipped_unassigned:
print(f"Skipped (unassigned): {', '.join(res.skipped_unassigned)}")
if res.skipped_per_profile_capped:
for tid, who, current in res.skipped_per_profile_capped:
print(
f"Deferred ({who} at per-profile cap, {current} running): {tid}"
)
if res.skipped_nonspawnable:
print(
f"Skipped (non-spawnable assignee — terminal lane, OK): "
+166 -37
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ import threading
import logging
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Iterable, Optional
@@ -111,6 +110,16 @@ _IS_WINDOWS = sys.platform == "win32"
# long single-call MCP workflows.
DEFAULT_CLAIM_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
# If a worker's PID is still alive but its ``last_heartbeat_at`` is
# older than this when ``release_stale_claims`` runs, treat the worker
# as wedged and reclaim regardless of PID liveness (#29747 gap 3).
# This catches the logic-loop case where the process is technically
# running but not making observable progress. ``_touch_activity``
# bridges chunk-level liveness into ``last_heartbeat_at`` via #31752,
# so any genuinely active worker keeps its heartbeat fresh as a side
# effect of normal API traffic.
DEFAULT_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS = 60 * 60
def _resolve_claim_ttl_seconds(ttl_seconds: Optional[int] = None) -> int:
"""Return the effective claim TTL, honoring the kanban env override.
@@ -2741,9 +2750,19 @@ def release_stale_claims(
then-immediately-reclaim loop seen on slow models that spend longer
than ``DEFAULT_CLAIM_TTL_SECONDS`` inside a single tool-free LLM
call (#23025): no tool calls means no ``kanban_heartbeat``, even
though the subprocess is healthy. ``enforce_max_runtime`` and
``detect_crashed_workers`` remain the upper bounds for genuinely
wedged or dead workers.
though the subprocess is healthy.
Backstop (#29747 gap 3): if the worker's PID is still alive but its
``last_heartbeat_at`` is stale by more than
``DEFAULT_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS`` (1h), the worker has
been making no observable progress and we reclaim anyway even if
``_pid_alive`` is still true. This catches the wedged-in-a-logic-loop
case where the process is technically running but accomplishing
nothing. ``_touch_activity`` (run_agent.py) bridges chunk-level
liveness into ``last_heartbeat_at`` via #31752, so any genuinely
active worker keeps its heartbeat fresh as a side effect of normal
API traffic. ``enforce_max_runtime`` and ``detect_crashed_workers``
remain the upper bounds for genuinely wedged or dead workers.
Returns the number of stale claims actually reclaimed (live-pid
extensions don't count). Safe to call often.
@@ -2761,7 +2780,21 @@ def release_stale_claims(
for row in stale:
lock = row["claim_lock"] or ""
host_local = lock.startswith(host_prefix)
if host_local and row["worker_pid"] and _pid_alive(row["worker_pid"]):
hb = row["last_heartbeat_at"]
# Heartbeat staleness backstop: if we have a heartbeat at all
# and it's older than the max-stale threshold, the worker is
# not making observable progress. Reclaim instead of extending,
# even if the PID is still alive (it's likely in a logic loop).
heartbeat_stale = (
hb is not None
and (now - int(hb)) > DEFAULT_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS
)
if (
host_local
and row["worker_pid"]
and _pid_alive(row["worker_pid"])
and not heartbeat_stale
):
new_expires = now + _resolve_claim_ttl_seconds()
with write_txn(conn):
cur = conn.execute(
@@ -2830,6 +2863,7 @@ def release_stale_claims(
),
"now": now,
"host_local": host_local,
"heartbeat_stale": bool(heartbeat_stale),
}
payload.update(termination)
_append_event(
@@ -4289,6 +4323,12 @@ class DispatchResult:
skipped_unassigned: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
"""Ready task ids skipped because they have no assignee at all.
Operator-actionable usually a misfiled task waiting for routing."""
auto_assigned_default: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
"""Task ids that were unassigned in the DB and had
``kanban.default_assignee`` applied this tick before spawning (#27145).
Surfaces the auto-assignment to telemetry / CLI / dashboard so the
operator can see when the dispatcher is acting on the fallback rule
rather than on explicit per-task assignments."""
skipped_nonspawnable: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
"""Ready task ids skipped because their assignee names a control-plane
lane (a Claude Code terminal like ``orion-cc``) rather than a Hermes
@@ -4296,6 +4336,14 @@ class DispatchResult:
operator-actionable failure. Tracked separately so health telemetry
can distinguish "real stuck" (nothing spawned but spawnable work
available) from "correctly idle" (nothing spawnable in the queue)."""
skipped_per_profile_capped: list[tuple[str, str, int]] = field(default_factory=list)
"""Tasks deferred this tick because their assignee is already at
``kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile`` (#21582). Each entry is
``(task_id, assignee, current_running_count)``. NOT an
operator-actionable failure the task will be picked up on a
subsequent tick when the assignee has capacity. Separate bucket so
telemetry / dashboards can show "this profile is busy" vs
"task is genuinely stuck"."""
crashed: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
"""Task ids reclaimed because their worker PID disappeared."""
auto_blocked: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
@@ -4729,7 +4777,6 @@ def detect_stale_running(
if stale_timeout_seconds <= 0:
return []
import signal as _signal_mod
now = int(time.time())
host_prefix = f"{_claimer_id().split(':', 1)[0]}:"
@@ -4818,21 +4865,6 @@ def detect_stale_running(
return reclaimed
def set_max_runtime(
conn: sqlite3.Connection,
task_id: str,
seconds: Optional[int],
) -> bool:
"""Set or clear the per-task max_runtime_seconds. Returns True on
success."""
with write_txn(conn):
cur = conn.execute(
"UPDATE tasks SET max_runtime_seconds = ? WHERE id = ?",
(int(seconds) if seconds is not None else None, task_id),
)
return cur.rowcount == 1
def _error_fingerprint(error_text: str) -> str:
"""Normalize an error message for grouping identical failures.
@@ -5342,6 +5374,8 @@ def dispatch_once(
failure_limit: int = DEFAULT_SPAWN_FAILURE_LIMIT,
stale_timeout_seconds: int = 0,
board: Optional[str] = None,
default_assignee: Optional[str] = None,
max_in_progress_per_profile: Optional[int] = None,
) -> DispatchResult:
"""Run one dispatcher tick.
@@ -5427,12 +5461,89 @@ def dispatch_once(
if max_spawn is None or max_spawn > remaining:
max_spawn = remaining
spawned = 0
# Per-profile concurrency cap (#21582): when set, track how many
# workers each assignee already has in flight, and refuse to spawn
# when this would push that assignee past the cap. Prevents
# fan-out workloads from melting a single profile's local model /
# API quota / browser pool while leaving other profiles idle.
# Tasks blocked this way go to skipped_per_profile_capped (not
# skipped_unassigned — the operator-actionable signal is different:
# "this profile is busy, try again later" not "this needs routing").
_per_profile_cap = max_in_progress_per_profile if (
isinstance(max_in_progress_per_profile, int)
and max_in_progress_per_profile > 0
) else None
_per_profile_running: dict[str, int] = {}
if _per_profile_cap is not None:
for prow in conn.execute(
"SELECT assignee, COUNT(*) AS n FROM tasks "
"WHERE status = 'running' AND assignee IS NOT NULL "
"GROUP BY assignee"
):
_per_profile_running[prow["assignee"]] = int(prow["n"])
# Normalize default_assignee once: empty/whitespace string → None so the
# rest of the loop can use ``if default_assignee:`` as a single check.
# We also resolve profile_exists once here for the same reason.
_default_assignee = (default_assignee or "").strip() or None
_default_assignee_resolved = False
if _default_assignee:
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import profile_exists as _pe
_default_assignee_resolved = bool(_pe(_default_assignee))
except Exception:
