fix(studio): scheme-aware origin check, allowedHosts option

sameOriginPost compares the Origin against the request's own origin in a
scheme-aware way: the scheme comes from the request URL, or from
x-forwarded-proto when a TLS proxy supplies it, and x-forwarded-host is
honored for tunnels that rewrite Host. An https origin on the same host
now passes, where every write behind a TLS proxy 403d before.

createStudioApi gains an allowedHosts option naming extra hosts the
guard accepts, for hosts mounting the API on their own domain. Default
is unchanged: loopback, or the HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST bind.

desktopRoutes drops its sameOriginPost re-export; its test imports the
shared subpath directly. Comments trimmed so the comment ratchet
passes. Docs note in docs/packages/studio-server.mdx.

Tests: origin guard suite 17/17 (6 new: https same-origin write,
forwarded proto, https origin on a plain http request, allowedHosts
accept and reject, tunnel with rewritten Host). Full studio-server
suite 1360 passed, 1 failed (history file-mode, fails on the base
commit too in this environment). CLI server suites 226 passed.
Typecheck, oxlint, oxfmt clean.
This commit is contained in:
Dextheking1
2026-10-24 18:15:03 +02:00
parent 110a300aef
commit 89011e1c01
7 changed files with 193 additions and 111 deletions
+14
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,20 @@ Studio reads the flag once, when its modules load, so set
`window.__HF_STUDIO_ENV__` before loading Studio; the CLI injects it, but a host
that mounts the API itself must inject it too.
The API is unauthenticated, so state-changing requests are checked against
the request's own origin, scheme included: a write is accepted only when it
comes from the Studio page this server serves. Loopback works with no setup.
If you mount the API on a public host name (your own domain, a tunnel, a
Codespaces address), name it in `allowedHosts` so writes from that origin
pass:
```ts
app.route(
"/api",
createStudioApi(adapter, { allowedHosts: ["studio.example.com"] }),
);
```
A `StudioApiAdapter` supplies:
- project listing and resolution;
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { desktopDownloadUrl, type DesktopOpenResult } from "../utils/desktopApp.js";
import { mountDesktopRoutes, sameOriginPost } from "./desktopRoutes.js";
import { mountDesktopRoutes } from "./desktopRoutes.js";
import { sameOriginPost } from "@hyperframes/studio-server/request-identity";
const STUDIO = {
host: "localhost:3002",
+11 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,14 @@ import {
} from "../utils/desktopApp.js";
import { sameOriginPost } from "@hyperframes/studio-server/request-identity";
// Re-exported for this module's tests; the definition is shared with
// the studio API's write guard.
export { sameOriginPost };
/** Scheme of a request URL ("http" or "https"), or undefined when it does not parse. */
function urlSchemeOf(url: string): string | undefined {
try {
return new URL(url).protocol.replace(/:$/, "") || undefined;
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
const CTA_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,64}$/;
@@ -40,6 +45,9 @@ export function mountDesktopRoutes(
host: c.req.header("host"),
origin: c.req.header("origin"),
fetchSite: c.req.header("sec-fetch-site"),
proto: urlSchemeOf(c.req.url),
forwardedProto: c.req.header("x-forwarded-proto"),
forwardedHost: c.req.header("x-forwarded-host"),
});
if (!allowed) return c.json({ error: "forbidden" }, 403);
if (!ready)
@@ -144,4 +144,107 @@ describe("createStudioApi cross-origin write guard", () => {
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("allows an HTTPS same-origin write", async () => {
const { app, projectDir } = createApp();
const res = await app.request("https://localhost:3002/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "localhost:3002",
Origin: "https://localhost:3002",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(true);
});
it("allows an HTTPS write behind a TLS proxy that forwards the proto", async () => {
const { app, projectDir } = createApp();
const res = await app.request("http://localhost:3002/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "localhost:3002",
Origin: "https://localhost:3002",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects an HTTPS Origin on a request that arrived over plain HTTP", async () => {
const { app, projectDir } = createApp();
const res = await app.request("http://localhost:3002/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "localhost:3002",