# Profiles module not importable (test stubs, exotic envs).
# Trust the operator's config and try the assignment; the
# downstream profile_exists check on the assigned row will
# bucket it as nonspawnable if the profile genuinely isn't
# there, with the existing diagnostic.
_default_assignee_resolved = True
for row in ready_rows:
if max_spawn is not None and running_count + spawned >= max_spawn:
break
if not row["assignee"]:
result.skipped_unassigned.append(row["id"])
continue
row_assignee = row["assignee"]
if not row_assignee:
# Honour kanban.default_assignee: when the dispatcher hits an
# unassigned ready task and an operator-configured fallback
# exists, persist the assignment and proceed. This removes the
# dashboard footgun where a task created without an assignee
# parks in 'ready' forever even though the operator's intent
# ("default") was perfectly clear (#27145). Mutating the row
# (not just the in-memory view) keeps diagnostics and the
# board state consistent: the task is now legitimately owned
# by ``kanban.default_assignee``, not "unassigned but secretly
# routed".
if _default_assignee and _default_assignee_resolved:
# Dry-run: show what WOULD happen (auto-assign + spawn) without
# mutating the DB. Real run: mutate the row + emit the
# 'assigned' event so the board state matches what just happened.
if not dry_run:
try:
with write_txn(conn):
conn.execute(
"UPDATE tasks SET assignee = ? WHERE id = ? "
"AND (assignee IS NULL OR assignee = '')",
(_default_assignee, row["id"]),
)
_append_event(
conn, row["id"], "assigned",
{
"assignee": _default_assignee,
"source": "kanban.default_assignee",
},
)
except Exception:
_log.debug(
"kanban dispatch: failed to apply default_assignee=%r "
"to task %s",
_default_assignee, row["id"], exc_info=True,
)
result.skipped_unassigned.append(row["id"])
continue
row_assignee = _default_assignee
result.auto_assigned_default.append(row["id"])
else:
result.skipped_unassigned.append(row["id"])
continue
# Skip ready tasks whose assignee is not a real Hermes profile.
# `_default_spawn` invokes ``hermes -p <assignee>`` which fails
# with "Profile 'X' does not exist" when the assignee names a
@@ -5447,7 +5558,7 @@ def dispatch_once(
from hermes_cli.profiles import profile_exists # local import: avoids cycle
except Exception:
profile_exists = None # type: ignore[assignment]
if profile_exists is not None and not profile_exists(row["assignee"]):
if profile_exists is not None and not profile_exists(row_assignee):
# Bucket separately from skipped_unassigned: the operator
# cannot fix this by assigning a profile (the assignee IS the
# intended owner — a terminal lane). Health telemetry uses
@@ -5456,6 +5567,19 @@ def dispatch_once(
# of human-pulled work.
result.skipped_nonspawnable.append(row["id"])
continue
# Per-profile concurrency cap (#21582): even if there's global
# headroom, refuse to spawn for an assignee that's already at
# its in-flight cap. Prevents one profile's local model / API
# quota / browser pool from being overwhelmed by a fan-out
# while the global max_in_progress / max_spawn caps still allow
# work on OTHER profiles.
if _per_profile_cap is not None:
current = _per_profile_running.get(row_assignee, 0)
if current >= _per_profile_cap:
result.skipped_per_profile_capped.append(
(row["id"], row_assignee, current)
)
continue
# Respawn guard: refuse to re-spawn when useful work is already
# in-flight/recent, or when the last failure is a deterministic
# blocker (quota / auth). The guard defers the spawn this tick so
@@ -5478,7 +5602,15 @@ def dispatch_once(
)
continue
if dry_run:
result.spawned.append((row["id"], row["assignee"], ""))
result.spawned.append((row["id"], row_assignee, ""))
# Increment per-profile counter even in dry_run so the cap
# check sees the would-be spawn on subsequent iterations.
# Without this, dry_run reports every task as spawnable and
# under-reports the capped subset (#21582).
if _per_profile_cap is not None and row_assignee:
_per_profile_running[row_assignee] = (
_per_profile_running.get(row_assignee, 0) + 1
)
continue
claimed = claim_task(conn, row["id"], ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds)
if claimed is None:
@@ -5521,6 +5653,13 @@ def dispatch_once(
# complete_task).
result.spawned.append((claimed.id, claimed.assignee or "", str(workspace)))
spawned += 1
# Track the new in-flight count for this profile so later
# iterations in this same tick respect the per-profile cap
# (#21582). Subsequent ticks re-query from the DB.
if _per_profile_cap is not None and claimed.assignee:
_per_profile_running[claimed.assignee] = (
_per_profile_running.get(claimed.assignee, 0) + 1
)
except Exception as exc:
auto = _record_spawn_failure(
conn, claimed.id, str(exc),
@@ -6362,7 +6501,7 @@ def _to_epoch(val) -> Optional[int]:
pass
# ISO-8601 fallback (e.g. '2026-05-10T15:00:00Z')
try:
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from datetime import datetime
dt = datetime.fromisoformat(s.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
return int(dt.timestamp())
except (ValueError, OSError):
@@ -6813,16 +6952,6 @@ def get_run(conn: sqlite3.Connection, run_id: int) -> Optional[Run]:
return Run.from_row(row) if row else None
def active_run(conn: sqlite3.Connection, task_id: str) -> Optional[Run]:
"""Return the currently-open run for ``task_id`` (``ended_at IS NULL``)."""
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM task_runs WHERE task_id = ? AND ended_at IS NULL "
"ORDER BY started_at DESC LIMIT 1",
(task_id,),
).fetchone()
return Run.from_row(row) if row else None
def latest_run(conn: sqlite3.Connection, task_id: str) -> Optional[Run]:
"""Return the most recent run regardless of outcome (active or closed)."""
row = conn.execute(
+79 -30
View File
@@ -191,23 +191,6 @@ def _active_hallucination_events(
elif k == kind:
active.append(ev)
return active
def _latest_clean_event_ts(events: Iterable[Any]) -> int:
"""Timestamp of the most recent clean completion / edit event.
Kept for general "has this task ever been successfully completed"
lookups; hallucination rules use ``_active_hallucination_events``
instead because they need strict ordering.
"""
latest = 0
for ev in events:
if _event_kind(ev) in {"completed", "edited"}:
t = _event_ts(ev)
latest = max(latest, t)
return latest
# Standard always-available actions. Every diagnostic can offer these as
# fallbacks regardless of kind — they're the two baseline recovery
# primitives the kernel supports.
@@ -791,6 +774,83 @@ def _rule_stuck_in_blocked(task, events, runs, now, cfg) -> list[Diagnostic]:
)]
def _rule_block_unblock_cycling(task, events, runs, now, cfg) -> list[Diagnostic]:
"""Task has cycled through blocked → unblocked many times — the
``unblock`` is not fixing the underlying problem and the worker
keeps re-blocking for substantially the same reason.
``_rule_stuck_in_blocked`` resets its timer on any ``commented`` /
``unblocked`` event, so a task that cycles every few minutes is
invisible to it regardless of how many times it cycles (#29747
gap 1). This rule complements that one by counting blockunblock
cycles in a sliding window.
Threshold: cfg["block_cycle_threshold"] (default 3) cycles within
cfg["block_cycle_window_seconds"] (default 24h).
"""
threshold = _positive_int(cfg.get("block_cycle_threshold"), 3)
window_seconds = float(cfg.get("block_cycle_window_seconds", 24 * 3600))
cycle_cutoff = now - window_seconds
# Walk events chronologically (arrival order — callers pre-sort by
# id, which is the canonical chronological order; ``created_at``
# alone is insufficient because multiple events can share the same
# second). Count "blocked after unblocked" transitions: every time
# a blocked event follows at least one unblocked event since the
# last cycle was counted, that's a new cycle.
cycles = 0
seen_unblock_since_last_cycle = False
initial_blocked_ts = 0
last_cycle_blocked_ts = 0
for ev in events:
ts = _event_ts(ev)
if ts < cycle_cutoff:
continue
kind = _event_kind(ev)
if kind == "blocked":
if initial_blocked_ts == 0:
initial_blocked_ts = ts
if seen_unblock_since_last_cycle:
cycles += 1
last_cycle_blocked_ts = ts
seen_unblock_since_last_cycle = False
elif kind == "unblocked":
seen_unblock_since_last_cycle = True
if cycles < threshold:
return []
task_id = _task_field(task, "id")
actions: list[DiagnosticAction] = []
if task_id:
actions.append(DiagnosticAction(
kind="cli_hint",
label=f"Check block reasons: hermes kanban events {task_id}",
payload={"command": f"hermes kanban events {task_id}"},
suggested=True,
))
return [Diagnostic(
kind="block_unblock_cycling",
severity="warning",
title=f"Task block→unblock cycled {cycles}x in {int(window_seconds/3600)}h",
detail=(
f"This task has been blocked {cycles} times after being "
"unblocked, suggesting the unblock is not addressing the "
"root cause and the worker keeps hitting the same wall. "
"Review the block reasons in the event history; a different "
"intervention (reassign, change scope, archive) may be needed."
),
actions=actions,
first_seen_at=int(initial_blocked_ts) if initial_blocked_ts else int(now),
last_seen_at=int(last_cycle_blocked_ts) if last_cycle_blocked_ts else int(now),
count=cycles,
data={
"cycles": cycles,
"window_seconds": int(window_seconds),
},
)]
def _rule_stranded_in_ready(task, events, runs, now, cfg) -> list[Diagnostic]:
"""Task has been in ``ready`` status for too long without any worker
claiming it.
@@ -923,6 +983,7 @@ _RULES: list[RuleFn] = [
_rule_repeated_failures,
_rule_repeated_crashes,
_rule_stuck_in_blocked,
_rule_block_unblock_cycling,
_rule_stranded_in_ready,
]
@@ -936,6 +997,7 @@ DIAGNOSTIC_KINDS = (
"repeated_failures",
"repeated_crashes",
"stuck_in_blocked",
"block_unblock_cycling",
"stranded_in_ready",
)
@@ -1043,16 +1105,3 @@ def compute_task_diagnostics(
)
)
return out
def severity_of_highest(diagnostics: Iterable[Diagnostic]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Highest severity present in the list, or None if empty. Useful
for card badges that need a single color."""
highest_idx = -1
highest = None
for d in diagnostics:
idx = SEVERITY_ORDER.index(d.severity) if d.severity in SEVERITY_ORDER else -1
if idx > highest_idx:
highest_idx = idx
highest = d.severity
return highest
+1 -1
View File
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ def create_swarm(
priority=priority,
workspace_kind=workspace_kind,
workspace_path=workspace_path,
skills=["avoid-ai-writing"],
skills=["humanizer"],
)
created = SwarmCreated(root, worker_ids, verifier, synthesizer)
+31 -32
View File
@@ -3004,7 +3004,6 @@ def _model_flow_nous(config, current_model="", args=None):
"""Nous Portal provider: ensure logged in, then pick model."""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
get_provider_auth_state,
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
_prompt_model_selection,
_save_model_choice,
_update_config_for_provider,
@@ -3072,7 +3071,7 @@ def _model_flow_nous(config, current_model="", args=None):
# Verify credentials are still valid (catches expired sessions early)
try:
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(min_key_ttl_seconds=5 * 60)
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials()
except Exception as exc:
relogin = isinstance(exc, AuthError) and exc.relogin_required
msg = format_auth_error(exc) if isinstance(exc, AuthError) else str(exc)
@@ -3106,14 +3105,13 @@ def _model_flow_nous(config, current_model="", args=None):
if not free_tier:
try:
refreshed_creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=5 * 60,
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
force_refresh=True,
)
if refreshed_creds:
creds = refreshed_creds
except Exception:
# Runtime inference has its own paid-entitlement recovery path; do
# not block model selection if this opportunistic remint fails.
# not block model selection if this opportunistic refresh fails.
pass
# Resolve portal URL early — needed both for upgrade links and for the
@@ -5593,7 +5591,6 @@ def _model_flow_bedrock(config, current_model=""):
def _model_flow_api_key_provider(config, provider_id, current_model=""):
"""Generic flow for API-key providers (z.ai, MiniMax, OpenCode, etc.)."""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
LMSTUDIO_NOAUTH_PLACEHOLDER,
PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
_prompt_model_selection,
_save_model_choice,
@@ -6163,13 +6160,6 @@ def cmd_webhook(args):
webhook_command(args)
def cmd_portal(args):
"""Nous Portal status and Tool Gateway routing surface."""
from hermes_cli.portal_cli import portal_command
return portal_command(args)
def cmd_slack(args):
"""Slack integration helpers.
@@ -10978,24 +10968,6 @@ def cmd_logs(args):
since=getattr(args, "since", None),
component=getattr(args, "component", None),
)
def _build_provider_choices() -> list[str]:
"""Build the --provider choices list from CANONICAL_PROVIDERS + 'auto'."""
try:
from hermes_cli.models import CANONICAL_PROVIDERS as _cp
return ["auto"] + [p.slug for p in _cp]
except Exception:
# Fallback: static list guarantees the CLI always works
return [
"auto", "openrouter", "nous", "openai-codex", "xai-oauth", "copilot-acp", "copilot",
"anthropic", "gemini", "google-gemini-cli", "xai", "bedrock", "azure-foundry",
"ollama-cloud", "huggingface", "zai", "kimi-coding", "kimi-coding-cn",
"stepfun", "minimax", "minimax-cn", "kilocode", "novita", "xiaomi", "arcee",
"nvidia", "deepseek", "alibaba", "qwen-oauth", "opencode-zen", "opencode-go",
]
# Top-level subcommands that argparse knows about WITHOUT running plugin
# discovery. Used to short-circuit eager plugin imports (which can take
# 500ms+ pulling in google.cloud.pubsub_v1, aiohttp, grpc, etc.) when the
@@ -12911,7 +12883,34 @@ Examples:
)
plugins_remove.add_argument("name", help="Plugin directory name to remove")
plugins_subparsers.add_parser("list", aliases=["ls"], help="List installed plugins")
plugins_list = plugins_subparsers.add_parser(
"list", aliases=["ls"], help="List installed plugins"
)
plugins_list.add_argument(
"--enabled",
action="store_true",
help="Show only enabled plugins",
)
plugins_list.add_argument(
"--user",
action="store_true",
help="Show only user-installed plugins (including git plugins)",
)
plugins_list.add_argument(
"--no-bundled",
action="store_true",
help="Hide bundled plugins",
)
plugins_list.add_argument(
"--plain",
action="store_true",
help="Print compact plain-text output instead of a Rich table",
)
plugins_list.add_argument(
"--json",
action="store_true",
help="Print machine-readable JSON",
)
plugins_enable = plugins_subparsers.add_parser(
"enable", help="Enable a disabled plugin"
+1 -2
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ See references/mcp-catalog.md (this repo's skill) for the manifest schema.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ from hermes_cli.config import (
get_env_value,
save_env_value,
)
from hermes_cli.cli_output import prompt as _prompt_input, prompt_yes_no
from hermes_cli.cli_output import prompt as _prompt_input
_MANIFEST_VERSION = 1
+35 -1
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,15 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
DEFAULT_CATALOG_URL = (
"https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/api/model-catalog.json"
)
# Fallback fetch chain. The Docusaurus site is served through Vercel, which
# occasionally returns HTTP 403 + x-vercel-mitigated: challenge for non-
# browser clients (urllib, curl). When that happens the disk cache goes
# stale and new model releases never reach the picker. The raw GitHub URL
# is the same manifest published from the same repo and is not bot-gated,
# so we fall through to it whenever the primary URL fails.
DEFAULT_CATALOG_FALLBACK_URLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/main/website/static/api/model-catalog.json",
)
DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS = 24
DEFAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT = 8.0
SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
@@ -139,6 +148,31 @@ def _fetch_manifest(url: str, timeout: float) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
return data
def _fetch_manifest_with_fallback(
primary_url: str,
timeout: float,
fallback_urls: tuple[str, ...] = DEFAULT_CATALOG_FALLBACK_URLS,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Try ``primary_url`` first, then walk ``fallback_urls``.
Returns the first manifest that fetches and validates, or None when
every URL fails. Skips fallback URLs identical to the primary so an
operator who configured the catalog URL to point at the raw GitHub
copy doesn't double-fetch.
"""
data = _fetch_manifest(primary_url, timeout)
if data is not None:
return data
for url in fallback_urls:
if not url or url == primary_url:
continue
data = _fetch_manifest(url, timeout)
if data is not None:
logger.info("model catalog primary URL failed; using fallback %s", url)
return data
return None
def _validate_manifest(data: Any) -> bool:
"""Return True when ``data`` matches the minimum manifest shape."""
if not isinstance(data, dict):
@@ -235,7 +269,7 @@ def get_catalog(*, force_refresh: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
return disk_data
# Need to (re)fetch. If it fails, fall back to any stale disk copy.
fetched = _fetch_manifest(cfg["url"], DEFAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT)
fetched = _fetch_manifest_with_fallback(cfg["url"], DEFAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT)
if fetched is not None:
_write_disk_cache(fetched)
new_disk_data, new_mtime = _read_disk_cache()
+1 -15
View File
@@ -277,19 +277,6 @@ class ModelSwitchResult:
capabilities: Optional[ModelCapabilities] = None
model_info: Optional[ModelInfo] = None
is_global: bool = False
@dataclass
class CustomAutoResult:
"""Result of switching to bare 'custom' provider with auto-detect."""