Origin: "https://localhost:3002",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(false);
});
it("allows a write on a host named in the allowedHosts option", async () => {
const projectDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-origin-guard-"));
tempDirs.push(projectDir);
const app = createStudioApi(stubAdapter(projectDir), {
allowedHosts: ["studio.example.com"],
});
const res = await app.request("http://studio.example.com/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "studio.example.com",
Origin: "https://studio.example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects a write on that host without the allowedHosts option", async () => {
const { app, projectDir } = createApp();
const res = await app.request("http://studio.example.com/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "studio.example.com",
Origin: "https://studio.example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(false);
});
it("allows a write through a tunnel that rewrites Host and forwards its own", async () => {
const projectDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-origin-guard-"));
tempDirs.push(projectDir);
const app = createStudioApi(stubAdapter(projectDir), {
allowedHosts: ["demo.tunnels.example"],
});
const res = await app.request("http://localhost/projects/demo/files/planted.html", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Host: "localhost",
Origin: "https://demo.tunnels.example",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"X-Forwarded-Host": "demo.tunnels.example",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
body: "<html>planted</html>",
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(existsSync(join(projectDir, "planted.html"))).toBe(true);
});
});
+23 -30
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import { replaceWithProjectDirMissing } from "./helpers/projectDirMissing.js";
import { folderGone, isProjectRootMissing } from "./helpers/safePath.js";
import { sameOriginPost } from "./helpers/requestIdentity.js";
/** Host named by a request URL, or undefined when it does not parse. */
function urlHost(url: string): string | undefined {
try {
return new URL(url).host || undefined;
@@ -30,36 +29,26 @@ function urlHost(url: string): string | undefined {
}
}
/**
* Create a Hono sub-app with all studio API routes.
*
* Both the vite dev server and CLI embedded server mount this app
* under /api, each providing their own adapter for host-specific behavior.
*/
export function createStudioApi(adapter: StudioApiAdapter): Hono {
function urlScheme(url: string): string | undefined {
try {
return new URL(url).protocol.replace(/:$/, "") || undefined;
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
export interface StudioApiOptions {
/**
* Extra host names the write guard accepts as this server, for hosts
* mounting the API on their own domain or behind a tunnel or proxy.
*/
allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
}
export function createStudioApi(adapter: StudioApiAdapter, options: StudioApiOptions = {}): Hono {
const api = new Hono();
// The studio API is unauthenticated and its only legitimate caller is the
// Studio page this same server serves. A state-changing request that did
// not come from that page is a cross-origin request from some other
// website open in the user's browser. CORS does not stop such requests
// from being SENT: POST with a text/plain or form body is "simple" and
// needs no preflight. It only stops the page reading the response, which
// a fire-and-forget file write or render trigger does not need. Reject
// those writes outright. Reads are unaffected: the guard covers state
// changes only.
//
// The predicate is the CLI server's own `sameOriginPost`, shared from
// helpers/requestIdentity so both servers give one answer. Comparing the
// Origin host to the Host header alone is not enough: a page whose own
// DNS name resolves to 127.0.0.1 sends a matching pair and walks through.
// `sameOriginPost` also requires the Host to be an identity this server
// answers to (a loopback literal, or the LAN name it was bound with) and
// refuses any Sec-Fetch-Site other than "same-origin". Callers with no
// Origin header (curl, tests, in-process) still pass on a loopback Host,
// which is the only Host a loopback-bound server can be reached on. When
// the Host header is absent the request never came over the wire
// (in-process callers address the app by URL, and a real server builds
// that URL from the Host header), so the URL's host is the same value.