success: bool
model: str = ""
base_url: str = ""
api_key: str = ""
error_message: str = ""
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Flag parsing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1085,8 +1072,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
from hermes_cli.models import (
OPENROUTER_MODELS, _PROVIDER_MODELS,
_MODELS_DEV_PREFERRED, _merge_with_models_dev, provider_model_ids,
cached_provider_model_ids,
_MODELS_DEV_PREFERRED, _merge_with_models_dev, cached_provider_model_ids,
get_curated_nous_model_ids,
)
+2 -99
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ OPENROUTER_MODELS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
("google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview", ""),
("google/gemini-3.1-flash-lite-preview", ""),
("qwen/qwen3.6-35b-a3b", ""),
("stepfun/step-3.5-flash", ""),
("stepfun/step-3.7-flash", ""),
("minimax/minimax-m2.7", ""),
("z-ai/glm-5.1", ""),
("x-ai/grok-4.20", ""),
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ _PROVIDER_MODELS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
"google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview",
"google/gemini-3.1-flash-lite-preview",
"qwen/qwen3.6-35b-a3b",
"stepfun/step-3.5-flash",
"stepfun/step-3.7-flash",
"minimax/minimax-m2.7",
"z-ai/glm-5.1",
"x-ai/grok-4.3",
@@ -484,41 +484,6 @@ def _is_model_free(model_id: str, pricing: dict[str, dict[str, str]]) -> bool:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Nous Portal account tier detection
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def fetch_nous_account_tier(access_token: str, portal_base_url: str = "") -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Fetch the user's Nous Portal account/subscription info.
Calls ``<portal>/api/oauth/account`` with the OAuth access token.
Returns the parsed JSON dict on success, e.g.::
{
"subscription": {
"plan": "Plus",
"tier": 2,
"monthly_charge": 20,
"credits_remaining": 1686.60,
...
},
...
}
Returns an empty dict on any failure (network, auth, parse).
"""
base = (portal_base_url or "https://portal.nousresearch.com").rstrip("/")
url = f"{base}/api/oauth/account"
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
"Accept": "application/json",
}
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=8) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read().decode())
except Exception:
return {}
def is_nous_free_tier(account_info: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""Return True if the account info indicates a free (unpaid) tier.
@@ -1223,68 +1188,6 @@ def _format_price_per_mtok(per_token_str: str) -> str:
return f"${per_m:.2f}"
def format_model_pricing_table(
models: list[tuple[str, str]],
pricing_map: dict[str, dict[str, str]],
current_model: str = "",
indent: str = " ",
) -> list[str]:
"""Build a column-aligned model+pricing table for terminal display.
Returns a list of pre-formatted lines ready to print.
*models* is ``[(model_id, description), ...]``.
"""
if not models:
return []
# Build rows: (model_id, input_price, output_price, cache_price, is_current)
rows: list[tuple[str, str, str, str, bool]] = []
has_cache = False
for mid, _desc in models:
is_cur = mid == current_model
p = pricing_map.get(mid)
if p:
inp = _format_price_per_mtok(p.get("prompt", ""))
out = _format_price_per_mtok(p.get("completion", ""))
cache_read = p.get("input_cache_read", "")
cache = _format_price_per_mtok(cache_read) if cache_read else ""
if cache:
has_cache = True
else:
inp, out, cache = "", "", ""
rows.append((mid, inp, out, cache, is_cur))
name_col = max(len(r[0]) for r in rows) + 2
# Compute price column widths from the actual data so decimals align
price_col = max(
max((len(r[1]) for r in rows if r[1]), default=4),
max((len(r[2]) for r in rows if r[2]), default=4),
3, # minimum: "In" / "Out" header
)
cache_col = max(
max((len(r[3]) for r in rows if r[3]), default=4),
5, # minimum: "Cache" header
) if has_cache else 0
lines: list[str] = []
# Header
if has_cache:
lines.append(f"{indent}{'Model':<{name_col}} {'In':>{price_col}} {'Out':>{price_col}} {'Cache':>{cache_col}} /Mtok")
lines.append(f"{indent}{'-' * name_col} {'-' * price_col} {'-' * price_col} {'-' * cache_col}")
else:
lines.append(f"{indent}{'Model':<{name_col}} {'In':>{price_col}} {'Out':>{price_col}} /Mtok")
lines.append(f"{indent}{'-' * name_col} {'-' * price_col} {'-' * price_col}")
for mid, inp, out, cache, is_cur in rows:
marker = " ← current" if is_cur else ""
if has_cache:
lines.append(f"{indent}{mid:<{name_col}} {inp:>{price_col}} {out:>{price_col}} {cache:>{cache_col}}{marker}")
else:
lines.append(f"{indent}{mid:<{name_col}} {inp:>{price_col}} {out:>{price_col}}{marker}")
return lines
def fetch_models_with_pricing(
api_key: str | None = None,
base_url: str = "https://openrouter.ai/api",
-1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ so plugin-defined tools appear alongside the built-in tools.
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import importlib
import importlib.metadata
import importlib.util
import inspect
+68 -6
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ rendered with Rich Markdown. Otherwise a default confirmation is shown.
from __future__ import annotations
import functools
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
@@ -810,7 +811,29 @@ def _discover_all_plugins() -> list:
return list(seen.values())
def cmd_list() -> None:
def _plugin_status(name: str, enabled: set, disabled: set) -> str:
"""Return the user-facing activation state for a plugin name."""
if name in disabled:
return "disabled"
if name in enabled:
return "enabled"
return "not enabled"
def _filter_plugin_entries(entries: list, args: Any, enabled: set, disabled: set) -> list:
"""Apply ``hermes plugins list`` CLI filters."""
filtered = entries
if getattr(args, "no_bundled", False) or getattr(args, "user", False):
filtered = [entry for entry in filtered if entry[3] != "bundled"]
if getattr(args, "enabled", False):
filtered = [
entry for entry in filtered
if _plugin_status(entry[0], enabled, disabled) == "enabled"
]
return filtered
def cmd_list(args: Any | None = None) -> None:
"""List all plugins (bundled + user) with enabled/disabled state."""
from rich.console import Console
from rich.table import Table
@@ -824,6 +847,31 @@ def cmd_list() -> None:
enabled = _get_enabled_set()
disabled = _get_disabled_set()
entries = _filter_plugin_entries(entries, args, enabled, disabled)
if getattr(args, "json", False):
payload = [
{
"name": name,
"status": _plugin_status(name, enabled, disabled),
"version": str(version),
"description": description,
"source": source,
}
for name, version, description, source, _dir in entries
]
print(json.dumps(payload, indent=2))
return
if getattr(args, "plain", False):
for name, version, _description, source, _dir in entries:
status = _plugin_status(name, enabled, disabled)
print(f"{status:12} {source:8} {str(version):8} {name}")
return
if not entries:
console.print("[dim]No plugins matched the selected filters.[/dim]")
return
table = Table(title="Plugins", show_lines=False)
table.add_column("Name", style="bold")
@@ -833,9 +881,10 @@ def cmd_list() -> None:
table.add_column("Source", style="dim")
for name, version, description, source, _dir in entries:
if name in disabled:
status_name = _plugin_status(name, enabled, disabled)
if status_name == "disabled":
status = "[red]disabled[/red]"
elif name in enabled:
elif status_name == "enabled":
status = "[green]enabled[/green]"
else:
status = "[yellow]not enabled[/yellow]"
@@ -844,6 +893,7 @@ def cmd_list() -> None:
console.print()
console.print(table)
console.print()
console.print("[dim]Compact view:[/dim] hermes plugins list --plain --no-bundled")
console.print("[dim]Interactive toggle:[/dim] hermes plugins")
console.print("[dim]Enable/disable:[/dim] hermes plugins enable/disable <name>")
console.print("[dim]Plugins are opt-in by default — only 'enabled' plugins load.[/dim]")
@@ -1110,7 +1160,7 @@ def _run_composite_ui(curses, plugin_names, plugin_labels, plugin_selected,
stdscr.addnstr(0, 0, "Plugins", max_x - 1, hattr)
stdscr.addnstr(
1, 0,
" \u2191\u2193 navigate SPACE toggle ENTER configure/confirm ESC done",
" ↑↓/j/k navigate PgUp/PgDn page SPACE toggle ENTER configure/confirm ESC done",
max_x - 1, curses.A_DIM,
)
except curses.error:
@@ -1150,7 +1200,9 @@ def _run_composite_ui(curses, plugin_names, plugin_labels, plugin_selected,
pass
y += 1
for i in range(n_plugins):
plugin_start = scroll_offset
plugin_stop = min(n_plugins, scroll_offset + max(visible_rows, 0))
for i in range(plugin_start, plugin_stop):
if y >= max_y - 1:
break
check = "\u2713" if i in chosen else " "
@@ -1208,6 +1260,16 @@ def _run_composite_ui(curses, plugin_names, plugin_labels, plugin_selected,
elif key in {curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")}:
if total_items > 0:
cursor = (cursor + 1) % total_items
elif key in {curses.KEY_NPAGE, ord("f")}:
if total_items > 0:
cursor = min(total_items - 1, cursor + max(1, max_y - 5))
elif key in {curses.KEY_PPAGE, ord("b")}:
if total_items > 0:
cursor = max(0, cursor - max(1, max_y - 5))
elif key == curses.KEY_HOME:
cursor = 0
elif key == curses.KEY_END:
cursor = max(0, total_items - 1)
elif key == ord(" "):
if cursor < n_plugins:
# Toggle general plugin
@@ -1649,7 +1711,7 @@ def plugins_command(args) -> None:
elif action == "disable":
cmd_disable(args.name)
elif action in {"list", "ls"}:
cmd_list()
cmd_list(args)
elif action is None:
cmd_toggle()
else:
-14
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import sys
import webbrowser
from typing import Optional
from hermes_cli.colors import Colors, color
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
@@ -23,19 +22,6 @@ SUBSCRIPTION_URL = "https://portal.nousresearch.com/manage-subscription"
DOCS_URL = "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/tool-gateway"
def _nous_portal_base_url() -> str:
"""Resolve the Portal base URL from auth state or default."""
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_auth_status
status = get_nous_auth_status() or {}
url = status.get("portal_base_url")
if isinstance(url, str) and url.strip():
return url.rstrip("/")
except Exception:
pass
return DEFAULT_PORTAL_URL
def _cmd_status(args) -> int:
"""Show Portal auth + Tool Gateway routing summary."""
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_auth_status
-1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
-1
View File
@@ -940,7 +940,6 @@ def delete_profile(name: str, yes: bool = False) -> Path:
``sys.exc_info()`` tuple).
"""
import stat as _stat
import sys as _sys
# Normalise the two callback signatures:
# onexc(func, path, exc_instance) — 3.12+
+3 -4
View File
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ class UpstreamAdapter(ABC):
@abstractmethod
def get_credential(self) -> UpstreamCredential:
"""Return a fresh credential, refreshing/minting if necessary.
"""Return a fresh credential, refreshing or rotating if necessary.
Implementations should:
- refresh the access token if it's near expiry
- mint/rotate the upstream bearer key if it's near expiry
- rotate the upstream bearer key if it's near expiry
- persist any refreshed state back to disk
Raises:
@@ -90,8 +90,7 @@ class UpstreamAdapter(ABC):
"""Return an alternate credential after an upstream auth failure.
The default is no retry. Providers can override this for one-shot
fallback paths, such as switching from a preferred token type to a
legacy bearer after the upstream rejects the first request.
fallback paths after the upstream rejects the first request.
"""
_ = failed_credential, status_code
return None
+18 -24
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
"""Nous Portal upstream adapter.
Reads the user's Nous OAuth state from ``~/.hermes/auth.json`` through the
shared runtime resolver, refreshes the access token and resolves the
``agent_key`` compatibility credential when needed, then exposes the upstream
base URL plus bearer for the proxy server to forward to.
The ``agent_key`` field may hold either a NAS invoke JWT or the legacy
opaque session key. The refresh helper handles both see
:func:`hermes_cli.auth.resolve_nous_runtime_credentials`.
shared runtime resolver, validates or refreshes the inference JWT, then exposes
the upstream base URL plus bearer for the proxy server to forward to.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -19,8 +14,6 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, FrozenSet, Optional
from hermes_cli.auth import (
AuthError,
DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL,
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO,
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
_load_auth_store,
_auth_store_lock,
_is_terminal_nous_refresh_error,
@@ -72,17 +65,15 @@ class NousPortalAdapter(UpstreamAdapter):
state = self._read_state()
if state is None:
return False
# We need either a usable agent_key OR (refresh_token + access_token)
# to recover. The refresh helper will mint/refresh as needed.
# We need either a usable inference JWT OR (refresh_token + access_token)
# to recover. The refresh helper validates and refreshes as needed.
return bool(
state.get("agent_key")
or (state.get("refresh_token") and state.get("access_token"))
)
def get_credential(self) -> UpstreamCredential:
return self._get_credential(
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO,
)
return self._get_credential()
def get_retry_credential(
self,
@@ -90,16 +81,19 @@ class NousPortalAdapter(UpstreamAdapter):
failed_credential: UpstreamCredential,
status_code: int,
) -> Optional[UpstreamCredential]:
_ = failed_credential
if status_code != 401:
return None
if failed_credential.bearer.count(".") != 2:
return None
logger.info("proxy: Nous upstream rejected bearer; retrying with legacy session key")
logger.info("proxy: Nous upstream rejected bearer; force-refreshing invoke JWT")
return self._get_credential(
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_LEGACY,
force_refresh=True,
)
def _get_credential(self, *, inference_auth_mode: str) -> UpstreamCredential:
def _get_credential(
self,
*,
force_refresh: bool = False,
) -> UpstreamCredential:
with self._lock:
state = self._read_state()
if state is None:
@@ -109,7 +103,7 @@ class NousPortalAdapter(UpstreamAdapter):
try:
refreshed = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
inference_auth_mode=inference_auth_mode,
force_refresh=force_refresh,
)
except AuthError as exc:
if _is_terminal_nous_refresh_error(exc):
@@ -131,10 +125,10 @@ class NousPortalAdapter(UpstreamAdapter):
f"Failed to refresh Nous Portal credentials: {exc}"
) from exc
agent_key = refreshed.get("api_key")
if not agent_key:
runtime_key = refreshed.get("api_key")
if not runtime_key:
raise RuntimeError(
"Nous Portal refresh did not return a usable agent_key. "
"Nous Portal refresh did not return a usable inference JWT. "
"Try `hermes auth add nous` to re-authenticate."
)
@@ -145,7 +139,7 @@ class NousPortalAdapter(UpstreamAdapter):
base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
return UpstreamCredential(
bearer=agent_key,
bearer=runtime_key,
base_url=base_url,
expires_at=refreshed.get("expires_at"),
)
-12
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ or rewrite request/response bodies. It's a credential-attaching forwarder.
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import signal
from typing import Optional
@@ -105,17 +104,6 @@ def create_app(adapter: UpstreamAdapter) -> "web.Application":
}
)
async def handle_models_fallback(request: "web.Request") -> "web.Response":
# Most clients hit /v1/models on startup. If the upstream doesn't
# serve /models, synthesize a minimal response so clients don't
# crash. The actual forwarding path handles /models when allowed.
return web.json_response(
{
"object": "list",
"data": [],
}
)
async def handle_proxy(request: "web.Request") -> "web.StreamResponse":
# Extract the path *after* /v1
rel_path = request.match_info.get("tail", "")
+37
View File
@@ -81,3 +81,40 @@ def install_ctrl_enter_alias() -> int:
ANSI_SEQUENCES[seq] = alt_enter
changed += 1
return changed
def install_ignored_terminal_sequences() -> int:
"""Map terminal-emitted noise sequences to ``Keys.Ignore`` so they
are consumed by the VT100 parser before they reach key bindings or
the input buffer.
Currently covers focus reports:
- ``\\x1b[I`` terminal regained focus (focus in)
- ``\\x1b[O`` terminal lost focus (focus out)
Ghostty, iTerm2, and some xterm builds can emit these sequences when
the user switches tabs / windows or when a multiplexer toggles focus
tracking upstream. prompt_toolkit does not map these by default, so
its parser falls back to literal key presses (ESC, ``[``, ``I``/``O``)
and inserts ``[I``/``[O`` into the prompt buffer after the ESC byte
is handled.
Registering them as ``Keys.Ignore`` is parser-level strictly
cleaner than post-hoc regex stripping in the input sanitizer because
the bytes never reach the buffer. ``setdefault`` is used so any user
or downstream registration wins.
Returns the number of sequences whose mapping was changed.