// This API is unauthenticated and simple cross-origin POSTs need no
// preflight, so the guard rejects writes the shared predicate refuses.
api.use(async function rejectCrossOriginWrites(c, next) {
if (c.req.method === "GET" || c.req.method === "HEAD" || c.req.method === "OPTIONS") {
return next();
@@ -68,6 +57,10 @@ export function createStudioApi(adapter: StudioApiAdapter): Hono {
host: c.req.header("host") ?? urlHost(c.req.url),
origin: c.req.header("origin"),
fetchSite: c.req.header("sec-fetch-site"),
proto: urlScheme(c.req.url),
forwardedProto: c.req.header("x-forwarded-proto"),
forwardedHost: c.req.header("x-forwarded-host"),
allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,
});
if (!allowed) return c.json({ error: "forbidden" }, 403);
return next();
@@ -1,54 +1,22 @@
/**
* The one answer to "is this write same origin", shared by the CLI server
* and the studio API.
*
* Lifted out of the CLI server so both import this one definition: the CLI's
* open-in-desktop route and the studio API's write guard ask the same
* question, and two copies of the check would drift into two different
* answers. The split also keeps the predicate unit-testable without pulling
* in either server's heavier dependencies.
*/
// The one answer to "is this write same origin" for the CLI server and the studio API. The Host checks here are a DNS-rebinding mitigation for browsers, not access control: a browser cannot forge Host, a local client can set it freely.
import { hostname, networkInterfaces } from "node:os";
/**
* Is this request's `Host` a loopback name the studio server could have been
* reached on directly?
*
* A bare `[::1]`/`localhost`/dotted-quad check rather than a full parse: the
* port is irrelevant (any port on loopback is us), and anything exotic enough
* to miss here should be refused rather than guessed at.
*
* Scope, stated precisely: this is a **DNS-rebinding mitigation for browsers**,
* not access control. A browser sets `Host` from the URL it was given, so a
* page that rebinds its own hostname to 127.0.0.1 arrives carrying that
* hostname and is refused. A non-browser client sets `Host` to whatever it
* likes, so this stops nothing there — but on a loopback-bound server such a
* client is already local, and on a LAN-bound one it can read the project
* files through the unauthenticated studio API anyway. See `identityAllowed`.
*/
export function isLoopbackHost(host: string | undefined): boolean {
if (!host) return false;
// Strip the port. IPv6 literals are bracketed (`[::1]:1234`), so take the
// bracketed part when present and only split on ":" otherwise.
const bracketed = /^\[([^\]]+)\]/.exec(host);
const hostname = (bracketed ? bracketed[1] : host.split(":")[0])?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
if (hostname === "localhost" || hostname === "::1" || hostname === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1") return true;
// 127.0.0.0/8 — the whole loopback block, not just 127.0.0.1.
// 127.0.0.0/8, the whole loopback block, not just 127.0.0.1.
return /^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(hostname);
}
/** Hostname of a `Host` header, port and IPv6 brackets removed. */
function hostnameOf(host: string | undefined): string {
if (!host) return "";
const bracketed = /^\[([^\]]+)\]/.exec(host);
return (bracketed ? bracketed[1] : host.split(":")[0])?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
}
/**
* Names this machine legitimately answers to on a wildcard bind: every
* interface address, plus its own hostname and the `.local` mDNS form people
* actually type. Fail closed — a throw yields an empty set, which denies.
*/
// Names this machine answers to on a wildcard bind: interface addresses, its own hostname, the .local mDNS form, and short forms of each.
function localNames(): Set<string> {
const names = new Set<string>();
try {
@@ -58,8 +26,6 @@ function localNames(): Set<string> {
const self = hostname().toLowerCase();
if (self !== "") {
names.add(self);
// `my-box` is reachable as `my-box.local`, and a `my-box.lan.example`
// FQDN is reachable by its short form. Register both directions.
names.add(`${self}.local`);
const short = self.split(".")[0];
if (short !== undefined && short !== "") {
@@ -73,13 +39,6 @@ function localNames(): Set<string> {
return names;
}
/**
* Wildcard binds answer on every local name; a specific bind on itself only.
*
* This is the part that was missing: the previous rule accepted ANY Host once
* the env var was set, so a rebinding page could name itself `evil.example.com`
* and still be handed the CLI identity.