"""
try:
from prompt_toolkit.input.ansi_escape_sequences import ANSI_SEQUENCES
from prompt_toolkit.keys import Keys
except Exception:
return 0
changed = 0
for seq in ("\x1b[I", "\x1b[O"):
if seq not in ANSI_SEQUENCES:
ANSI_SEQUENCES[seq] = Keys.Ignore
changed += 1
return changed
+13 -9
View File
@@ -1115,14 +1115,20 @@ def _resolve_explicit_runtime(
explicit_base_url
or str(state.get("inference_base_url") or auth_mod.DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL).strip().rstrip("/")
)
# Only use the agent_key compatibility field for inference. It may be
# either a NAS invoke JWT or a legacy opaque session key; raw OAuth
# access_token fallback is handled by resolve_nous_runtime_credentials().
api_key = explicit_api_key or str(state.get("agent_key") or "").strip()
# Only use the agent_key compatibility field for inference when it
# contains a NAS invoke JWT; raw OAuth access_token fallback is handled
# by resolve_nous_runtime_credentials().
api_key = explicit_api_key or (
str(state.get("agent_key") or "").strip()
if _agent_key_is_usable(
state,
max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800"))),
)
else ""
)
expires_at = state.get("agent_key_expires_at") or state.get("expires_at")
if not api_key:
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800"))),
timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "15")),
)
api_key = creds.get("api_key", "")
@@ -1309,12 +1315,11 @@ def resolve_runtime_provider(
or getattr(entry, "access_token", "")
)
# For Nous, the pool entry's runtime_api_key is the agent_key
# compatibility field: either an invoke JWT or legacy opaque key.
# The pool doesn't
# compatibility field. It must be an invoke JWT. The pool doesn't
# refresh it during selection (that would trigger network calls in
# non-runtime contexts like `hermes auth list`). If the key is
# expired, clear pool_api_key so we fall through to
# resolve_nous_runtime_credentials() which handles refresh + fallback.
# resolve_nous_runtime_credentials() which handles refresh.
if provider == "nous" and entry is not None and pool_api_key:
min_ttl = max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800")))
nous_state = {
@@ -1338,7 +1343,6 @@ def resolve_runtime_provider(
if provider == "nous":
try:
creds = resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
min_key_ttl_seconds=max(60, int(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_MIN_KEY_TTL_SECONDS", "1800"))),
timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("HERMES_NOUS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "15")),
)
return {
+1 -2
View File
@@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ import argparse
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
from typing import List, Optional
from rich.console import Console
from rich.panel import Panel
+1 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Iterable, Optional
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Iterable, Optional
from typing import Iterable, Optional
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
-3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ Config files are stored in ~/.hermes/ for easy access.
"""
import importlib.util
import json
import logging
import os
import re
@@ -782,7 +781,6 @@ def setup_model_provider(config: dict, *, quick: bool = False):
timeout=15.0,
insecure=False,
ca_bundle=None,
min_key_ttl_seconds=5 * 60,
)
)
pool = load_pool(selected_provider)
@@ -2976,7 +2974,6 @@ def _run_portal_one_shot(config: dict) -> None:
timeout=None,
insecure=False,
ca_bundle=None,
min_key_ttl_seconds=5 * 60,
)
try:
auth_add_command(ns)
-1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ Shows the status of all Hermes Agent components.
import os
import sys
import subprocess # noqa: F401 — re-exported for tests that monkeypatch status.subprocess to guard against regressions
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.resolve()
-1
View File
@@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ def _augment_path_with_known_tools() -> None:
if not is_windows():
return
import shutil as _shutil
local_appdata = os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA", "")
if not local_appdata:
+24 -27
View File
@@ -110,17 +110,20 @@ app.add_middleware(
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoints that do NOT require the session token. Everything else under
# /api/ is gated by the auth middleware below. Keep this list minimal —
# only truly non-sensitive, read-only endpoints belong here.
# /api/ is gated by the auth middleware below.
#
# This list is defined in ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths`` so the
# OAuth gate middleware can honour the same allowlist — keeping the two
# gates in lockstep avoids drift like the wildcard-subdomain regression
# where ``/api/status`` was public under the legacy gate but 401'd under
# the OAuth gate (breaking the portal's liveness probe).
#
# Keep the upstream list minimal — only truly non-sensitive, read-only
# endpoints belong there.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_PUBLIC_API_PATHS: frozenset = frozenset({
"/api/status",
"/api/config/defaults",
"/api/config/schema",
"/api/model/info",
"/api/dashboard/themes",
"/api/dashboard/plugins",
})
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import (
PUBLIC_API_PATHS as _PUBLIC_API_PATHS,
)
def _has_valid_session_token(request: Request) -> bool:
@@ -1895,8 +1898,7 @@ async def _start_device_code_flow(provider_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""
if provider_id == "nous":
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_nous_device_scope_with_env_override,
_request_nous_device_code_with_scope_fallback,
_request_device_code,
PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
)
import httpx
@@ -1907,22 +1909,21 @@ async def _start_device_code_flow(provider_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
or pconfig.portal_base_url
).rstrip("/")
client_id = pconfig.client_id
scope, explicit_scope = _nous_device_scope_with_env_override(
None,
default_scope=pconfig.scope,
)
scope = pconfig.scope
def _do_nous_device_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
return _request_nous_device_code_with_scope_fallback(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
scope=scope,
allow_legacy_fallback=not explicit_scope,
return (
_request_device_code(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
scope=scope,
),
scope,
)
device_data, effective_scope = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
@@ -2064,7 +2065,6 @@ async def _start_device_code_flow(provider_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
def _nous_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller that drives a Nous device-code flow to completion."""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_FRESH,
_poll_for_token,
refresh_nous_oauth_from_state,
)
@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ def _nous_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
expires_in=expires_in,
poll_interval=interval,
)
# Same post-processing as _nous_device_code_login (mint agent key)
# Same post-processing as _nous_device_code_login (validate/refresh JWT)
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
token_ttl = int(token_data.get("expires_in") or 0)
auth_state = {
@@ -2110,10 +2110,8 @@ def _nous_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
}
full_state = refresh_nous_oauth_from_state(
auth_state,
min_key_ttl_seconds=300,
timeout_seconds=15.0,
force_refresh=False,
inference_auth_mode=NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_FRESH,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import persist_nous_credentials
persist_nous_credentials(full_state)
@@ -3348,7 +3346,6 @@ async def get_models_analytics(days: int = 30):
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
import re
import asyncio
# PTY bridge is POSIX-only (depends on fcntl/termios/ptyprocess). On native
# Windows the import raises; catch and leave PtyBridge=None so the rest of
+93 -6
View File
@@ -296,19 +296,39 @@ def setup_verbose_logging() -> None:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class _ManagedRotatingFileHandler(RotatingFileHandler):
"""RotatingFileHandler that ensures group-writable perms in managed mode.
"""RotatingFileHandler that ensures group-writable perms in managed mode
AND survives external rotation.
In managed mode (NixOS), the stateDir uses setgid (2770) so new files
inherit the hermes group. However, both _open() (initial creation) and
doRollover() create files via open(), which uses the process umask
typically 0022, producing 0644. This subclass applies chmod 0660 after
both operations so the gateway and interactive users can share log files.
Two responsibilities:
1. In managed mode (NixOS), the stateDir uses setgid (2770) so new files
inherit the hermes group. However, both ``_open()`` (initial creation)
and ``doRollover()`` create files via ``open()``, which uses the
process umask typically 0022, producing 0644. This subclass applies
``chmod 0660`` after both operations so the gateway and interactive
users can share log files.
2. ``RotatingFileHandler`` keeps an open file descriptor. If anything
rotates the file *externally* (``logrotate``, manual ``mv``,
another process rotating under us, a transient unlink), our fd
keeps pointing at the renamed/unlinked inode and every subsequent
write goes to ``gateway.log.1`` instead of ``gateway.log`` silent
log loss for the file every operator expects to read. Before each
emit we ``stat`` ``baseFilename`` and compare it against the open
stream's inode; on mismatch we reopen. This is the same pattern
as stdlib ``WatchedFileHandler.reopenIfNeeded()``, adapted for
rotating handlers.
"""
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
from hermes_cli.config import is_managed
self._managed = is_managed()
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
# Snapshot the inode of the currently open stream so emit() can
# detect external rotation without an extra fstat per write.
self._stat_dev: Optional[int] = None
self._stat_ino: Optional[int] = None
self._record_stream_stat()
def _chmod_if_managed(self):
if self._managed:
@@ -317,6 +337,70 @@ class _ManagedRotatingFileHandler(RotatingFileHandler):
except OSError:
pass
def _record_stream_stat(self) -> None:
"""Snapshot dev/ino of ``baseFilename`` so we can detect external rotation."""
try:
st = os.stat(self.baseFilename)
self._stat_dev, self._stat_ino = st.st_dev, st.st_ino
except OSError:
self._stat_dev, self._stat_ino = None, None
def _reopen_if_externally_rotated(self) -> None:
"""Reopen the stream when ``baseFilename`` no longer matches our fd.
Triggered when ``baseFilename`` was renamed (logrotate), unlinked,
or replaced by a different inode. Silent + best-effort: any error
falls back to the existing (possibly stale) stream so logging keeps
working instead of dying on a stat failure.
"""
try:
st = os.stat(self.baseFilename)
except FileNotFoundError:
# File was rotated/unlinked underneath us. Close + reopen so a
# fresh inode is created at the expected path.
try:
if self.stream is not None:
self.stream.close()
except Exception:
pass
self.stream = None # type: ignore[assignment]
try:
self.stream = self._open()
self._record_stream_stat()
except Exception:
# Couldn't reopen — leave stream=None; next emit will
# bail rather than write to a stale inode.
pass
return
except OSError:
return # transient — try again on the next emit
if self._stat_dev is None or self._stat_ino is None:
self._stat_dev, self._stat_ino = st.st_dev, st.st_ino
return
if (st.st_dev, st.st_ino) != (self._stat_dev, self._stat_ino):
# baseFilename now points at a DIFFERENT inode than the one we
# hold open. Close the old stream and open the new file.
try:
if self.stream is not None:
self.stream.close()
except Exception:
pass
self.stream = None # type: ignore[assignment]
try:
self.stream = self._open()
self._stat_dev, self._stat_ino = st.st_dev, st.st_ino
except Exception:
pass
def emit(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> None:
# Cheap-ish stat-per-record check; the kernel caches inode metadata
# so the syscall is sub-microsecond on a hot file.
if self.stream is not None or os.path.exists(self.baseFilename):
self._reopen_if_externally_rotated()
super().emit(record)
def _open(self):
stream = super()._open()
self._chmod_if_managed()
@@ -325,6 +409,9 @@ class _ManagedRotatingFileHandler(RotatingFileHandler):
def doRollover(self):
super().doRollover()
self._chmod_if_managed()
# Our own rollover writes a new baseFilename; refresh the snapshot
# so the next emit doesn't mistake it for external rotation.
self._record_stream_stat()
def _add_rotating_handler(
+136 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ T = TypeVar("T")
DEFAULT_DB_PATH = get_hermes_home() / "state.db"
SCHEMA_VERSION = 13
SCHEMA_VERSION = 14
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WAL-compatibility fallback
@@ -281,10 +281,18 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS state_meta (
value TEXT
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS compression_locks (
session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
holder TEXT NOT NULL,
acquired_at REAL NOT NULL,
expires_at REAL NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_source ON sessions(source);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_parent ON sessions(parent_session_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_started ON sessions(started_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messages_session ON messages(session_id, timestamp);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_compression_locks_expires ON compression_locks(expires_at);
"""
FTS_SQL = """
@@ -791,6 +799,133 @@ class SessionDB:
)
self._execute_write(_do)
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Compression locks
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Atomic per-session locks that prevent two compression paths from
# racing on the same session_id and producing orphan child sessions.
#
# The race: ``conversation_compression.py`` rotates ``agent.session_id``
# as a side effect of a successful compression (end old session, create
# new). That mutation is local to the AIAgent instance — but ``state.db``
# is shared across all instances. Two AIAgents that share the same
# ``session_id`` at the moment they both decide to compress (most
# commonly the parent turn's agent + a background-review fork started
# right after the turn ended) each end the parent and create their own
# NEW session, parented to the same old id. The gateway SessionEntry
# only catches one rotation; the other child silently accumulates
# writes — Damien's "parent → two orphan children" repro shape.
#
# The lock is keyed by ``session_id`` and is held for the duration of
# the compress() call plus the rotation. ``holder`` identifies the
# current owner (pid:tid:nonce) for diagnostics; the lock is recovered
# via ``expires_at`` if the holder process crashed without releasing.
def try_acquire_compression_lock(
self,
session_id: str,
holder: str,
ttl_seconds: float = 300.0,
) -> bool:
"""Try to atomically acquire the compression lock for ``session_id``.
Returns ``True`` on success (caller now owns the lock and must
release via :meth:`release_compression_lock`). Returns ``False``
if another holder already owns a non-expired lock the caller
MUST NOT proceed with compression in that case (its rotation would
race against the holder's, splitting the session lineage).
Expired locks (``expires_at < now``) are reclaimed transparently:
the stale row is deleted and the new holder acquires it. This
prevents a crashed compressor from permanently blocking the
session.
Implementation: single-transaction DELETE-expired + INSERT-or-IGNORE,
followed by a SELECT to confirm we got the row. SQLite serialises
writes, so the whole sequence is atomic against other writers.
"""
if not session_id:
return False
now = time.time()
expires_at = now + ttl_seconds
def _do(conn):
# First: reclaim any expired lock for this session_id.
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM compression_locks "
"WHERE session_id = ? AND expires_at < ?",
(session_id, now),
)
# Then: try to insert. INSERT OR IGNORE returns no rowcount
# difference — verify ownership via SELECT.
conn.execute(
"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO compression_locks "
"(session_id, holder, acquired_at, expires_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
(session_id, holder, now, expires_at),
)
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT holder FROM compression_locks WHERE session_id = ?",
(session_id,),
).fetchone()
return row is not None and (
row["holder"] if isinstance(row, sqlite3.Row) else row[0]
) == holder
try:
return bool(self._execute_write(_do))
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
logger.warning(
"try_acquire_compression_lock(%s) failed: %s",
session_id, exc,
)
# Fail open: returning False makes the caller skip compression,
# which is the safe behaviour when the lock subsystem is broken.
return False
def release_compression_lock(self, session_id: str, holder: str) -> None:
"""Release the compression lock for ``session_id`` iff we own it.
Idempotent: no-op when the lock has already expired and been
reclaimed by a different holder, or when no lock exists. The
``holder`` check prevents a late-returning compressor from
clobbering a fresh lock held by someone else.
"""
if not session_id:
return
def _do(conn):
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM compression_locks "
"WHERE session_id = ? AND holder = ?",
(session_id, holder),
)
try:
self._execute_write(_do)
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
logger.warning(
"release_compression_lock(%s) failed: %s",
session_id, exc,
)
def get_compression_lock_holder(self, session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the current (non-expired) holder for ``session_id``, or None.
Diagnostic helper not used by the locking protocol itself.
"""
if not session_id:
return None
now = time.time()
row = self._conn.execute(
"SELECT holder FROM compression_locks "
"WHERE session_id = ? AND expires_at >= ?",
(session_id, now),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
return row["holder"] if isinstance(row, sqlite3.Row) else row[0]
def update_system_prompt(self, session_id: str, system_prompt: str) -> None:
"""Store the full assembled system prompt snapshot."""
def _do(conn):
+1 -5
View File
@@ -29,12 +29,8 @@ Usage:
import json
import logging
import os
import sys
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import List, Dict, Any, Optional, Literal
from typing import List, Dict, Any, Optional
import fire
from dotenv import load_dotenv
+149 -5
View File
@@ -262,9 +262,10 @@ def _clear_tool_defs_cache() -> None:
def get_tool_definitions(
enabled_toolsets: List[str] = None,
disabled_toolsets: List[str] = None,
enabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
disabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
quiet_mode: bool = False,
skip_tool_search_assembly: bool = False,
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""
Get tool definitions for model API calls with toolset-based filtering.
@@ -275,6 +276,11 @@ def get_tool_definitions(
enabled_toolsets: Only include tools from these toolsets.
disabled_toolsets: Exclude tools from these toolsets (if enabled_toolsets is None).
quiet_mode: Suppress status prints.
skip_tool_search_assembly: When True, return the pre-assembly tool list
(raw schemas for every enabled tool). Used internally by the
tool_search / tool_describe bridge handlers so they can read the
real catalog, not the already-collapsed one. Public callers should
leave this False.
Returns:
Filtered list of OpenAI-format tool definitions.
@@ -301,6 +307,7 @@ def get_tool_definitions(
registry._generation,
cfg_fp,
bool(os.environ.get("HERMES_KANBAN_TASK")),
bool(skip_tool_search_assembly),
)
cached = _tool_defs_cache.get(cache_key)
if cached is not None:
@@ -312,7 +319,8 @@ def get_tool_definitions(
# schemas are treated as read-only by all known callers.
return list(cached)
result = _compute_tool_definitions(enabled_toolsets, disabled_toolsets, quiet_mode)
result = _compute_tool_definitions(enabled_toolsets, disabled_toolsets, quiet_mode,
skip_tool_search_assembly=skip_tool_search_assembly)
if quiet_mode:
# Cache the freshly-computed list, but hand callers a shallow copy so
# downstream mutations (e.g. run_agent appending memory/LCM tool
@@ -327,9 +335,10 @@ def get_tool_definitions(
def _compute_tool_definitions(
enabled_toolsets: List[str] = None,
disabled_toolsets: List[str] = None,
enabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
disabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
quiet_mode: bool = False,
skip_tool_search_assembly: bool = False,
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Uncached implementation of :func:`get_tool_definitions`."""