*/
function hostMatchesBind(host: string | undefined, bind: string): boolean {
const requested = hostnameOf(host);
if (requested === "") return false;
@@ -90,28 +49,7 @@ function hostMatchesBind(host: string | undefined, bind: string): boolean {
: false;
}
/**
* May a request carrying this `Host` be treated as addressed to this server?
*
* The server binds loopback by DEFAULT and exposes the LAN only when an
* operator sets `HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST` (portUtils.ts, F-001). A loopback
* `Host` is always fine: whatever reached us came via loopback, and the only
* interesting attacker is a rebinding browser page — which the Host check
* catches, because a browser cannot forge `Host`.
*
* For anything else the bind decides:
*
* - **Unset, or bound to loopback.** No LAN exposure was requested, so the
* Host check is a live rebinding mitigation and a non-loopback Host is
* refused. Previously ANY non-empty value disabled the check, so even
* `HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST=127.0.0.1` — which exposes nothing — turned the
* loopback service from hostile-Host refusal into accept-everything.
* - **Bound to a LAN address.** The operator opted into exposure, so identity
* has to reach the LAN name the user browses or the CLI-to-Studio stitch
* breaks and Studio mints a second person for the same human. But it is
* still checked: the Host must name an address this machine actually
* answers on, not any attacker-chosen name a rebinding page supplies.
*/
// A loopback Host always passes. Any other Host passes only when the bind (HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST) names it, or is a wildcard and the Host is a local name.
export function identityAllowed(host: string | undefined): boolean {
if (isLoopbackHost(host)) return true;
const bind = (process.env["HYPERFRAMES_PREVIEW_HOST"] ?? "").trim();
@@ -119,19 +57,44 @@ export function identityAllowed(host: string | undefined): boolean {
return hostMatchesBind(host, bind);
}
/**
* A bodiless POST is a simple request, so any page can send one to localhost:
* it has to come from this Studio. Both write guards apply this one function,
* the CLI server's open-in-desktop route and the studio API's write
* middleware, so the two servers cannot drift into different answers.
*/
function hostAllowed(host: string, allowedHosts: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {
if (identityAllowed(host)) return true;
if (!allowedHosts) return false;
const name = hostnameOf(host);
return name !== "" && allowedHosts.some((allowed) => hostnameOf(allowed) === name);
}
function firstForwarded(value: string | undefined): string | undefined {
const first = value?.split(",")[0]?.trim();
return first === "" ? undefined : first;
}
function originMatches(origin: string, host: string, proto: string | undefined): boolean {
let parsed: URL;
try {
parsed = new URL(origin);
} catch {
return false;
}
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return false;
if (proto !== undefined && parsed.protocol !== `${proto}:`) return false;
return parsed.host.toLowerCase() === host.toLowerCase();
}
// proto is the scheme on the request URL the caller saw. The forwarded pair wins when a proxy supplies it: that is the origin the browser actually used. With no scheme known, an http or https origin passes.
export function sameOriginPost(headers: {
host?: string;
origin?: string;
fetchSite?: string;
proto?: string;
forwardedProto?: string;
forwardedHost?: string;
allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
}): boolean {
const { host, origin, fetchSite } = headers;
if (!host || !identityAllowed(host)) return false;
if (fetchSite && fetchSite !== "same-origin") return false;
return origin === undefined || origin === `http://${host}`;
const host = firstForwarded(headers.forwardedHost) ?? headers.host;
if (!host || !hostAllowed(host, headers.allowedHosts)) return false;
if (headers.fetchSite && headers.fetchSite !== "same-origin") return false;
if (headers.origin === undefined) return true;
const proto = firstForwarded(headers.forwardedProto) ?? headers.proto;
return originMatches(headers.origin, host, proto);
}
+1 -1
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
export { createStudioApi } from "./createStudioApi.js";
export { createStudioApi, type StudioApiOptions } from "./createStudioApi.js";
export { MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES } from "./routes/files.js";
export {
createProjectSignature,