# Determine which tool names the caller wants
@@ -481,9 +490,61 @@ def _compute_tool_definitions(
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — defensive
logger.warning("Schema sanitization skipped: %s", e)
# ── Tool Search (progressive disclosure) ────────────────────────────
# Conditionally replace MCP + plugin (non-core) tools with three bridge
# tools (tool_search / tool_describe / tool_call) when the deferrable
# surface exceeds the configured threshold (default 10% of context
# window). Core Hermes tools (toolsets._HERMES_CORE_TOOLS) are NEVER
# deferred. See tools/tool_search.py for full design notes.
#
# This is deliberately the last step before returning — sanitization
# has already normalized schemas, and the assembly is idempotent in
# case some caller invokes get_tool_definitions twice.
try:
from tools.tool_search import assemble_tool_defs, load_config as _load_ts_config
ts_cfg = _load_ts_config()
if not skip_tool_search_assembly and ts_cfg.enabled != "off":
context_length = _resolve_active_context_length()
assembly = assemble_tool_defs(
filtered_tools,
context_length=context_length,
config=ts_cfg,
)
if assembly.activated and not quiet_mode:
print(
f"🔎 Tool Search: {assembly.deferred_count} MCP/plugin tools deferred "
f"(~{assembly.deferred_tokens} tokens) behind tool_search/describe/call. "
f"Threshold ~{assembly.threshold_tokens} tokens."
)
filtered_tools = assembly.tool_defs
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — never break tool loading
logger.warning("Tool search assembly skipped: %s", e)
return filtered_tools
def _resolve_active_context_length() -> int:
"""Look up the active model's context length for the tool-search gate.
Returns 0 when the model can't be resolved — ``should_activate`` falls
back to a fixed token cutoff in that case.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load
cfg = _load() or {}
model_cfg = cfg.get("model") if isinstance(cfg.get("model"), dict) else {}
if not isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
model_cfg = {}
model_id = (model_cfg.get("model") or model_cfg.get("default") or "").strip()
if not model_id:
return 0
from agent.model_metadata import get_model_context_length
return int(get_model_context_length(model_id) or 0)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Could not resolve active context length: %s", e)
return 0
# =============================================================================
# handle_function_call (the main dispatcher)
# =============================================================================
@@ -747,6 +808,8 @@ def handle_function_call(
user_task: Optional[str] = None,
enabled_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None,
skip_pre_tool_call_hook: bool = False,
enabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
disabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None,
) -> str:
"""
Main function call dispatcher that routes calls to the tool registry.
@@ -760,6 +823,14 @@ def handle_function_call(
execute_code uses this list to determine which sandbox
tools to generate. Falls back to the process-global
``_last_resolved_tool_names`` for backward compat.
enabled_toolsets: The session's enabled toolsets. Used to scope the
Tool Search bridge catalog so ``tool_search`` /
``tool_describe`` / ``tool_call`` only see and invoke
tools the session was actually granted. ``None`` means
"no restriction" (the caller scopes to every toolset),
matching ``get_tool_definitions`` semantics.
disabled_toolsets: The session's disabled toolsets, applied as a
subtraction when scoping the bridge catalog.
Returns:
Function result as a JSON string.
@@ -767,6 +838,79 @@ def handle_function_call(
# Coerce string arguments to their schema-declared types (e.g. "42"→42)
function_args = coerce_tool_args(function_name, function_args)
# ── Tool Search bridge dispatch ──────────────────────────────────
# tool_search and tool_describe are pure catalog reads — handle them
# inline. tool_call is unwrapped to the underlying tool so that every
# downstream hook (pre/post, edit approval, guardrails) sees the real
# tool name, not the bridge.
_ts_mod = None
try:
from tools import tool_search as _ts_mod # noqa: F401
except Exception:
_ts_mod = None
if _ts_mod is not None and _ts_mod.is_bridge_tool(function_name):
try:
# Use skip_tool_search_assembly=True so we see the real catalog,
# not the already-collapsed bridge-only list (the bridge would
# otherwise be searching only itself).
#
# Scope the catalog to the session's toolsets so the bridge can
# only surface and invoke tools the session was actually granted.
# Without this, a restricted-toolset session (subagent, kanban
# worker, curated gateway session) would see and be able to call
# the entire process registry via the bridge. Passing the same
# enabled/disabled toolsets the session was assembled with keeps
# the deferred catalog identical to the deferrable subset of the
# session's own tool list, and avoids polluting the process-global
# _last_resolved_tool_names with out-of-scope tools.
current_defs = get_tool_definitions(
enabled_toolsets=enabled_toolsets,
disabled_toolsets=disabled_toolsets,
quiet_mode=True, skip_tool_search_assembly=True,
) or []
except Exception:
current_defs = []
if function_name == _ts_mod.TOOL_SEARCH_NAME:
return _ts_mod.dispatch_tool_search(function_args or {},
current_tool_defs=current_defs)
if function_name == _ts_mod.TOOL_DESCRIBE_NAME:
return _ts_mod.dispatch_tool_describe(function_args or {},
current_tool_defs=current_defs)
if function_name == _ts_mod.TOOL_CALL_NAME:
underlying_name, underlying_args, err = _ts_mod.resolve_underlying_call(function_args or {})
if err or not underlying_name:
return json.dumps({"error": err or "tool_call could not be resolved"},
ensure_ascii=False)
# Defense in depth: the underlying tool MUST be in the session's
# scoped deferrable catalog. resolve_underlying_call() only checks
# that the name is deferrable in the global registry; this gate
# additionally rejects any tool the session was not granted, so a
# restricted session can never invoke an out-of-scope tool through
# the bridge even if the catalog scoping above regressed.
_scoped_deferrable = _ts_mod.scoped_deferrable_names(current_defs)
if underlying_name not in _scoped_deferrable:
return json.dumps({
"error": (
f"'{underlying_name}' is not available in this session. "
"Use tool_search to find tools you can call."
),
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Recurse with the underlying tool. All hooks fire against the
# real tool name. The bridge is invisible to hooks by design.
return handle_function_call(
function_name=underlying_name,
function_args=underlying_args,
task_id=task_id,
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
session_id=session_id,
user_task=user_task,
enabled_tools=enabled_tools,
skip_pre_tool_call_hook=skip_pre_tool_call_hook,
enabled_toolsets=enabled_toolsets,
disabled_toolsets=disabled_toolsets,
)
try:
if function_name in _AGENT_LOOP_TOOLS:
return json.dumps({"error": f"{function_name} must be handled by the agent loop"})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ let
src = ../web;
npmDeps = pkgs.fetchNpmDeps {
inherit src;
hash = "sha256-6qhGuifHVtCeep1SiQdCUxBMr7UGhYpdMTvXhrQu/zA=";
hash = "sha256-HV0aISBVjwbGqDj8qQynSxGFrrZDzuYAW3D3lB/x3zo=";
};
npm = hermesNpmLib.mkNpmPassthru { folder = "web"; attr = "web"; pname = "hermes-web"; };
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ unknown templates get smart default text positioning based on their box_count.
import json
import os
import sys
import textwrap
from io import BytesIO
from pathlib import Path
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ Validates Excel DCF models for formula errors and common DCF mistakes
import sys
import json
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
class DCFModelValidator:
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import json
import time
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse
import urllib.error
API_KEY = os.environ.get("USDA_API_KEY", "DEMO_KEY")
BASE = "https://api.nal.usda.gov/fdc/v1"
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Usage: python3 chembl_target.py "EGFR" --min-pchembl 7 --limit 20
No external dependencies.
"""
import sys, json, time, argparse
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, urllib.error
import urllib.request, urllib.parse
BASE = "https://www.ebi.ac.uk/chembl/api/data"
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ ro5_screen.py — Batch Lipinski Ro5 + Veber screening via PubChem API.
Usage: python3 ro5_screen.py aspirin ibuprofen paracetamol
No external dependencies beyond stdlib.
"""
import sys, json, time, argparse
import urllib.request, urllib.parse, urllib.error
import sys, json, time
import urllib.request, urllib.parse
BASE = "https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/rest/pug/compound/name"
PROPS = "MolecularWeight,XLogP,HBondDonorCount,HBondAcceptorCount,RotatableBondCount,TPSA"
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import csv
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.parse
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import csv
import json
import os
import re
import sys

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